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Although participatory budgeting (PB) was introduced in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2005, it 
has yet to be widely adopted. While PB has great potential to enhance citizen 
participation in the democratic process, little academic research has focused on the utility 
of PB as a mechanism for citizen empowerment in the region. The purpose of this case 
study was to gain further understanding of the role of civil society in educating and 
empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA in Lagos State, Nigeria to participate effectively 
in budgetary decision-making processes. The data were gathered from 15 semi-
structured, one-on-one interviews of purposefully selected participants that included adult 
citizens of Ijede, government officials, politicians, and representatives of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) connected to the budget process, two follow-up 
focus groups with participants, and analysis of government budgetary documents. Using 
Avritzer’s theory of participatory institutions as the foundation, the study explored 
stakeholder perceptions of how citizens can be effectively educated and empowered to 
participate in the PB process. The data revealed the fragility of PB when local 
government officials suspended the process because other financial demands were 
considered more expedient than PB, a situation made possible in the absence of a legal 
framework institutionalizing the process. Another major theme uncovered is that PB must 
engage community-based organizations to be effective. Positive social change in the form 
of enhanced citizen participation in the political process can come about in Nigeria if PB 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study  
As a political institution in Nigeria, participatory budgeting (PB) has not attracted 
sufficient interest among the socially disadvantaged who stand to benefit the most from 
being involved in political discourses (Osmani, 2007). The decision-making processes in 
the region, most of which are under democratically elected governments, exclude the 
involvement of several classes of citizens whose lives the decisions affect (Bratton, 
2012). The political class appears unconcerned about such excluded citizens. They 
consider such individuals as commoners and unintelligent, lacking in the sophistication of 
governance, and unworthy of the power to make public policy decisions (Bratton, 2012; 
Leduka, 2009).  
Participatory democracy has grown in recent times, especially because of the PB 
experience of Porto Alegre, Brazil.  In the 1980s, the opposition of civil society in Brazil 
to years of military rule was the formation of the formation of political movements, 
which metamorphosed into political parties such as the Worker’s Party, and the Brazilian 
Democratic Movement. In 1985, democratic governance returned the new parliament 
passed a constitution guarantying citizen access to health care, education and housing 
(Avritzer, 2009; Wampler, 2012a). Under the government guaranteed access to social 
services, federal, state and municipal administrations began experimenting with various 
processes that permit citizen participation in public policy decision-making. The 
Worker’s Party introduced PB to allocate resources to Brazil’s low-income communities 






Participatory democracy redirects power away from the highest level of 
governance and presents new opportunities for those at the bottom of the social ladder to 
have a say in governance. It does this because it is a bottom-up approach to democratic 
governance that places control in the hands of ordinary citizens (Roussopoulos, 2005). 
Participatory budgeting is an annual process that allows citizens in organized groups to 
participate voluntarily in decision-making concerning parts of local budgets. It has 
proven to be the quintessential example of participatory democracy (Pateman, 2012).  
The World Bank and the United Nations have promoted PB, which has become a 
universal phenomenon present in hundreds of cities and local governments around the 
world (The World Bank, n.d.; United Nations Democracy Fund, 2014). All citizens, 
especially the grassroots and the poor who are remote from political leadership, should 
have decision-making opportunities in matters that influence their lives.  
The federal government of Nigeria, prompted by the United Nations, encouraged 
local governments to begin experimenting with PB (DESA, 2005). The experimentation 
represents an excellent opportunity in the subfield of participatory democracy to explore 
an emerging research area concerning the factors that best facilitate public involvement 
and best practices in the PB process (Avritzer, 2010; Goldfrank, 2007; Wampler, 2012a). 
This study leverages this opportunity by undertaking a case study of PB in Ijede Local 
Development Area (LCDA) of Lagos State, Nigeria.  
The study explored the role of civil society and government in fostering the skills 
and resources necessary to encourage grassroots participation via PB. Without such 





that affect their lives. This is of particular importance for the relevance of governance to 
ordinary citizens.  
Citizens determine the projects to be executed under PB because they know what 
they want, being the direct beneficiaries of the decisions in which they participate. The 
ultimate benefit to the citizenry is that politicians give priority to the desires of the 
people, as the ruling class does not determine matters for the people. To this end, the 
people inspire government projects that meet their needs. Having ordinary citizens decide 
on project priorities makes governance directly relevant to meet the peoples’ needs. In 
Nigeria, there is a gulf between the government and the governed, which could be 
bridged through a democratic institution such as PB. 
In the next section of this introductory chapter, the background of this study on 
PB, and its roots in participatory democracy as exemplified through PB are examined. 
Following this, I present the research problem that this study interrogates and follow the 
examination with the explanation of the research methodology for the study. Next, I 
present my research questions with the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, which 
drive this academic analysis. In the final section, I narrate the potential contributions of 
this study to the body of knowledge in participatory democracy and PB. 
Background of the Study 
To achieve the overarching objectives of PB, citizens need to play key roles of 
providing grassroots information emerging from the community and generating native, 
intuitive ideas to the government for the enactment of public policies in the best interest 
of the public (Michels & de Graaf, 2010). Thus, the citizens serve as informants to the 





In their study of PB in the Netherlands, Michels and de Graaf (2010) suggested 
that participatory democracy might be less successful in developed economies where 
representative democracies have been established for several centuries. In contrast with 
older democracies, Avritzer (2010) posited that because of PB, participatory democracy 
has recorded impressive success in Brazilian cities, especially Porto Alegre. Michels and 
de Graaf (2010) and Donaghy (2010) observed that voting pattern and numbers at general 
elections neither tell the whole story of protestations of citizens nor express judgment 
they pass on policy issues. After elections, there is the general feeling of apathy among 
the electorates, causing a gradual erosion of grassroots interest and reduced voter turnouts 
at elections from year to year. In response to this state of apathy, governments, with the 
encouragement from the United Nations and the World Bank, have turned to 
participatory democracy through PB.  
Participatory budgeting encourages participation of the electorate at the local level 
in decision-making on issues of direct concern to their daily economic and social lives 
(Avritzer, 2010; Dobson, 2005; Michels & de Graaf, 2010). Avritzer observed that with 
PB, the grassroots of Brazil gained some control of and access to public services. 
Participatory budgeting provided the forum at which the government and the citizens 
interacted to undertake significant socio-economic decisions. As Donaghy (2010) 
observed, the grassroots developed active influence once they had shared points of 
interest around which they could organize themselves to present their needs to the 
government. Consequently, the people learned the democratic process by engaging in 
various purposeful and deliberate actions that constitute their democratic activities and 





the political class, acting as the watchdog against the excesses of government officials. 
The people reciprocate the ceding of some political space by paying taxes, because they 
know such government revenues would be put to judicious use for which there would be 
proper accountability. 
In Brazil, civil society, which included NGOs, neighborhood associations, 
business communities and professional organizations, formed social structures that 
supported participation (Avritzer, 2010; Donaghy, 2010). Through the social structures, 
the citizens learned to engage in the social discourses, which provided the springboard for 
informed participation in decision-making processes. The system of political education 
by doing and practicing democracy encouraged the people to recognize the importance of 
their input and the protection of their stake in the government. Through the process of 
learning, the citizens defied the belief that the grassroots lacked the sophistication to 
comprehend the rudiments of governance and the confidence to get involved in political 
processes as participants (Avritzer, 2010; Michels & de Graaf, 2010).  
The training provided by NGOs contributed in no small way to the development 
of novice grassroots organizations, which acquired the necessary skills to become 
politically perceptive participants (Avritzer, 2010; Michels & de Graaf, 2010). As 
Acharya, Lavalle, and Houtzager (2004) found, community-based associations are more 
likely to participate effectively in local issues than advocacy NGOs, most of which fail to 
empower the people with the skills necessary for participation. As Michels and de Graaf 
(2010) observed, politicians recognized the knowledge and ideas that the grassroots 






Participatory budgeting has been successful because elected officials yielded 
some control over political decisions to the grassroots, by providing the necessary legal 
framework that institutionalized the process (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). 
Furthermore, civil society and community leaders recognized the need to organize the 
citizens at the lowest levels of human assembly for the opportunity to be part of the 
decision-making machinery of the government (Avritzer, 2010).  
The findings of Acharya et al. (2004) set the backdrop for this postulation but 
pointed out that civil society organizations (CSOs) such as the NGOs tend to be 
“institutionally embedded actors” that are closer to the government than with those they 
are set out to represent (p. 41).  Bherer (2010) held that the state could change the status 
quo and empower the economically disadvantaged by strengthening neighborhood civic 
groups. Participatory budgeting created avenues for social groups, hitherto excluded from 
decision-making, to get involved in public decision-making (Acharya, Lavalle, & 
Houtzager, 2004). 
As in any corrupt environment, the poorest people in Nigeria suffer most from the 
repercussions of corruption. Corruption eliminates, or at best, weakens the social supports 
for the poor and deprives them of the knowledge, skills, and abilities to confront the 
ravaging effects of corruption (Essia & Yearoo, 2009). Dobson (2005) posited that 
without a voice or representation from their socioeconomic groups, the grassroots are an 
excluded group in most democracies. However, when the grassroots get involved with a 
participatory process, corrupt practices are noticeable to the grassroots, leaving political 
officials to submit to embracing governance that is more transparent. Bherer (2010) 





civil society to dialog and collaborate, but without excluding the rights of civil society to 
protest. Civil society organizations could be critical of the state without being 
confrontational, but they could form partnerships with the state for the benefit of the 
community as a whole (Essia & Yearoo, 2009). It is possible for average people to learn 
governance by participation as the educational benefits make for a population with a high 
sense of civic responsibility (Bherer, 2010). A sign of the link between policymakers and 
the poor in the society is visible when citizens can hold politicians accountable for public 
spending and other issues that affect the poor and the vulnerable in the society.  
There have been few studies on the educational content of the training civil 
society provides or should offer grassroots populations to allow them to participate in a 
meaningful way in PB in sub-Saharan countries (Conyers, 2007; Dobson, 2005; Leduka, 
2009; Matovu & Mumvuma, 2008). Furthermore, there are very few published research 
materials in the professional literature about PB in Nigeria.  Adesopo (2011) is one 
author who has addressed PB in Nigeria. Through the literature on PB, Adesopo 
identified some difficulties that are likely to confront the process in Nigeria. These 
inhibitors include the lack of understanding on the part of stakeholders of how democracy 
works, misunderstanding about the functions and obligations of stakeholders. Other 
inhibitors include poor oversight and evaluation of projects, transparency and 
accountability issues, poor communication, and inadequate resources.  
The article fell short of identifying ways to overcome these shortcomings in the 
context of the Nigerian space. It is necessary to examine the presence of these gaps in the 





by strengthening PB. Therefore, this study aims to gain further understanding of the 
issues to which CSOs need to pay more attention in educating grassroots for effective PB. 
Problem Statement  
It was not known whether and how civil society empowers citizens to participate 
in the PB process. Specifically, was is not known whether and how civil society can 
empower citizens of Ijede LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria to participate in the PB process. 
Participatory budgeting is still a practice at the fringes of democratic development in 
most of Sub-Saharan Africa despite its introduction in the region in 2005, to encourage 
the attainment of the millennium development goals of the United Nations (Bertucci, 
2008).  
The failure of PB, a soft introductory process to participatory democracy, has 
been due primarily to poor implementation that did not embrace local dynamics such as, 
the complexity of the process of rule-making, the role of women, transportation, cultural 
values, and perennial violence in the slums (Avritzer, 2010; Avritzer, 2012). In 
Pateman’s (2012) view, citizens soon develop the knowledge, skills, and sophistication of 
governance if they have the opportunity to participate in the decision-making processes 
that affect their lives (Osmani, 2007). What stands in the way of democratic participation 
by the grassroots is the lack of skills and the confidence to engage politicians and 
professionals that are more knowledgeable. It remains unknown how civil society might 
better integrate and empower citizens of Ijede LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria to 
participate in the PB process. Participatory budgeting designs work best when they are 
organic, and they are not constrained by foreign ideas that have no bearing on the realities 





participants to understand from their perspectives the particularities that need to be 
considered in Ijede for PB to yield its desired objectives.  
The Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to gain further understanding of the 
role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to 
participate effectively in budgetary decision-making processes. The data for this study 
were collected from 15 semi-structured one-on-one interviews of purposefully selected 
participants that included adult citizens of Ijede, government officials, politicians, and 
representatives of NGOs. Participants partook in focus group discussions at the end of the 
one-on-one interview sessions. For data triangulation, government documents of past 
budgets were reviewed. 
Research Questions  
The research questions drive the qualitative methodological approach to gain 
further understanding of the role of CSOs in educating and empowering the citizens of 
Ijede LCDA to participate in PB. Thus, the following research questions probed the 
subjective understanding of those who have been directly involved in the PB process at 
the site of inquiry: 
RQ1:   What roles do nongovernmental organizations play in the design structure of the 
PB process at Ijede LCDA? 
RQ2: What resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at 
Ijede LCDA?  
RQ3:  What local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business 





RQ4: What sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected 
projects? 
These research questions were designed to extract from the participants the 
necessary components if citizens were to have the ability to engage with the government 
over budgetary allocations and spending. To answer these questions, I used interview 
questions to interrogate the roles of NGOs, if any, in empowering citizens to acquire the 
necessary skills to engage the government effectively. 
Research question 1 addressed the problem statement by investigating the roles of 
NGOs, if any, in working with the government to design a PB process that enabled the 
citizens to participate in, and benefit from, the objectives of interacting with the 
government for decision-making purposes. The question also probed the means by which 
NGOs engaged with the citizens in order to empower them. Research question 2 
unraveled, through the intuitive perception of the participants, the activities CSOs needed 
to embark on in order to empower the citizens to participate in the PB process at Ijede 
LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria. 
Financial resources are hardly adequate for local or municipal administrations to 
fund PB to meet the desires of the citizens. Idemudia (2009) conjectured that some 
corporate organizations do reinvest in the communities by providing funds, materials, and 
equipment toward the execution of community projects. Idemudia suggested NGOs, in 
their advocacy roles, interact with corporations to participate in community projects. 
Research question 3 explored, through the experiences of the participants, the underlying 
factors that encouraged corporations to fill the resources gap experienced by 





community needs. Such intervention is essential to the success of PB. Research question 
4 also explored the sustainability strategies the government could consider to ensure 
citizen-selected projects are completed and maintained. This research question could 
potentially lead to policy changes requiring NGOs to pressure the government to consider 
some sustainability strategy for a stronger PB process. 
Together, these research questions provided the means to collect relevant data 
through semi-structured interview questions, follow up questions, and focus group 
discussions. The data collected allowed me to gain a deeper understanding of the role of 
civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate 
effectively in budgetary decision-making. 
Theoretical Framework 
The foundations of this study hang on the two frameworks of participatory 
institutions, and the conceptual framework of PB. The frameworks serve to explicate the 
praxis of PB and serve as the prism to stratify the interplay of elements that drive the 
process. 
The Theory of Participatory Institutions 
The main theoretical framework of this study is the theory of participatory 
institutions as posited by Avritzer (2009). The theory connects the tripartite relationship 
between “civil society, the political society, and institutional design” (p. 1). Avritzer 
(2009) argued that the three bottom-up approaches to democratic institutions emerging 
from Brazil’s democratic governance did not always create the much touted active public 
engagement and equitable distribution of public services. Avritzer (2009) posited that the 





cities of Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, Salvador, and Sao Paulo. The precondition that 
permitted these results was the presence and the nexus between civil society, the political 
society, and institutional design.  
The Workers’ Party introduced participatory budgeting to Porto Alegre, Brazil in 
1989. The party had won the mayoral election on the backdrop of political legacies of 
corruption and discrimination against the poor (Wampler, 2012c). The party promised the 
kind of democracy in which the poor could participate and to alter the pattern of public 
spending to include the development of poor neighborhoods.  The Workers’ Party met an 
empty municipal treasury when it took over the administration of Porto Alegre (Acharya, 
Lavalle, & Houtzager, 2004). In keeping with its electoral manifesto of giving citizens 
direct involvement in governance and to reverse the pattern of concentrating social 
programs in middleclass neighborhoods, the concept of PB came into being (Abers, 
2001). 
Participatory Budgeting 
Participatory budgeting is a democratic process that provides the opportunity for 
the electorates to interact with the government when the constituents actively engage in 
decision-making on fiscal planning priorities from the perspective of the voters. 
Electorates can develop political sophistication through regular interaction and contacts 
in public discourses with the government and bureaucrats (Fischer, 2012; Pateman, 
2012). Participatory budgeting programs have the hallmark of transparent governance in 
that citizens are directly involved in the allocation of resources among competing 





For PB to be successful, there must be the willingness on the part of the 
government to respect the budget priorities of its citizens. The community organizing 
activities of civil society in educating and informing the electorates on procedural and 
legal matters need the support and encouragement of the government (Grajzl & Murrell, 
2009). Since PB involves fiscal issues, the government must be transparent in providing 
the citizens with its finance and policy guidelines. In Porto Alegre, the organizers 
provided transportation and childcare facilities for those who may be inhibited from 
participating because of the absence of these incentives (Wampler, 2012b). 
In participatory spaces, civil society is attentive to the actions and nuances of the 
political society, as the two have direct exchanges often in the full view of the citizenry 
(Avritzer, 2009). With legal support for the process, these direct exchanges become 
institutionalized over time and the citizens develop expectations of positive outcomes 
from the relationship as civil society introduces broader and pertinent issues into the PB 
arena. Thus, political society in PB spaces sees the formation of citizen agendas through 
the activities of civil society actors. Civil society could contribute to the restoration of 
social interactions among the poor and the middleclass, just as it did in Latin America 
(Peruzzotti, 2012).  
The advancement of citizen participation occurs under purposefully designed 
institutional arrangements such as PB (Avritzer, 2009). Where there is the nexus between 
civil society, the political society, and purposeful institutional design, PB is capable of 
rebalancing power between a disconnected central government and the grassroots. The 
tripartite network could evolve among the citizenry, the awareness of rights to certain 





to the PB process (Abers, 2001; Baierle, 2005; Wampler, 2012a). Civil society has been 
responsible for the realignment of social networks among the poor such that the political 
society could no longer ignore their contributions to public policy decisions (Avritzer, 
2009). 
The important design feature relevant to PB is the enhancement of the potential 
benefits of doing away with the top-down approach of the political society and 
establishing a level or bottom-up approach to decision making. Thus, institutional design 
would focus on direct communication between the political society and the community 
(Avritzer, 2009). 
Operational Definitions 
The following are the operational definitions that are germane to the contextual 
corpus of this study:   
Civil society, or civil society organizations (CSOs): consist of nonpolitical 
organized social formations, which exist based on the rule of law and civility, 
representing social movements and civic activism, with all activities outside the ambit of 
government. Civil society organizations include charitable organizations, professional 
associations, and voluntary organizations (Kaldor, 2003). 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): are a subset of CSOs that are not 
politically partisan or private, but their purpose is not to challenge institutions of 
governance but to cooperate with the government as advocates of the citizens (Clarke, 
1998). Their activities are humanitarian without criminal purpose. As the name suggests, 
they do not make any profit, but they provide voluntary services to communities, groups, 





religious organization, professional, and academic institutions that are not profit making. 
For the purpose of this study, NGOs include community-based organizations (CBOs) that 
mobilize and organize communities towards shared goals. 
Grassroots: refers to any group of people with limited access to social goods, 
services, and government institutions (Willie, Ridini, & Willard, 2008). Grassroots 
includes and is interchangeable with excluded people who are entrenched in impenetrable 
existence in a closed network with others of similar characteristics with poverty been the 
strong connection between them (Catell, 2004). Grassroots also include the poor who, 
according to Gordon (2005), are those who lack opportunities and the economic ability to 
live a dignified existence. Consequently, the poor lack the capacity to partake in basic 
societal engagements such as public discourses. They lack adequate means to feed or 
clothe their families, and they are powerless and insecure without healthcare and 
educational opportunities (Catell, 2004). Environmentally, the poor live on the fringe of 
existence without water or sanitation. When they have jobs, the poor are poorly paid and 
unable to take adequate care of their families (Gordon, 2005). The cause of poverty is not 
natural phenomenon but structural deficiency of equitable distribution of resources 
(Pearce, 2006). 
Nature of the Study 
Design of the Study 
 The choice of a research method depends on its adequacy and relevance to the 
research question and the purpose of the study (Yin, 2009; Locke, 1989).  Yin (2009) 
presented the definitional foundation for this case study as the firsthand inquiry into 





gathering of multifaceted data at the locus of inquiry. Yin (2009) embraced interviewing, 
review of documents, direct observations, scrutiny of artifacts, and participant 
observation as the data collection strategies available to qualitative researchers. The 
appropriate data collection strategies for this study were in-depth, semi-structured, open-
ended one-on-one interviews; focus group discussions; and the review of government 
records (Seidman, 2006; Yin, 2012).  
As a qualitative approach, interviewing is best suited to investigate a process such 
as PB through the subjective understanding of those who have been directly involved in 
the process. According to Ferrarotti (1981), the best way to understand a sociopolitical 
process such as PB is through the first-hand experiences of the organizers of, and the 
participants in the process. As participants provide answers to interview questions, they 
ruminate about events to construct realities through their experiences (Yin, 2012).  
The lives and professional activities of the organizers of PB and the participants 
in the programs form the content of the process of PB. Interviewing isolates the 
individual experiences of the participants from the collective experiences of others thus 
engendering context and diversity of participant perspectives (Ferrarotti, 1983). Seidman 
(2006) further asserted that interviewing is as necessary, as it is a sufficient strategy of 
inquiry. I used interviews as a means to understand the effectiveness of the activities of 
civil society in the process of PB in Ijede LCDA. The participant selection method was 
purposive, in an effort to select individuals who could provide specific, relevant, and rich 
information.  
The study population consisted of citizens of Ijede LCDA, who were civil 





whom had previously participated in PB at the local level. The sample size consisted of 
15 individuals representing each of the aforementioned groups. The sample size (n = 15) 
was sufficient to take care of attrition, and according to Marshall and Rossman (2011), 
the diversity of the population group required a large sample, which enhanced 
transferability. The participants fulfilled the qualitative research paradigm of using 
narratives to provide meaning and trends of the research phenomenon (Hancock & 
Algozinne, 2011; Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009). 
Yin (2009) recommended the use of some theoretical basis to provide a strategy 
to the design including screening of the case to study, selection of participants data 
collection, and data analysis and interpretation. This guidance provided the source of data 
for this study. Data were collected from citizens, government officials, active NGOs, and 
CBOs. Purposively selecting participants from these groups was appropriate and 
consistent with the purpose of the research. The theory of participatory institutions and 
the concept of PB recognize each group as a unit of investigation (Avritzer, 2009; Klein, 
Dansereau, & Hall, 1994).  
The interviews provided thick data that I used to describe and analyze the 
implementation of PB in Ijede LCDA at the time of the study (Hancock & Algozinne, 
2011; Yin, 2009). The design provided the best-fit alignment between the research 
questions, the methodology, and the conceptual and theoretical frameworks. The design 
also aligned with the sampling method, sample size, the role of the researcher, and ethical 
issues (Endicott, 2010). I submit that interviewing provided the best-fit alignment 
between the research question and the qualitative method to understand the particular 





framework sought to provide description and meaning specific to a given population 
without the intention of applying the results to groups or settings outside the study group 
(Hancock & Algozinne, 2011).  
Assumptions 
There were four basic assumptions of this study. First, the study assumed the 
current process of PB had not sufficiently yielded the desired results the sponsors of the 
process, that is, the United Nations, anticipated; hence the need to strengthen the process. 
The 2014 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) Reports indicated that despite global 
improvements in all the seven goals, Nigeria still lagged behind in many of the areas 
including poverty and infrastructure development (United Nations, 2014). The MDGs 
included: (a) eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; (b) the achievement of universal 
primary education; (c) gender equality and empowerment for women; (d) reduction of 
child mortality; (e) improvement of maternal health; (f) combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, 
and other diseases; (g) ensuring environmental sustainability; and (h) the development of 
a global partnership for development. 
Participant selection was purpursive to capture the perspectives of those who have 
had prior experiences of PB. This study assumed these individuals had much to 
contribute to the study because of their prior involvements. This study assumed that the 
participants had good memory and accurate recall of event sequences, context and 
contents, such that the information they gave was truthful. The categories of participants 
were those with sufficient knowledge and understanding of issues involved in PB and 
that they had good command of English to narrate technical information without the need 





Scope and Delimitations 
The focus of this study was to identify barriers that might have limited the ability 
of PB to yield desired results, to determine local solutions to strengthen PB, and improve 
outcomes. Poor implementation could be symptomatic of poor understanding of the aims 
and goals of PB. Nongovernmental organizations are in the best position to be neutral 
educators to improve the people’s understanding, and to motive citizens to action.  
The scope of this study was limited to the activities of NGOs and the roles they 
played in creating a common link among the elements and factors that could strengthen 
the PB process. The inclusion of the political society, civil servants, NGOs, and 
community representatives in the list of participants ensured that this study collected 
information from diverse perspectives. The selection strategy limited the information 
available to this study to the particular space and time of the experiences of the 
participants. The pool of participants did not include citizens who might have participated 
in prior PB processes but were unknown to the intermediary who provided access to the 
participants. Furthermore, residents of the community who could corroborate any claims 
to success, or point to failures, were not included in the participant pool.  
Having provided contextual details of the research paradigm of this study, and 
having disclosed the assumptions and limitations that are pivotal to the research, the 
results of this study are potentially transferable to environments with idiosyncratic 
dynamics that are similar to the locus of this study. The setting of Ijede LCDA is quite 
similar in several respects to other local governments in Lagos State and several other 
states in Nigeria. Therefore, the findings of this study have the potential for 






Following case study design, I used interviewed participants in person. Unlike in 
a typical ethnographic case study, I did not immerse myself in the participants’ lived 
experiences. Therefore, this study did not involve the observation of an actual PB 
process. Furthermore, in the absence of any record at the local government of individuals 
and organizations who participated in prior processes, I relied on an intermediary to 
identify the participants for this study. It was necessary to adopt snowball sampling when 
some of the selected participants were considered unable to yield sufficient information. 
My bias as the researcher is rooted in the passion as a Nigerian citizen who is concerned 
about the development of the electorates to become sensitive to their environments and 
be sufficiently enlightened. Such bias could have an impact on data interpretation. 
Significance 
The significance for social change included the potential to influence how 
government arrives at public policy decisions, supported by better informed and active 
electorates, for successful policy implementation, especially when the policies might be 
unpalatable (Avritzer, 2009; Donaghy, 2010). From a public policy standpoint, by 
integrating citizens’ priorities into budget priorities, there is strong perception of 
transparency by the citizens who feel the direct impact and relevance of public policy, an 
elusive situation since independence in 1960. 
With the collaboration of the citizenry, government should be able to create 
strong institutional designs of particular relevance to local dynamics that are inclusive of 
the poor and marginalized in the community. Early local developmental successes have 





community, to direct more resources toward PB. Thus, public policy might become 
citizen focused, having been instigated by the consensus of the people ab initio.  This is 
also significant for the improvement of a peaceable social environment devoid of 
incidences of sporadic violence, engendering peaceful coexistence in a society that 
respects individual liberty and freedom of expression (Hazen, 2009).  
Beyond enthusiasm at election times, the citizens of Ijede LCDA, as most of 
Nigeria’s poor, are not actively engaged in the political process in a tangible way. This 
study could help identify the dynamics CSOs need to consider and to integrate into their 
activities such that the poor could sit at the table in a PB process to negotiate for 
resources to provide needed sustainable public goods and services. Subsequently, 
developing economies across the globe could develop PB designs to attain similar goals.  
This study promotes positive social change by informing the government of 
Lagos State of the need to institutionalize the PB process through a legal framework that 
prevents the impulsive interruption of the process by political office holders and civil 
servants. Ijede is in dire need of development programs beyond available resources.  
The study also informs the Ijede community, which expressed its desire for 
developmental evolution, of development strategies through public-private partnerships 
under the build-operate-transfer agreement, incorporating the Smart Growth Strategies of 
the United States Environmental Protection Agency. Participatory budgeting makes 
possible the creation of the type of urban development that the citizens desire and support 
(Avritzer, 2010; Wampler, 2012a). After all, the adoption of PB should go beyond 
fulfilling the demand of the World Bank and the United Nations but lead to tangible and 






Participatory budgeting is a quintessential example of participatory democracy, in 
which a political institution that has not attracted sufficient interest among the socially 
disadvantaged who stand to benefit the most from being involved in political discourses. 
Participatory budgeting gives citizens the opportunity to engage actively with the 
government in decision making on fiscal planning priorities. It is not known whether and 
how civil society empowers citizens to participate in the PB process. Specifically, it is not 
known whether and how civil society can empower citizens of Ijede LCDA in Lagos 
state, Nigeria to participate in the PB process. The purpose of this qualitative case study 
was to understand the role of civil society in educating the citizens to participate 
effectively in the budgetary decision making processes. 
The foundations of this study centered on the Avritzer’s theory of participatory 
institutions, and the concept of PB. The case study design with particular emphasis on 
semi-structured interviewing was of particular relevance to this study. It facilitated the 
extrication of relevant information from the subjective understanding of the participants. 
In Chapter 2, I discuss the historical and current outlines of literature that support 
the importance of PB and the role of civil society in the praxis of the process. Chapter 3 
details the methodological approach, data collection, and the strategy for data analysis. In 
Chapter 4, I lay out the results of the study. Chapter 5 articulates the detailed discussion 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
To most Africans on the continent, participatory democracy is defined by the 
ability to vote in general elections (Adesopo, 2011; Leduka, 2009). Beyond suffrage, the 
socially disadvantage neither appreciate the need to be involved in decision making, nor 
the necessity of engaging the political class directly in discourses on matters that affect 
their daily lives (Bashir & Muhammed, 2012; Bowen, 2008; Donaghy, 2010; Ganuza & 
Frances, 2012). Consequently, decision making remains firmly within the purview of 
politicians.  
The purpose of this literature review is to gain further understanding of the role of 
civil society in educating and empowering citizens to participate effectively in decision 
making processes through participatory budgeting (PB). This literature review analyzed 
the concepts of CSOs, participatory democracy, PB, and best budgeting paradigms. 
Circa 2007, Nigeria joined a host of developing economies to adopt PB, a process 
that Brazil introduced to 36 of its municipalities that were under the control of the 
Worker’s Party in 1989 (Adesopo, 2011). Porto Alegre, Brazil emerged as the 
quintessential example of PB and the socio-political lessons learned from that example 
continue to be the reference point for studies on PB. However, the actual origin of PB 
could be traced back to the 1970s, when the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement 
submitted its budget plans to the citizens for open debate (Avritzer, 2010; Goldfrank, 
2007; Wampler, 2007;).  
Participatory budgeting was an idea out of Latin American socialist ideology to 





both the political right and left worldwide have embraced the process as a tool to combat 
the menace of poverty and as a strategy to reduce the gap between the rich and the poor 
in the jurisdictions that have adopted it. International organizations such as the World 
Bank, the United Nations, and the European Union have been responsible for the ubiquity 
of PB (Avritzer, 2010; Fung & Wright, 2001; Goldfrank, 2007; Latendresse, 2005). 
These institutions have recommended PB as a democratic tool to address the menace of 
poverty that continues to ravage portions of developed economies and the developing 
world. However, in spite of legal mandates introducing PB to municipalities, the 
underlying principle or orientation of PB has nonetheless failed to filter to the majority 
poor, the intended target of the process (Dewachter & Molenaers, 2011; Donaghy, 2010).  
Efficiency in the administration of scarce resources and transparency are two 
principal objectives of PB. However, authors and researchers of PB could not 
categorically conclude that these goals have been achievable with PB experiments 
(Goldfrank, 2007; Heller, 2012; Peruzzotti, 2012). More often than not, there are 
contending local factors and circumstances affecting the ultimate outcomes of PB. It is, 
however, by its nature, iterative and open to continuous improvement. The effectiveness 
of PB at achieving its primary goals also depends on the presence of active and well-
informed CSOs that partner with the citizens as advocates in the state (Donaghy, 2010; 
Ganuza & Frances, 2012). 
Some conditions have arguably furthered the success of PB in different 
jurisdictions. These include willing heads of governments, the absence of strong right-
wing opposition, and influential elites, all of whom have played some important roles in 





financial assistance by national and international agencies, the availability of adequate 
budgetary allocations, and the active involvement of CSOs are some of the enabling 
dynamics that have contributed to the success of PB (Avritzer, 2009; Baierle, 2009;  
Bherer, 2010; Goldfrank, 2007). 
Literature Search Strategy 
This literature review benefited from a broad spectrum of research from various 
databases including the Walden Library linking with Google Scholar and dissertation 
databases. Google Scholar was the primary resource for the articles reviewed in this 
chapter. Through Google Scholar, I was able to access materials available at Walden 
University Online Library. The databases included: ProQuest Central, EBSCOhost, and 
Sage Political Science Complete. Although Walden University dissertation database 
yielded only a couple of dissertations that had any relevance to PB, a slightly higher 
number addressed participatory democracy in the areas of housing, transportation, and 
urban planning. The relative unavailability of materials on PB at Walden University 
dissertation database makes this study a valuable contribution to scholarship at the 
University. Beyond the dissertation, PB is prevalent among the proponents of 
participatory democracy and searches on Google Scholar demonstrated the ubiquity of 
the process worldwide. 
Keywords that yielded search results included: participatory budgeting, 
participatory democracy, civil society, nongovernmental organizations, participatory 
budgeting in Brazil, participatory budgeting in Nigeria, participatory budgeting in 
Africa, participatory institutions, and deliberative democracy. Others included: budgeting 





strategic planning. Although the search date range was in the last 5 years, it was often 
necessary to widen the scope to accommodate the review of older articles on theory and 
classic articles by authorities in the fields covered by this study. 
The articles that informed this study contributed through their relevance to 
participatory democracy and PB and in many respects suggested ways to strengthen 
participation in public discourses. The body of literature contributing to the knowledge 
base of participatory democracy uses a variety of research styles and methods. Some 
scholarly articles developed frameworks and discussions using existing literature in the 
field. Others use the mixed methods research design in which the researchers sought 
external validity to their studies. Predominantly, researchers used qualitative 
methodology to study various aspects of participatory democracy and PB. 
In the remainder of Chapter 2, I will discuss participatory institutions as the 
theoretical framework and PB the conceptual framework of the study interrogation. 
Following this is the analysis of CSOs and participatory democracy. The review 
discussed the review of current literature on participatory democracy, PB, CSOs, and 
some best practices in budgeting. 
Literature Review: Background 
In Lagos State, Nigeria, 100% of the capital budget of local governments is 
available for PB. Previous research I conducted via email and telephone interviews into 
the practice and implementation of PB in six local governments of Lagos State, Nigeria 
revealed weak implementation of PB, skeptical electorates, and unmotivated officials at 
the state and local levels. These preliminary findings suggested that there was the general 





are the targets of the process declined the call to participate for fear of being labeled tax 
dodgers. The study also found that rather than encouraging individuals to participate in 
PB, representatives of neighborhood associations were the invited participants. All the 
participants in that research identified inadequate funding as a challenge to development. 
Expectedly, governments have to operate with scarce resources; the efficient and 
equitable management of resources distinguishes effective governments from inefficient 
administrations. 
The literature on PB indicated only 20 to 30% as the percentage of capital budgets 
available for PB in most jurisdictions (Abers, 2001; Boulding & Wampler, 2010; 
Fölscher, 2007; Geissel, 2009; Gollwitzer, 2011; Matovu & Mumvuma, 2008). As good 
as this may sound for Lagos State, it is common for politicians to intrude into the process 
by prioritizing participant selected projects for their vested interests, known locally as 
constituency projects (Adesopo, 2011). Consequently, transparency suffers because the 
budget documents are not in the public domain, and neither do the participants’ 
involvements go beyond project selection into project monitoring. 
Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks 
The two frameworks that drive this study are the theory of participatory 
institutions and the concept of participatory budgeting. The effectiveness of the roles of 
participatory institutions determines the outcomes of PB as a framework. 
The Theory of Participatory Institutions 
Avritzer (2009) had set out to discover under what conditions PB could succeed 
and whether the Brazilian experience of PB could be replicable elsewhere with different 





to determine if participation yielded the presumed outcomes of empowering ordinary 
citizens and sharing control over decision making. 
 Civil society had become involved in political movements in Brazil a relationship 
that blurred the boundary between the state and civil society. The connection between 
civil society and political party in implementing reforms of participation turned out to be 
a variable that required some theoretical explanation. The hitherto autonomy of civil 
society within participatory institutions diminished and a new relationship between civil 
society and political society developed. Avritzer (2009) propounded a new theory of 
participatory institutions to explain the emerging relationship between civil society and 
political society in the participatory space. Avritzer (2009) developed the theory of 
participatory institutions as a departure from some 20th century democratic theories 
including Weber’s theory of irrationality of popular sovereignty, which posited that 
participation by the general populace in decision making could not have rational 
outcomes (Weber, 1947).  
Nevado (2010) in agreement with Avritzer (2009) recognized the shortcomings of 
other theories of participation such as those postulated by Habermas (1994) and Oxhorn 
(1995), which are offshoots of social movement theories. Avritzer stated that these 
theories were incapable of capturing the enduring interactions between civil society and 
state actors.  
 Theorists of representative democracy such as Berelson (1952), Dahl (1966), and 
Schumpeter (1976) are contented with representation as a form of political participation. 
These theorists view collective actions of unelected citizens as irrational (Fischer, 2012; 





connects the tripartite relationship between “civil society, the political society, and 
institutional design” (p. 1). According to Avritver’s (2009) observation, the three 
institutional design approaches, that is, the bottom-up designs, power-sharing designs, 
and ratification designs to democratic institutions emerging from Brazil’s democratic 
governance created the much touted active public engagement and equitable distribution 
of public services. Bottom-up designs are open to all citizens to participate such as in PB 
programs. Power sharing designs allow for civil society actors and political actors to 
share decision-making with the citizens. In ratification designs, citizens do not take part 
in the deliberations over the contents of proposals, but they can vote to accept or reject 
proposals.  
 Civil society actors, who were embedded in government institutions in the search 
for resources, lost some autonomy in their interactions with the political society  
(Acharya, Lavalle, & Houtzager, 2004). Notwithstanding, the work of civil society in 
participatory democracy in Brazil shaped a political process in which the poor could 
contest elective positions. Despite the success of PB, unemployment was high while 
violence increased but Avritzer (2010) argued that the opportunity to participate in 
governance enabled the poor to envision the possibility of easing the burden of poverty 
by increasing access to public goods and services.  
In Brazil, Argentina, and Bolivia, especially in the 1990s, civil society actors were 
able to advocate for participation by ordinary citizens in institutionalized public places 
(Wampler, 2012a). It thus became necessary for these public institutions to gravitate 
towards the interest of the people in the affairs of state and to open up the participatory 





Nevado (2010) identified four characteristics of participatory institutions that are 
necessary for participation. These features are: the interconnectedness between 
participation and representation; the transformation of volunteerism of civil society into 
organizing for political actions; the interactions between participatory institutions, the 
political society and state actors; and the necessity for institutional design for the success 
of participatory institutions. The ability of civil society to advance from community 
organizing to visible presence in the conscience of the political society contributed to the 
success of PB in Brazil (Wampler, 2012c). 
Institutional design goes a long way in determining the overall success or failure 
of participatory institutions; hence, Nevado (2010) advocated regular reviews and 
variations of participatory designs to ensure their continued relevance and sustainability. 
In effect, there should be a nexus of relationships between civil society, political society, 
participation, and representation. Therefore, where civil society understands the actions 
of the political society, participatory institutions provide the space for the state and civil 
society actors to collaborate in responding to the needs of society as a whole (Avritzer, 
2009).   
Since PB permits open participation by individuals and groups, civil society 
actors can participate in matters in which their program objectives focus. In other cases, 
they form alliances or loose cooperatives with groups of CSOs, elected representatives, 
and individuals (Nevado, 2010). Comparing the outcomes of PB, the health councils and 
municipality planning processes in four of Brazil’s major cities, Avritzer (2009) posited 
that the favorable results were due to the individual peculiarities of each of the cities, 





outcomes was the presence and the interconnection that existed between civil society, the 
political society, and institutional design.  
Participation. The opportunity for all citizens to contribute to decision-making 
conversations that affect their daily lives is one of the pillars that give legitimacy to any 
democratic system (Marien, Hooghe, & Quintelier, 2010). A democratic society is weak 
and of little relevance if the poor cannot participate in anti-poverty initiatives (Bowen, 
2008). The United States’ Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 acknowledged the 
significance of participation by the beneficiaries of an anti-poverty program when it 
called for “maximum feasible participation” of the beneficiaries of the program (p. 451). 
The consequence of this provision was the ubiquity of grassroots community organizing. 
The idea of maximum feasible participation unsettled the elites who sensed the 
weakening of their hold on power (Bowen, 2008; Hardina, 2004).  
At the signing ceremony of the law, President Lyndon Johnson assured the elites 
that the aim of the law was to end poverty by helping rural and urban dwellers to re-
establish their footing, a scenario that potentially benefited United States, rather than 
entrench them in poverty, (Johnson, 1964). The political elites were not convinced, but 
incrementally, the United States congress defunded the program into obscurity (Hardina, 
2004). Similar to political leaders in Africa, the elites of the United States did not want to 
share power with the poor (Mosca, 1939). 
Group Strategy versus Individualism. Low-income citizens who operate within 
social groups are the primary targets of PB because the theory focuses individual 





decisions (Wampler, 2007). Therefore, CSOs with substantial capacity to mobilize tend 
to thrive well in PB.  
Voting methods within PB vary from city to city and from country to country. 
Some of the voting practices include secret ballots or show of hands with majority 
carrying the decisions. Cities have tried to be all inclusive by distributing resources 
according to the proportional representativeness of the population (Wampler & Hartz-
Karp, 2012). Montambeault (2009) hypothesized that when mobilizing efforts for 
participation is at the individual level, quid-pro-quo arrangements between politicians 
and political parties, and exploitation the political environment for personal gins are 
pervasive. Consequently, an autonomous civil society that mobilizes at the individual 
level produces uncoordinated participation in public discourse. Individuals with self-
interests and the inability to negotiate effectively with other persons or groups have no 
influence over public policy. However, when civil society uses its autonomy to mobilize 
people into groups for collective purposes, the benefits of participatory democracy are 
exemplary. 
In general, voting practices at PB sessions mirror the pattern with which the 
citizens are already familiar. Governments have experimented with voting rules to 
determine alternative strategies to arrive at the optimum outcomes acceptable to all 
citizens. The process of PB has empowered citizens to learn how to network and 
negotiate trade-offs by creating the kind of trust environment that unites rather than 
divide (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). Magee (2012) investigated the impact of 
participation in urban planning in five US cities of Birmingham, Alabama; Dayton, Ohio; 





concluded that when the public participates in decision-making processes on issues that 
directly concern them, the citizens could build strong communities with a healthy sense 
of civic responsibility. The participants in the study agreed that their input supported the 
government in focusing on issues relevant to their communities, assisting government to 
identify priorities, and in propagating government actions on project implementation 
among citizens. 
Inequality and Social Justice. Political participation is as much a strategy as it is 
a moral responsibility to ascertain that no interest supplants another and that all citizens 
have equal access to decision-making (Dalton, 2008; Marien et al., 2010). In other words, 
citizens may not receive or enjoy public goods equally, but their interests should be given 
equal consideration along with other contending interests of groups with higher economic 
or social status. Participation provides the platform for citizens to air their voices (Dalton, 
2008). Thus, a structural defect exists in a political arena where poor citizens do not have 
the resources to undertake their civic obligations (Marien et al., 2010). 
However, there are factors creating and encouraging inequality in participation. 
Marien et al. (2010) identified education, age, and gender as three of the factors that 
create inequality in participation. The better-educated citizens participate and engage 
intensely in political activism than do the poorly educated. While gender inequality in 
participation may have declined in Western politics, it is still prevalent in developing 
democracies with large rural populations. Marien et al. posited that the lack of political 
engagement is quite prevalent among youths, but when age is considered along with the 
use of social media, the situation changes. Social media has encouraged political 





Participatory democracy theorists believe that for democracy to thrive, citizens 
must participate beyond exercising suffrage rights (Fischer, 2012; Pateman, 1995). 
Indeed, by delegating decision-making powers to representatives, citizens are 
disenfranchised from the political sphere (Michels & de Graaf, 2010). The researchers 
did not observe any controversy in the legitimacy of public decision where the citizens 
formulated the decisions. The process of engagement empowers citizens to develop 
strong civic responsibility and interdependency such that there is a sense of personal 
ownership towards the decisions. In the course of engaging with peers, there are superior 
and compelling arguments, cajoling and juxtaposing of interests, all of which culminate 
in policy decisions acceptable to all (Dobson, 2005; Fung, 2006; Richard, 2013). 
Contrary to this position, Mutz (2006) posited that such deliberations unduly task citizens 
with the unrealistic assumption of mutual respect. Michels and de Graaf (2010) on the 
other hand observed the personal satisfaction of citizens in collective free expression as 
equals, devoid of superior interests, but conducted with mutual respect. 
Engaging the Poor. Some researchers and authors have found that poor citizens 
are more likely to experience disconnection from, and lack interest in political discourses 
(Brodie, 2011; Dewachter & Molenaers, 2011; Haynes, 2013; Marien et al., 2010; 
Pateman, 1995; Richard, 2013). Thus, the lack of active participation by the poor 
majority limits their access to public goods. In developing nations, such lack of access 
encourages corruption, waste, fraud, and abuse by elected officials and civil servants 
(Avritzer, 2012; Verba, 2003; Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). Therefore, to participate 
effectively, poor citizens require education in the form of social and civic training, the 





civil society creates independent and politically aware citizenry, whose increased 
awareness encourages transparency, accountability and efficiency (Postigo, 2011). 
The Concept of Civil Society 
Although there is the lack of consensus on a definition of civil society, some 
authors agree that civil society is the public space of voluntary actions between the state, 
the market, and the family (Akpan, 2009; Fowler, 2012; Idemudia, 2011; Obadare, 2011; 
Powell, 2008). Diamond (1994) defined civil society as the “realm of organized social 
life that is voluntary, self-generating, largely self-supporting, autonomous from the state, 
and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules” (p. 5). This definition clarified the 
distinction between civil society and the society as a whole. Citizens have to act 
collectively and publicly to make their mutual demands, express their interests, and hold 
the state accountable for its actions. Walzer (1991) associated civil society with an arena 
of freedom for “family, faith, interest, and ideology” to exist openly (p. 1).  
Other authors described civil society as a dense network of civil associations 
formed to stabilize the democratic process and to be the public conscience in support or 
against policies emanating from the government (Foley & Edwards, 1996; Newton, 
2001). Diamond (1994) and Newton (2001) rejected the inclusion of family for the 
simple reason that it is not up to anyone to determine to what biological family they 
belong. Diamond (1994) went further to reject the inclusion of the individual, 
recreational, and religious groups for profit entities and political associations in the 
definition because potentially, these entities exclude those who hold contrary beliefs and 
ideologies. Therefore, civil society consists of voluntary associations, without restrictive 





organizations (Diamond, 1994; Newton, 2001; Powell, 2008). One assumption is that 
citizens and institutional actors outside the government can work together for citizen 
participation in democratic arrangements (Nevado, 2010). 
Another assumption is that CSOs are civic, proclaiming and ensuring equality, 
equity, and the entrenchment of strong democratic principles (Fowler, 2012). Fowler 
(2012) and Powell (2008) held that civil society is a community, rather than an 
aggregation of agitating organizations, which have some common norms as a minimum 
with the normative purpose for the community. The exclusion of religious and 
associational life groups from civil society would hold in Africa where society relies on 
and trusts those formations more than other groups (Orji, 2009). Religion and life 
associations that connect to collective affinities are the main forces of attraction that give 
rise to community-level association. 
For civil society to have broader application and entrench social roots without 
unnecessarily excluding major groups, Orji (2009) posited that the dominant powers of 
such groups are necessary for CSOs to have a meaningful impact in influencing policy 
processes. Civil society organizations consolidate efforts to highlight societal concerns 
for the attention of the state and the larger public. In so doing, they also act to provide 
contrary positions in their areas of expertise and over a broad range of issues (Grajzl & 
Murrell, 2009). 
The premise for the activities of CSOs is the rule of law, freedom of association, 
and the establishment of civility between governments and citizens (Diamond, 1994; 
Fowler, 2012; Newton, 2001; Orji, 2009; Powell, 2008). The activities often involve 





democracy (Heller, 2012; Hilmer, 2010; Powell, 2008). Thus, the rights to associate 
freely, socially, politically and economically form the bond on which the concept of civil 
society hangs (Dobson, 2005; Donaghy, 2010). With freedom of association emerged the 
cooperation between citizens and groups to provide self-help where governments have 
failed (Fowler, 2012). Through such self-help, civil society has created a platform of 
equality where the poor can demand the attention of the state to address issues that affect 
the poor in the society (Powell, 2008).  
Civil society organizations have opened up the public sphere such that those who 
hitherto were too poor to be part of governance and public decision-making could have a 
say through participatory democracy (Orji, 2009). The struggle for equality and 
fundamental rights that the intelligentsia spearheaded in defiance against oppressive 
states has shifted gradually to communities and individuals for collective social actions 
(Powell, 2008). Civil society has thus shown its ability to educate the poor to recognize 
public ethics, morality, transparency, and accountability (Fowler, 2012). At the turn of 
the century, Brazil led the way in converting the effectiveness of civil society to the 
social movement of the poor (Powell, 2008). Civil society organizations in Nigeria have 
the additional task of establishing trust between the government and citizens in the effort 
to attain the social transformation that restores the people’s confidence in their 
government (Dobson, 2005). 
There is unanimity among some authors that the attainment of heightened 
participation by the citizenry requires a vibrant civil society to actively mobilizing the 
people (Avritzer, 2007; Avritzer, 2010; Fischer, 2012; Pateman, 2012; Postigo, 2011; 





in the positive outcomes of participatory democracy by identifying best practices that 
stimulate participation among the poor. Postigo (2011) informed that civil society was 
able to operate efficiently and thus developed as mobilizing agents because the state 
opened up the space by sponsoring and encouraging PB. Thus, these authors contended 
that the enabling environments for successful PB were the presence of a vibrant civil 
society, and the willingness of the state to cede grounds for citizen participation. Since 
the poor often lack the confidence, skills, organization, and the education to participate, 
the state and civil society need to establish some institutional design to stimulate 
participation (Hilmer, 2010; Wampler, 2012b). In other words, there must be civic 
mobilization, stable financial and organizational arrangements.  
Grassroots democratic participation requires issue-based community organizing 
that enhances specialized influence rather than addressing all issues, which obviates 
potential mediocrity on complex issues (Devarajan, Khemani, & Walton, 2011). When 
communities organize around issues, the electorates gain a better understanding of those 
interests, thus developing better control over matters of direct interest to the community 
(Powell, 2008). Poorer communities can attract the attention of the government through 
the support of civil society when they gain some expertise on contending issues in their 
communities (Lewis, 2002). In the absence of community, organizing, ordinary citizens 
lose the opportunity to convince policymakers to provide access to public services and to 
empower communities economically (Brodie, 2011). 
Transparency, Good Governance, and Civil Society 
Generally, there is agreement among authors about the need to strengthen 





2010; Fischer, 2012; Fowler, 2012; Grajzl & Murrell, 2009; Houtzager & Lavalle, 2010; 
Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010; Pateman, 2012; Peruzzotti, 2012; Postigo, 2011). However, 
authors have conceptualized the issues from varying perspectives. For instance, 
Peruzzotti (2012) abstracted accountability and transparency from the standpoint of the 
three factors that determine these matters. The legal frameworks that institutionalize the 
reforms that support participation include the specialized CSOs. The CSOs along with the 
press intervene in the democratic space as watchdogs and to project the visibility and 
dissemination of sociopolitical agenda. 
The globalization of social movements against neoliberalism in Porto Alegre, 
Brazil showed the world that poor citizens are capable of learning the complexities of 
democratic paradigms if given the education and the opportunity (Cabannes, 2004). The 
poor and the uneducated can learn to shift the balance of economic equality by 
contributing to their social destiny (Powell, 2008). In spite of the progress made by civil 
society in mobilizing the people, several NGOs would only participate if they have some 
official relationship with the government or some sponsoring organizations external to 
the jurisdictions (Donaghy, 2010). Community-based organizations have to engage the 
state, as they know best, which results in inadequate self-representation and inadvertent 
legitimization of the acts of the state that might be inimical to the wellbeing of the poor 
(Grajzl & Murrell, 2009). 
Effectiveness of Civil Society Organizations 
An advantage of CSOs is that they enjoy unfettered autonomy to engage in 
organizing citizens for action. With the exit of the Workers' Party in Porto Alegre in 





policy to de-emphasize PB (Rodgers, 2010). Consequently, participation in PB became 
less organized. Unfortunately, functioning neighborhood associations lacked the required 
experience and resources to mobilize, and group membership waned (Montambeault, 
2009). Citizens could learn governance by participating in PB, and the experience makes 
for a population with a high sense of civic responsibility (Bherer, 2010). As one of the 
objectives of budget distribution is to minimize poverty, the decline in the poverty rate 
can be noticeable wherever PB succeeds (McGee & Gaventa, 2013).  
In Nigeria, as in most of Africa, citizens are rightly skeptical of civil society and 
its activists who have defected from championing the peoples’ course to join the political 
class (Obadare, 2011). According to Obadare, the people see these activists as political 
opportunists, whose real ethical and moral legitimacy occurs when they malign elected 
officials, and at the right moment, ride on the sentiments of the people for personal 
political gains. For several citizens, the disillusionment with civil society has generated 
distrust to the point that activists are perceived as economic opportunists that pretend to 
do good for the poor, when indeed, all they have is self-interest (Essia & Yearoo, 2009). 
After all, the activists are the products of the same harsh economic climate that has driven 
the people to poverty. Activism in the civil society realm provides a window of 
opportunity to address poverty and inequality, but on its own, it does not provide ways 
out of poverty (Bowen, 2008; Postigo, 2011). 
Works and Expectations of Civil Society Organizations 
The most important function of CSOs is in strengthening democracy and 
supporting the interaction between citizens and their governments (Mill, 1909; Weber, 





interests together to engender mutual appreciation and respect. Civil society 
organizations strive to relieve unpleasant circumstances and induce societal tolerance 
(Newton, 2001). Socially, CSOs use common bonds and ties to resolve conflict without 
external interventions. The civic advocacy of CSOs creates a responsible citizenry that 
learns to appreciate the necessity of reciprocal empathy. Where CSOs cooperate among 
themselves, they achieve greater reach and stronger collaborative efforts (Putnam, 1995). 
Such, according to Putnam, presupposes neutrality in political ideology and other divisive 
issues that may fragment or factionalize the associations.  
The dilemma with Putnam’s position is that most of the issues confronting CSOs 
have the propensity for factionalizing the public space (Foley & Edwards, 1996). Overall, 
civil society can influence policies emerging from reform processes without direct benefit 
from the improvements. They serve to reduce the domination of the public space by 
wealthy self-interest groups and their political collaborators (Grajzl & Murrell, 2009). 
Corporations, Civil Engagement, and the Effect on the Poor 
In the West, corporate organizations are directly active with civil society through 
their corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs when they address issues such as the 
environment, education, health and poverty (Idemudia, 2011). Corporate organizations 
engage in CSR programs to enhance their public image of accountability and social 
responsibility (Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). These organizations expend considerable 
resources to impress on the public that profit is not their sole motivation. In the absence 
of legal or regulatory compulsion, they maintain high ethical standards alongside their 
commitments to the socio-economic development of the communities in which they 





corporate strategy to the defense against some anticipated actions, and altruism 
(Idemudia, 2011; Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). 
To advance the discussion to the African context, Idemudia (2011) highlighted 
issues such as tax avoidance, tax evasion, unsustainable investment, and poverty 
reduction agenda of the corporate organizations operating within the continent. These 
organizations benefit from the inadequacy, gaps, and lapses in administrative exactitudes 
including corrupt practices. Thankfully, posited Idemudia (2009), through CSR, some of 
these organizations do reinvest in the communities by providing funds, materials, and 
equipment towards the execution of community projects.  
Perhaps African NGOs need to look to corporations to participate in community 
projects rather than providing funds to the state, which are often misdirected and 
misappropriated. Such misdirection of resources, suggested Idemudia (2011), is evident 
in Nigeria where multinational oil companies fail to focus on the real issues such as 
corruption, environmental degradation, and declining economic climate in all sectors, all 
of which confront their host communities. In exploring the ramifications of government 
inadequacy for CSR, Idemudia (2011) further postulated that the voluntary nature of CSR 
weakens the effect of the practice on the intended beneficiaries. Idemudia suggested that 
CSOs should serve as the conduits for CSR efforts. Without a full understanding of 
cultural nuances and socio-political complexities of communities in Africa, CSR 
programs do not only fail to address poverty reduction but they also exacerbate the fragile 






Idemudia (2009) discovered that when CSR efforts link directly with CBOs, the 
outcome has more positive impact on the community than when corporate organizations, 
device strategies and impose policies. Indeed, CBOs can advance CSR initiatives of 
corporate organizations by helping to identify what message to communicate and other 
factors unique to the effectiveness of communication in the community (Lindgreen & 
Swaen, 2010). The involvement of civil society in CSR helps to avoid rash and impulsive 
actions that may yield disruptive and wasteful consequences (Grajzl & Murrell, 2009). 
Furthermore, as far as the Brazilian PB experience goes, skilled delegates who operated 
within CSOs realize they have the power to influence decisions; thus. PB highlights the 
importance of active CSOs, which leads to the formation of competing NGOs in the 
participatory space (Wampler, 2007). 
Civil society organizations are important institutional building partners. They 
provide the public space for discourses on public policy, debates over matters of 
importance to communities, and the atmosphere for the expression of individual rights 
(Grajzl & Murrell, 2009). Citizens need to be wary of individuals and groups with vested 
interests that sponsor CSOs since such partisan interests are counterproductive for 
legitimacy in public discourses (Essia & Yearoo, 2009). 
Some Observed Weaknesses of Civil Society Organizations 
Some significant roles of CSOs are those of advocacy, to be the voice for the 
voiceless, to ensure social justice and equitable distribution of public goods (Diamond, 
1994). Civil society organizations in many countries, including Nigeria, rely on the 
government to provide substantial resources (Essia & Yearoo, 2009). This dependency 





under threat. The reliance on state fund has emboldened state officials to diminish the 
efforts of CSOs at protecting the interest of ordinary citizens. Civil society organizations 
with multiple ties to political associations lack focus, but they pursue interests other than 
those of the communities they set out to represent.  
The Brazilian experience indicated that although CSO leaders in PB did not have 
to negotiate with the state secretly for equitable distribution of public goods, political 
patronage still existed at individual levels (Montambeault, 2009). Institutionally, political 
patronage and corruption declined as negotiations for new democratic spaces emerged 
(Baierle, 2008). Thus, CSOs that engage in participatory institutions occupied the 
traditional domain of control of political parties to eliminate rent seeking (Montambeault, 
2009). 
One of the challenges confronting CSOs concerning budgets is the timely access 
to comprehensive government budget documents (Benito & Bastida, 2009). The materials 
help to facilitate the analysis of budgets for CSOs to target their advocacy efforts at 
specific areas of concern (Carlitz, de Renzio, Krafchik, & Ramkumar, 2009). Several 
authors have demonstrated empirically that freedom of information, especially on 
budgeting and budget performances have a close correlation with good governance. Free 
flow of information reduces corruption, affects human development positively, and 
improves socio-economic pointers (Bastida & Benito, 2007; Benito & Bastida, 2009; 
Peruzzotti, 2012; Sintomer, Allegretti, Herzberg, & Rocke, 2008; de Renzio, Gomez, & 
Sheppard, 2009).  
As far as PB goes, transparency is a precondition for enthusiastic participation by 





(2009) argued that resource-dependent nations, like Nigeria, which relies on income from 
oil and gas, experience transparency gap, but the presence of active CSOs may help to 
close the gap. Carlitz et al. (2009) posited that transparency should go hand in hand with 
other factors and expectations. These include deliberate efforts by the government to 
promote pro-poor policies and agenda, encouraging information freedom and well-
informed media, providing prompt budget information, and facilitating a civil society that 
can interpret and analyze budgets.  
With more transparency, civil society gets more opportunities to intervene on 
behalf of the citizens and by so doing, widen the space for participation in governance. 
When the public has timely and reliable budget information, citizens can engage 
meaningfully in budgetary policies and hold the government to its public 
pronouncements. Carlitz et al. (2009) suggested that civil society could be more efficient 
by demanding more information under the freedom of information laws that most 
countries, including Nigeria, have enacted. In which case, civil society could analyze 
budgets and disseminate the information in more comprehensible language to the public 
with whom they should engage in advocacy on issues arising.  
Participatory Budgeting 
Electorates can develop political sophistication through regular interactions and 
contacts with elected officials and bureaucrats in public discourses (Fischer, 2012; 
Pateman, 2012). When citizens participate in budgetary policy formulation, they actively 
engaged in decision making on fiscal planning priorities. Participatory budgeting 
encourages the transparent environment for resource distribution and selection of choices 





willingness on the part of the state to respect the budget priorities of the citizens 
(Acharya, Lavalle, & Houtzager, 2004; Avritzer, 2012; Fung & Wright, 2001).  
The community-organizing activities of civil society in educating and informing 
the electorates on procedural and legal matters need the support and encouragement of 
the state (Fung, 2006; Goldfrank, 2007). Since PB involves fiscal issues, the government 
needs to be transparent in providing the electorates its finance and policy guidelines 
(Agbude & Egbide, 2012; Bastida & Benito, 2007; Benito & Bastida, 2009). To relieve 
the poorer electorates of the cost of participation, it is also necessary to address those 
obstacles that increase the burden of participation such as distance and language 
(Latendresse, 2005). 
Participatory budgeting is a public decision-making arrangement that provides a 
platform for citizens to negotiate with the government and to negotiate between 
competing communal interests on the distribution of budgetary allocations. In one yearly 
cycle, citizens decide what projects to undertake, by whom, and where to locate the 
projects (Goldfrank, 2007; Wampler, 2012b). 
The model of PB practice in Brazil usually begins with plenary sessions of all 
participants in each district to review budget implementations for the previous year 
(Postigo, 2011). The assembly then identifies areas of priority while it elects delegates 
who deliberate over all the proposals presented by different communities (Peruzzotti, 
2012). At the second round of plenary meetings, another set of elected delegates 
consolidates all the requests of the various communities, reviews each proposal, and 
allocates resources to the projects (Peruzzotti, 2012; Postigo, 2011). At a final stage, the 





proposals for deliberation at a municipal council meeting, which approves the plan for 
implementation (Peruzzotti, 2012; Postigo, 2011). The primary functions of municipal 
employees are to provide guidance and technical assistance to the delegates who may not 
understand the rudiments of governance and the complexity of the process (Wampler, 
2007). 
Participatory budgeting requires state officials not to have project preferences, 
and they do not determine or influence the location or the contractor to execute projects 
(Wampler, 2012b). Rather, the citizens deliberate in open fora among themselves while 
government officials act as impartial arbiters in cases of deadlock (Wampler, 2012a). 
Participatory budgeting is open to individuals without affiliations although as Wampler 
found, group membership increases the chances that their project preferences prevail. As 
citizens learn to dictate public agenda and negotiate budgetary spending in PB, they can 
transfer the skills to other participatory spaces to meet civic demands (Wampler, 2012a). 
Variations in Participatory Budgeting Processes and Outcomes  
Wampler’s (2007) described PB as a process that encourages citizens to engage in 
decision making by voicing their opinions and voting at meetings sponsored by the state. 
Participants at these meetings vote for important programs they believe the government 
should implement. They elect representative delegates from among the participants to 
negotiate on the issues and priorities that are of concern to the citizens. Elected delegates 
representing different communities negotiate among themselves, with government 
officials, CSOs and other activists for competing priorities. Figure 1 is a visual 
representation of a typical PB process, drawn for the purpose of this study from 





The variation in outcomes between municipalities could be due to differences in 
cultural, institutional, political, and historical connections of the territories. The successes 
of PB have occurred not because of any prescriptive best practice paradigm (Avritzer, 
2009). Indeed, the outcomes of participatory institutions vary by local political model, the 
willingness of local officials to advance the process, and the effectiveness of CSOs 
(Avritzer, 2010; Wampler, 2012a).  
As a political institution, PB engendered the environment for citizen involvement 
in creating the type or urban development that the citizens desired and supported. 
Consequently, it has enhanced local democracy and strengthened the effectiveness, 
efficiency, and transparency of local governance. In addressing issues through 
participation, Sheller (2010) suggested that communities should apply hierarchical order 
to prioritize the needs of the communities. In other words, concerns such as crime, 
sanitation, and environmental issues that lend themselves to social solutions should 
prevail over sidewalks and other esthetics. On the other hand, Geissel (2009) argued that 
municipalities adopted PB, not necessarily to improve representative democracy, but to 
address exploding public spending to attain balanced budgets. The assertion could be true 
of Europe where Geissel (2009) viewed PB as a glorified exercise in consultation. 
Postigo (2011) surmised that it would be unrealistic to expect PB to alleviate 
poverty. Bowen (2008) agreed with this position in Jamaica: citizen participation in 
decision making on community projects had limited effect on the economic conditions of 
the citizens. Poverty alleviation is a problem for central governments to address, but PB 
is a program for local governance (Avritzer, 2010). Participatory budgeting has achieved 





the creation of a citizenry that demands responsible and accountable government (Bowen, 
2008; Peruzzotti, 2012). Citizens who participate in PB processes understand how to 
demand transparency and equity in the distribution of public goods for the benefit of all 
citizens (Avritzer, 2010; Wampler, 2012a).  
As citizens learn to engage in participatory democracy, they also recognized the 
necessity to engage in other participatory processes involving health, education and urban 
planning (Peruzzotti, 2012; Postigo, 2011). Bowen (2008) submitted that where 
participation is inadequate, citizen involvement in decision making amounts to tokenism. 
Citizens need appropriate training and support from CSOs, just as they need opportunities 
to participate in developing the capacity to address communal issues effectively for 
meaningful participation in decision making (Bowen, 2008).  
Stimulus of the Growth of Participatory Budgeting 
The popularity of PB has been incrementally progressive (Wampler & Hartz-
Karp, 2012). As participation spread among citizens, interest in governance grew and the 
rate of citizen empowerment expanded to an unexpected level among the poor (Wampler, 
2012c). At the early stages of PB in Brazil between 1989 and 2004, districts with little 
civil society activity lagged behind developmentally (Donaghy, 2010; Goldfrank & 
Schneider, 2006; Latendresse, 2005; Wampler, 2007). In the absence of civil society 
activities, municipal employees went to the communities to encourage participation by 
forming self-help CBOs (Donaghy, 2010; Su, 2012; Wampler, 2007). As the CBOs 
motivated the excluded poor, participation rapidly spread across all neighborhoods. 
The lower economic class realized they had a voice in the decision-making 





were able to monitor the government and its actions; there was the rare sense of 
transparency and accountability (Donaghy, 2010). The early inter-communal 
disagreements over what projects to execute soon gave way to discussions about projects 
for the benefit of all, thus underplaying the hitherto self interests of the neighborhoods 
(Boulding & Wampler, 2010). 
Two problems plagued Brazilian polity: clientelism, the quid pro quo arrangement 
that corrupted the political theatre; and rent seeking, the corrupting influence of 
individuals and corporations to gain undue advantage without corresponding benefit to 
the society (Avritzer, 2010; Baierle, 2009; Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012; Peruzzotti, 2012; 
Schugurensky, 2009). Participatory budgeting opened up the system to be more 
transparent, and thus, it reduced corruption substantially while governance became more 
democratic (Peruzzotti, 2012). Consequently, transparency reduced political patronage as 
it improved the efficient allocation and consumption of resources, the legitimacy of the 
government and accountability to the people.  
Postigo (2010) found that the consultative nature of PB, coupled with its 
associated limited decision-making powers, discouraged some civil society organization 
from participating in the process. According to Postigo, the willingness of the local 
officials encouraged the promotion of PB by pushing for pro-poor policies and 
redistribution agenda. Thus, local officials settled disputes between competing groups 
thereby demonstrating the good faith of social justice in the distribution of public 
services. Postigo gave much credit to the state for opening up the space for PB to 







Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of a typical participatory budgeting process as 
described in “Can participatory institutions promote pluralism? Mobilizing low-income 
citizens in Brazil,” by B. Wampler, (2007), Studies in Comparative International 
Development, 41(4), 57-98.  
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The intervention of government officials encouraged cooperation between 
neighborhood associations (Postigo, 2012). When participatory opportunities declined, 
civil society involvement also declined. However, PB contributed to increased political 
awareness of the citizens by providing the skills required for engaging in other 
participatory spaces (Hilmer, 2010; Lavalle, Acharya, & Houtzager, 2005; Leubolt et al., 
2008; Michels & De Graaf, 2010). 
The political class having yielded some control over political decisions to the 
citizens, civil society and community leaders recognized the need to organize the citizens 
for the opportunity to be part of the decision-making machinery of the government 
(Avritzer, 2010; Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). Acharya et al. (2004) observed that 
CSOs such as the NGOs tend to be “institutionally embedded actors” that are closer to 
the government than with those they set out to represent (p. 41). Bherer (2010) asserted 
that the state could change the status quo, and it could empower the economically 
disadvantaged citizens if it strengthens neighborhood civic groups.  
Principles of Good Budget Practices 
One important instrument CSOs have used to advocate policy directions has been 
the budget. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank encourage 
governments to adopt budget processes that incorporate the participation of citizens, to 
ensure accountability, and to enhance transparency (Fukuda-Parr, Guyer, & Lawson-
Remer, 2011). The United Nations expected that through improved budget instruments, 
which strive to meet the requirements of the millennium development goals, especially 





governments (Simson, 2014). It is thus safe to anticipate encouraging socio-economic 
development results from countries that give priority to budget accountability. 
For PB to yield the desired socio-economic changes, all stakeholders are expected 
to ensure the process follows best practices in budgeting. The participatory purpose of PB 
may become meaningless and counterproductive if basic budgeting principles are traded 
off for participation (Schick, 2003). Best practice in the budgeting process should adhere 
to five core principles consisting of comprehensiveness, accuracy, annual span, legality, 
and transparency (Sintomer, Allegretti, Herzberg, & Rocke, 2008). There is a vicious 
circle of budget transparency leading to efficiency in governance, which gives rise to 
fiscal discipline, which in turn strengthens the budgeting procedure. This sequence of 
events produces better accountability and transparency in governance over budget and 
other fiscal policies (Bastida & Benito, 2007; Benito & Bastida, 2009). As Sintomer et al. 
(2008) surmised, there is a higher incidence of fiscal responsibility from politicians if the 
budget process is transparent. 
Transparency in a budget process guarantees the disclosure of substantial volume 
of information to the public and inhibits political office holders from undue opportunism 
(Sintomer et al., 2008). Benito and Bastida (2009) discovered in their quantitative study 
of the relationship between budget transparency, fiscal responsibility, and voter turnout 
that there exists a significantly positive correlation between transparency in budgeting 
and participation in elections. Therefore, what the budget process sets out to achieve is to 
enable governments to make informed decisions on what services to provide, what assets 
to expend in providing services, and how to encourage stakeholders to reach those 





A good budgeting process has specific rules and procedures (Schick, 2003). 
Setting fiscal rules for the budget process limits government spending, and it avoids an 
accumulation of debts (Gollwitzer, 2011). Budgets should be medium term, transparent, 
and comprehensive: the rules should be consistent in their content and application 
(Gollwitzer, 2011; Schick, 2003; Sintomer et al., 2008). Budget rules serve the purpose of 
enforcing the implementation of approved budget and for avoiding arbitrary applications 
of policies. However, according to Schick (2003), fiscal rules have no meaning when the 
budget spans a single fiscal year because budget monitoring would be weak, and the 
budget would not have considered sustainability. Additionally, the procedures should 
include performance evaluation of budgets against specific benchmarks to determine the 
overall effects of budgeting on the fiscal strategy (Bryson, 2011; Schick, 2003; Sintomer 
et al., 2008). 
Credible budgets are sustainable budgets within the context of macroeconomic 
dynamics and government strategy (Schick, 2003). The forecasting and planning that 
produce the budget should consider conceivably known risks that might negatively affect 
the overall aims of the government. The medium-term strategy set within an efficient 
strategic planning paradigm ensures sustainability of the budgets derived from the 
process (Bryson, 2011). Therefore, budgeting should be an integral part of the overall 
government strategy with measurable outcomes that guide future planning (Bryson, 2011; 
Gollwitzer, 2011; Schick, 2003). The process must encourage sustained and consistent 
communication with all stakeholders, especially when budgeting is a product of strategic 






Legislative oversight over budgets and the budgeting process provide political 
legitimacy (Gollwitzer, 2011). The supervision ensures compliance with approved 
budgets since budget expenditures are subject to periodic reviews of the legislature, thus 
giving credibility to the purpose of the budget process.  Fölscher (2007) submitted that 
the input of citizen stakeholders into the budget process involves setting priorities rather 
than allocation of resources. Adesopo (2011) observed that linking fiscal and strategic 
planning to PB process has contributed to the successful outcomes of the process. 
Fölscher (2007) informed that when there is a gap between the planning process and the 
PB process, participation by citizens has little visibility, which increases the propensity 
for corruption to thrive and to impair transparency. 
The Benefits of Participatory Budgeting 
As with other participatory democratic institutions, citizens who participate in PB 
learn civic activities and responsibilities through practice and thus improve the quality of 
the electorates (Hamlett & Cobb, 2006). Citizens learn to think regarding collective goals 
and benefits rather than personal gains and selfish agitations. Some of the aims of the PB 
process include the elimination of political patronage, combating corruption through a 
transparent budget process, and the reversal of socio-political exclusion of low economic 
status citizens (Baierle, 2009). Thus, PB has become an institution of learning where 
citizens acquire knowledge about their civic responsibilities and better negotiating tactics 
with politicians on public policies. Fung (2006) conjectured that if the government is to 
improve the type and quality of services that meet the needs of the citizens, the 
contributions of ordinary citizens should be the source of information for government 





resist or oppose such policies. Instead, they tend to support such policies enthusiastically 
(Hamlett & Cobb, 2006). Effective citizen participation requires a significant time 
commitment, the benefits of which include the acquisition of both technical and 
operational knowledge of public policy (Fung, 2006). 
Participatory budgeting has also contributed significantly to improved social 
justice in the equitable distribution of resources among citizens. Poor citizens have the 
right to determine spending priorities of government and to redirect resources towards the 
needs of the poor. Participatory budgeting closes the gap between elected representatives 
and the citizens since PB increases access to elected officials who attend spending 
prioritization meetings with their constituents (Wampler, 2012a). Therefore, there are 
opportunities for citizens to engage their representatives at all times and not only during 
electioneering campaigns. 
One of the arguments for participatory democracy is the belief that representative 
democracy, especially in developing economies, has not provided impactful governance 
from which ordinary citizens benefit (Wampler, 2012c). Representative democracy has 
failed to provide the public space for citizens to vote with their voices; it has not created 
empowering tools such as education and economic independence (Boulding & Wampler, 
2010; Dalton, 2008). Unfortunately, it has succeeded in the squandering of scarce public 
resources while the majority of citizens live in penury (Wampler, 2012c). However, with 
PB and similar participatory institutions, citizens and CSOs have managed to embrace 
participatory democracy to reduce tokenism (Gaventa & Barrett, 2012; Leduka, 2009). 





and to promote policies that are of interest to the wellbeing of the citizens (Wampler, 
2012c).  
Civil society organizations have leveraged their professional usefulness to 
negotiate pro-poor policies with governments. Therefore, the raison d’être for the 
adoption of participatory institutions is not to supplant representative democracy, but 
rather to make it the contributory effort that surmounts obstacles (Wampler, 2012c). 
Furthermore, participatory institutions have promoted social justice, addressed income 
inequality, and they have debunked the myth that only the wealthy and the middleclass 
could participate in the democratic process beyond suffrage rights (Fischer, 2012; 
Pateman, 1995). 
Resources available to participatory institutions are still relatively limited 
compared to the overall expenditure of governments. In Porto Alegre, the government 
allocated only about 15% of the available budget to PB (Wampler, 2012c). The limited 
nature of resources has increased the necessity for participants to compromise, negotiate, 
lobby, develop the interest in elective political positions, mobilizing for action, and form 
CBOs (Wampler, 2012c). 
The benefits of participatory institutions have also extended to government 
officials as they have become better at identifying critical issues confronting their 
jurisdictions (Peruzzotti, 2012; Wampler, 2012a). They could learn of citizens’ demands 
first hand, and they could address potential conflicts before they expand to unmanageable 
crises. Those seeking elective positions have venues at which they can gain access to 
active citizens and community leaders (Abers, 2001). The public space of PB provides 





and programs. Between political office holders and civil servants, governments could 
connect experts with communities and address their demands for better service delivery 
and efficient management of resources (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). 
Another benefit of participatory institutions is the establishment of social justice 
by providing pro-poor rules of engagement to encourage participation (Avritzer, 2010; 
Bertucci, 2008). In effect, participatory environments have pro-poor affirmative actions 
(Su, 2012). The establishment of some measure of social justice has been the nature of 
participatory spaces in developing economies with widening gaps between the rich and 
the poor (Bratton, 2012; Catell, 2004; Donaghy, 2010). There have been substantial 
infrastructure investments in affluent communities to the neglect of poorer neighborhoods 
that contribute little to the state revenue from taxation. However, participatory 
institutions have helped to address the skewed wealth distribution, and it has engendered 
development in poor communities (Gaventa & Barrett, 2012; Speer, 2012). A hallmark of 
good citizenship is the diligent payment of income tax. Citizens who participate in PB 
experience know, first hand, what their contributions to the revenue pool could provide 
(Adesopo, 2011; Wampler, 2012b).  
The Drivers of Participatory Budgeting 
The political system under which PB thrives is policy driven populism, and not 
personality, political patronage or aggrandizement (Wampler, 2012c). Participatory 
budgeting thrives under political systems that are fully democratic, with universal 
suffrage and guaranteed free and fair elections (Wampler, 2012b). Under such political 
systems, local government administrations have policy independence and fiscal 





administrators to operate without undue interference from the central or state 
governments (Wampler, 2012a). 
Researchers in the area of participatory democracy and PB have made some 
recommendations. Baierle (2008) suggested local administrations should access and 
control the resources they generate such that they would develop the capacity for long-
term planning and investment strategies. Without access to funds and adequate resources 
for inclusion in the budget, the process of PB becomes meaningless to the participants 
who might not witness the implementation of their desired projects and agenda (Avritzer, 
2012; Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). Adesopo (2011) identified the need for local 
administrations to develop the institution, human resources, and networking capacity to 
interface with CSOs to prepare citizens for interactive decision making. For democracy in 
Nigeria and other developing countries to experience the institutional reawakening, the 
citizens need civic engagement, which would involve the active participation of CSOs 
and activists (Adesopo, 2011; Avritzer, 2012). 
The decentralization of the local administration in Brazil facilitated the success of 
PB. Decision making was taken away from the hands of a few influential politicians and 
state officials (Wampler, 2012b). Information necessary for decision making and policy 
formulation was available to the citizens who participated in the budget process (Abers, 
2001). The relationship between the state and the stakeholders became transparent, and 
the atmosphere of trust prevailed. 
Success Factors in the Brazilian Experience 
In Porto Alegre, the social movement was vocal, particularly where restive 





indigent and forgotten neighborhoods (Leubolt et al., 2008). Perhaps the most important 
element that paved the way for PB was, as earlier stated, the political will of the state to 
cede some decision-making powers to the restive poor. Where PB succeeded, as in the 
case of Brazil, the government demonstrated its political will by establishing a legal 
framework to institutionalize and support PB (Rodgers, 2010). Thus, the decisions that 
emanated from the process were binding on all parties, including the government, and 
those decisions became public policies (Wampler, 2012b). The political will of the 
elected officials encouraged CSOs to engage state officials who worked along with CSOs 
to mobilize the citizens (Rodgers, 2010).  
An essential prerequisite for PB is that the organizers, usually the government, 
must guarantee equality of all participants in the process (Rodgers, 2010). It is common 
to find that elected delegates have had previous involvement with NGOs, especially 
community, and religious organizations. As Montambeault (2009) observed, religious 
organizations were able to form alliances with other groups and political parties. The 
general perception, therefore, was that CSOs were equal partners with the state in 
mobilizing the citizens to participate in decision-making processes, to learn negotiating 
skills, and by so doing, strengthened participatory institutions (Acharya, Lavalle, & 
Houtzager, 2004). The process should not give any privilege to the wealthy or influential 
participants, and neither should any class dominate activities within the process (Rodgers, 
2010). Except through the voting system, there should be no attempt to subvert decisions 
on what to include or exclude in the course of deliberations. The people of Porto Alegre 
and its environs demanded equality, justice, and wealth redistribution, and to some 





In spite of legal mandates introducing PB to municipalities, PB failed to spread to 
the poor at whom the process was targeted (Fung & Wright, 2001). Efficiency in the 
administration of scarce resources and transparency are two principal objectives of PB. 
However, authors and researchers in PB could not categorically conclude that these goals 
have been achievable with PB experiments (Fung, 2006). More often than not, there are 
contending local factors and circumstances affecting the outcome of PB, in spite of its 
iterative and continuous improvement nature (Goldfrank & Schneider, 2006; Goldfrank, 
2007). The effectiveness of PB at achieving its goals also depends on the presence of 
active and well-informed CSOs serving the citizens as advocates before the state (Leubolt 
et al., 2008). 
Some conditions have arguably furthered the success of PB in various 
jurisdictions. Factors that have contributed to recorded successes include willing heads of 
governments, the absence of strong Right-wing opposition, and weak, or nonexistence of 
influential elites (Leubolt et al., 2008). The provision of technical and financial assistance 
by national and international agencies, the availability of adequate budgetary allocations, 
and the active involvement of CSOs are some of the enabling dynamics that contribute to 
the success of PB (Osmani, 2007; Richard, 2013; Schneider & Baquero, 2006; 
Schugurensky, 2009). 
Systemic Weaknesses in Participatory Budgeting 
Magee (2012) identified some weaknesses with participatory democracy. 
Participants in public decision making have the propensity of bloated expectations of 
lofty achievements within specific budget constraints. These grand expectations lead to 





considerable interest in participation, the process could become unwieldy and time 
consuming. In spite of the ubiquity of success stories of PB, some localities were only 
able to sustain the process for a short period. In their study of PB in Portugal, Alves and 
Allegretti (2012) used the concepts of fragility and volatility to identify reasons for the 
failure to sustain the process. The researchers found that in spite of formal rules 
guaranteeing participation by all citizens, and notwithstanding the special political offices 
established to implement PB, the process was not sustainable. The focus was the 
establishment of a perfect PB process rather than a system that was amenable to changes 
and modifications.  
Another obstacle to the sustainability of PB was the change of government and 
political alliances. Election years tend to create disruption to PB sustainability as Alves 
and Allegretti (2012) discovered, through either fund reduction or outright suspension of 
the process. Some localities reduced and modified the process to accommodate 
consultations with stakeholders, but the outcome of such consultations was not 
necessarily binding on the government. The authors advanced the warning that in such 
situations where decision-making power failed to transfer to the citizens, the government 
could abandon the process ultimately. On the other hand, where the scope of PB 
expanded to include other spaces such as social justice, health, administrative reforms, 
social accountability, and redistribution of resources, PB has experienced sustainability. 
Sheller (2010) recognized the disparity between the needs of the middleclass and affluent 
communities on one hand, and the needs of the poorer neighborhoods on the other, a 





Participatory Budgeting De-emphasized in Porto Alegre, Brazil 
Changes in government in Brazil, particularly at the local level, have introduced 
various changes to PB. Opposing parties to the Workers’ Party (PT) became hostile to PB 
(Leubolt et al., 2008). The opposition blocked tax increases that would have made 
additional funds available, and in 2005, the PT lost control of the government (Leubolt et 
al., 2008). The new government, however, did not scrap PB. As Leubolt et al. informed, 
the government set up a parallel process tagged Local Solidarity Governance (LSG) 
while government officials boycotted PB sessions.  
Three of the grouses against PB were that parochial interests of participants 
overrode citywide strategy, that its one-year-span did not support sustainable 
development, and that the demand for state funds did not marry such demands with 
private-public partnership (PPP) investments (Leubolt et al., 2008; Sintomer et al., 2008). 
Those who promoted LSG called for the mobilization of private sector investors to 
supplement the scarce resources of government. The drawback with PPP, as observed by 
Leubolt et al., was that it focused on larger projects such as mass transportation systems 
and business district development rather than small projects to improve the immediate 
locale of the poor. 
In Brazil, the focus of PB has shifted since its introduction in 1989. Participatory 
budgeting now has its attention on good governance, transparency, and access to 
information on performance rather than robust negotiations between and among 
contending interests (Alves & Allegretti, 2012; Avritzer, 2012; Leubolt et al., 2008; 
Sintomer et al. 2008). Sadly, a major drawback of PPP is its lack of transparency 





governments’ LSG has used PPP arrangements as conduits to transfer funds earmarked 
for PB to contracts awarded to private sector sponsors. Thus, municipal governments 
have relinquished their obligations to PB to pursue strategies that are antithetical to PB 
(Hadjimichalis & Hudson, 2006). 
The motivation to participate in a participatory democratic process such as PB 
differs between economic groups. The motivation for poor citizens to participate is in 
direct access to public goods that would provide material benefits, whereas, the attraction 
of affluent citizens to PB is the potential for good governing characteristics such as 
transparency and anticorruption (Schneider & Baquero, 2006). In Porto Alegre, 
Schneider and Baquero (2006) observed that the government demanded taxation from the 
middleclass while it required support for the political process for material gratification 
from the poor citizens. In both cases, the government expected good citizenship with a 
strong sense of civic responsibility. The business sector prefers long-term fiscal planning 
as opposed to the rather anti sustainability single year span of PB (Schneider & Baquero, 
2006). 
The North American Mega City Experiences 
Lagos, Nigeria, is a mega city like New York City, Chicago, and Toronto. It is 
thus, informative to examine the PB experiences of these cities. Lerner and Secondo 
(2012) reported on PB in three North American megacities where the available funds 
went to the three main areas that were of concern to the low-income citizens of the cities. 
Participatory budgeting funds targeted schools, housing and jobs as opposed to public 





Targeted funding was possible because the majority of the participants were low-
income earners, and as Lerner and Secondo (2012) observed in New York City, the 
citizens decided the rules of PB while the poor assumed leadership roles in the process. 
Volunteers from various associations and committees had responsibility for the local 
administration of PB in conjunction with local officials who provided guidance. Thus, the 
space opened up for the usually excluded group to experience leadership (Lerner & 
Secondo, 2012). In each of the three cities, postmortem meetings served to review what 
worked and what did not work during previous rounds of the process. From the feedback, 
the CSOs involved in the process started work immediately to address whatever lessons 
emerged from the just concluded process. 
To boost the interest of low-income citizens in participation, Lerner and Secondo 
(2012) discovered that holding meetings in diverse locations reduced obstacles caused by 
distance. Evening and weekend schedules enabled workers and youths to attend meetings 
at which they participated in the discussions and voted on projects. Venues such as local 
schools were popular places for holding meetings. Skilled facilitators directed the 
meetings and encouraged those who might feel timid or intimidated by vociferous and 
better-educated participants to speak up rather than remain passive. Recruiting 
professional facilitators may require funding where a district does not have volunteers for 
the job. Lerner and Secondo also discovered that the low-income citizens of Chicago, 
New York, and Toronto required repeated invitations before they eventually attended PB 
meetings. Teams of volunteer recruiters went around the districts canvassing for 





Su (2012) observed PB in New York City and commented that New Yorkers, 
mostly the poor who were not engaged in community activities because they distrusted 
the government, became the proposers of ideas. The poor discovered the satisfaction in 
volunteering as delegates for the budget process and voted without any inhibition. The 
organizers of New York’s PB undertook outreach efforts targeted at the poor, and 
predictably, those whom the outreach failed to capture remained excluded from the 
process. Sixteen-year-old youths were also actively engaged in New York City PB 
process.  
In spite of the fact that youths under the age of 18 could not vote during national 
elections, the 16-year-old participants were able to participate in the budget process and 
voted. Participating youths learned to form interest groups to support their project ideas, 
and they soon understood the need to form alliances with adult groups. The adults 
expressed surprise at the contributions of the youths and soon embraced the youths as 
important stakeholders in community affairs. In confirming that there is no best practice 
in PB, Su posited that there is no fixed modus operandi, but the process should evolve to 
take account of local dynamics for the maximum benefits of all stakeholders. Su went 
further to suggest the need for the long-term engagement of participants to ensure 
effective implementation and monitoring of projects. 
Summarizing Participatory Budgeting 
Participatory budget is by no means a panacea for resolving socio-economic 
issues. Expectations should be within the bounds of its definition. Participatory budgeting 
is an annual process that allows citizens as individuals or in organized groups to 





process. Unless deliberate good budgeting strategies co-exist and blend with PB, the 
result could be similar to what obtained in Porto Alegre between 1995 and 1999 when the 
rate of unemployment increased to nearly 80%, and consequently, the number of poor 
people grew by 20% (Baierle, 2009). Lamentably, in the same period, income disparity 
broadened by as much as 16%.  
With good intentions at the local level, the best PB practices cannot create jobs, or 
reduce poverty where the macroeconomic policies of the central government do not 
promote economic growth (Goldfrank, 2007). In spite of its failure to alleviate poverty in 
Brazil, PB has been successful in health and education (Menegat, 2002; Su, 2010; 
Wampler, 2007). As Goldfrank (2007) posited, macroeconomic policies should strive for 
the inclusion of citizens in fiscal debates, be transparent, and promote pro-poor policies 
to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor to achieve poverty reduction. 
The World Bank, the United Nation, and some left-leaning governments have 
encouraged the ubiquity of PB worldwide, particularly in developing economies (Fung & 
Wright, 2001; Goldfrank, 2007). The belief by these organizations and governments is 
that participatory institutions, specifically, PB, create an atmosphere of good governance. 
The evidence points to success stories of PB in several cities (Avritzer, 2012; Avritzer, 
2010; Fung & Wright, 2001; Wampler, 2012a). There has been no empirical evidence to 
demonstrate that cities yet to adopted PB have produced different outcomes than cities 
that have adopted it (Boulding & Wampler, 2010). The failure of PB has been most 
noticeable in its inability to reduce poverty, or improve social wellbeing of citizens. The 





saving policies, as well as revenue generating initiatives that encourage transparency, 
which discourages corruption and reduces bureaucratic bottlenecks. 
These facts notwithstanding, the civic benefits of PB are essential in assessing its 
overall impact on poverty and social wellbeing (Catell, 2004; Boulding & Wampler, 
2010). Benefits such as citizen empowerment, providing public platforms for the poor to 
have a voice, and the creation of politically aware citizenry are laudable attributes that 
provide enough stimuli for the spread of PB (Boulding & Wampler, 2010). Participatory 
budgeting and similar participatory institutions serve to improve relations between the 
state and the citizens, promote transparency, and improve government performance. 
Integrating Participatory Budgeting with Strategic Planning 
In 1990, the Workers’ Party administration in Porto Alegre streamlined the 
process of setting budgetary priorities. A team of experts in strategic planning attached to 
the mayor’s office designed the structure of PB in response to the administration’s 
request (Menegat, 2002). Thus, PB was born out of strategic planning and hence the 
similarities in the structures and processes of PB and strategic planning (Abers, 2001; 
Menegat, 2002). Bryson (2011) defined strategic planning “as a deliberate, disciplined 
approach” to essential decision making and taking particular actions that direct the 
purpose and the existential stratagem of an organization (pp. 7-8). Strategic planning 
provides the roadmap to organization leaders to determine courses of action and to 
provide the basis for those actions (Bryson, 2011).  
By design, strategic planning gains its effectiveness from broad deliberative 
interactions among all stakeholders of an organization. Deliberations within strategic 





engage in persuasive negotiations for competing alternatives based on reasoned and 
convincing arguments (Steiner, 1997). The challenge for managers is to facilitate 
collective thinking, learning and actions among the stakeholders without domination by 
any group of stakeholders or a dominant individual (Innes & Booher, 2010).  
Organizations engage in strategic planning to determine what rational actions to 
undertake to project the organization’s goals and to fulfill its mandates. Strategic 
planning aids in developing organizational capacity to deliver services effectively, 
economically, and efficiently (Bryson, 2011). This linkage connects the stakeholders with 
established structures, processes, available resources, and the political environment to 
produce the kind or organizational efficiency that fulfills the mission, goals, and 
mandates of the organization. Therefore, the deliberative nature of strategic planning 
makes it an attractive approach for governments and nonprofits organizations to address 
social problems. 
Figure 2 is a model of an approach to strategic planning suggested by Bryson 
(2011). In this model for local governments, the council manager initiates the process of 
strategic planning, the ownership of which belongs to elected officials. Council managers 
recognize the importance of cooperation between elected officials and various groups in 
the community. By its nature, and similar to PB, strategic planning is capable of 
generating enthusiastic participation by entire communities in the interest of building a 
sustainable future. By discussing community values, vision, and mission early in the 
process, participants learn about the strategy of the community to improve the standard of 





statement projects the raison d'être of the community and it provide a source of 
community pride around which the citizens rally for collective motivation.  
Assessing the internal and external environments of the community provides the 
guide for the community to prepare for events that could cause disruptions and those 
events that present opportunities for the society. Internal environmental factors include 
the quality of elected officials, the employees, and the ability of these individuals to think 
critically and absorb new ideas (Gordon, 2005). External factors include 
macroeconomics, the political environment, the legal and regulatory environments, and 
the physical context of the locality (Bryson, 2011).  
Strategic planning takes a medium to a long-term approach to setting goals and 
objectives. The goals and objectives feed into the vision of the locality (Gordon, 2005). 
The plan outlines the purpose of each objective and the transparent means by which the 
district measures its performance. An important feature of strategic planning is the review 
and evaluation of the plan, the programs, and the projects it sets out to accomplish 
(Steiner, 1997). The locality sets criteria for performance measurement that determine 
cost efficiency, program effectiveness, and the impact of the plan of the municipality as a 
whole (Innes & Booher, 2010). Since performance measurement is a continuous process, 
strategic plans go through reviews and amendments to reflect emerging realities. For this 
reason, the locality needs to collect data that will guide the management of the locality to 
take prompt actions to maintain effective and efficient performance. 
Participatory budgeting emerged as a process in response to urgent demands of 
the needy majority in Brazilian communities (Cabannes, 2004). Because of the need to 





(2004), fails to fit in with most municipalities’ longer-term strategies and sustainable 
development plans. The challenge for government officials is to integrate the needs for 
community or neighborhood development with local government-wide physical and 
fiscal planning strategies. When the Workers’ Party introduced PB to Santo Andre, São 
Paulo, Brazil and Rosario, Argentina, it was with strong linkage to the localities’ strategic 
plans because the budgets of the strategic planning process spanned five to ten years, 
creating sustainable planning approach to governance and public policy (Menegat, 2002). 
Therefore, I propose an integration of PB into strategic planning process as shown in 
Figure 2, for more effective, longer term, strategic and sustainable development 
engendered by strategic planning. 
 Participatory budgeting stands to gain some added benefits if it is integrated 
within strategic planning structure. Government officials and politicians can better 
understand the context of budgeting when they consider various strategies, and how best 
to attain those strategies (Steiner, 1997). They are thus able to guide the process of PB to 
align with the local government’s objectives, overall budget performance, and future 
strategic implications of agreed actions (Gordon, 2005; Innes & Booher, 2010). 
Consequently, officials can coordinate various demands of the citizens for improved 
service delivery while government becomes responsive by fulfilling its mandates, 
obligation, and creating meaningful public value (Bryson, 2011). 
Local Governance in Nigeria 
The main purpose of local government administration in Nigeria, as with other nations 
that use this tier of governance, is to ensure that every citizen, regardless of his or her 





Muhammed, 2012). Local officials under the local government arrangement are 
responsible and accountable to the communities under their purview. Under Nigeria’s 
1999 constitution, local governments are institutions of decentralized governance, the aim 
of which is to create national integration, efficient governance, and transparent 
administration (Adesopo, 2011; Bashir & Muhammed, 2012). 
The Nigerian constitutional aspiration is that of active democratic participation that 
ultimately resonates at the national space. Therefore, the demands of the grassroots get 
the attention of the states and the central government for macroeconomic strategic 
planning. Bashir and Muhammed (2012) observed that the system has so far failed to 
deliver the expected political development and socioeconomic outcomes. This failure, 
posited Bashir and Muhammed (2012), has dogged freedom, liberty, and individual 
empowerment, but instead, it has entrenched perennial poverty and ignorance.  
For too long, the political system in Nigeria failed to improve the general living 
standards of citizens, especially the poorer population (Adesopo, 2011). The absence of 
participation by those who government policies affect is evident in the nonexistence or 
inadequacy of basic amenities such as roads, portable water supply, schools, and health 
care facilities (Dobson, 2005). These failures are not because of scarce local government 
resources but because of opaque administration over local funds, lack of accountability, 
corruption, and wanton disregard for the rule of law (Bashir & Muhammed, 2012; 
Dobson, 2005). 
Because of previous military regimes in Nigeria, there has been legitimacy crisis 
in the polity. By ensuring equality of all citizens demonstrated through grassroots 






Figure 2. A suggested model integrating participatory budgeting into strategic planning process: 
A visual representation partly designed from the narrative in “Strategic Planning: For Public and 
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yet overcome the legitimacy crisis (Avritzer, 2012). As Heller (2012) posited, when the 
lower economic class overcomes the myriads of obstacles to collective action, secures the 
anticipated gains of democracy. The role of civil society in this task is very pivotal to 
achieving the aspiration because through organizing for collective action, lasting changes 
could take place to create Rousseau’s community of equals (Pateman, 1995). 
The absence of several of the real virtues of budgeting has characterized 
government budgeting in Nigeria (Agbude & Egbide, 2012). In the absence of 
transparency and accountability, guided by institutionalized budget discipline, the 
country continues to suffer under the burden of waste, abuse, and fraud, the consequence 
of which is lingering underdevelopment. According to Agbude and Egbide, the level of 
underdevelopment in Nigeria, notwithstanding its wealth of crude oil reserve being the 
sixth largest producer, is a paradoxical embarrassment to the African continent. 
Reversing this trend requires good governance and by embracing the virtues of good 
budget practices (Agbude & Egbide, 2012). Because of the inherent weaknesses in 
governance, the urbanization of Nigeria and its attendant demand for infrastructure has 
left the government bewildered about how to tackle the problems. As more Nigerians 
move to urban centers, the growth of slums has been alarming due to lack of planning, 
especially in the areas of sanitation and waste management (Omar, 2013).  
The largest city in Nigeria is Lagos, which has fast become a city-state with 
massive conurbation that has elevated its status to that of a megacity with a population of 
over 14 million inhabitants. In the opinion of Agbude and Egbide, the government needs 
to focus on providing shelter to combat overcrowding, mass transportation, infrastructure, 





Methodology in Literature 
Since 1985 when PB took off in Porto Alegre, Brazil, there has been a burgeoning 
body of literature on both participatory democracy and PB. Authors and researchers have 
extensively examined the former through the prism of the latter thereby achieving 
empiricism through a variety of research methods depending on the questions the 
researchers set out to answer. Some inquiries into participatory democracy and 
institutions took the form of case studies, gathering data from purposively selected 
informants who participated in participatory processes especially PB (Bashir & 
Muhammed, 2012; Bowen, 2008; Dobson, 2005; Donaghy, 2010). Alternatively, other 
researchers conducted surveys of individual citizens who had engaged in participatory 
institutions in one capacity or the other (Houtzager & Lavalle, 2010; Marien, Hooghe, & 
Quintelier, 2010; Schier, 2000; Wampler, 2007; Wampler, 2012a).  
The two alternate methods served different research objectives. According to 
Houtzager and Lavalle (2010), those who used surveys to collect data identified the 
features of the democratic institutions or those of civil society through the characteristics 
of the individuals that participated in the studies. On the other hand, researchers who 
adopted the case study and interviewing designs did so to generalize their findings on 
participatory governance, which often involved civil society. They achieved their aims by 
using characteristic modes of practice, dictated by the political terrain, to generalize 
conceptual or theoretical assertions, albeit space and time limited the studies. 
 Peruzzotti (2012) employed the review of the literature in the position paper, to 
probe noticeable advancements in the participatory space especially democratic 





honed in on the innovations involving CSOs as protagonists of accountability. Peruzzotti 
concluded that, with the progress made in participatory democracy, citizens have the 
opportunities to demand and to promote accountability. Monitoring accountability shifted 
to civil society and other social actors whose objectives were to encourage responsible, 
responsive, open, and accountable governance. Participatory institutions hold public 
officials accountable, not at election cycles but at all moments during the life of a 
government. 
Discussion and position papers are quite common on discourses pertaining to PB 
and other participatory institutions. Baierle (2009) presented a thesis highlighting a 
number of issues on PB in the discussion paper on the anticipated challenges and 
roadblocks in the path of PB. In a similar vein, Avritzer (2010) presented a discussion 
paper on the development of PB and its transformative effects on the living standards of 
the poor in Brazil and its spread across the globe. 
Goldfrank (2007) engaged the use of the wealth of literature on participatory 
democracy and budgeting to analyze why some PB experiments failed, and others 
succeeded. Goldfrank (2007) established the connections between decentralized 
administrative styles, funding, and active civil society as the drivers of meaningful 
program designs. 
Participatory democracy researchers have also used quantitative and mixed 
methodology methods of research inquiry especially when they sought external validity 
and generalizability of their findings. Wampler (2012a) used secondary data from a 
survey of 833 elected officials involved with PB in Brazil to evaluate the effectiveness of 





with the quantitative method of research, the study used a random sampling method to 
select the survey participants from among the delegates who had taken part in PB. The 
study identified four categories of civil society organization actors, namely (a) leaders, 
(b) members, (c) ex-members, and (d) those citizens who had civic engagements without 
affiliations with any particular organizations.  
Wampler (2012a) used logistic regression where agenda setting, political 
strategies, and arena shopping served as the dependent variables to examine how 
particular public activities carried out by these individuals translated into cooperation 
with government mandated participatory institutions. With only one instance in the 
agenda setting variable – who sets internal debate – CSO leaders were significantly more 
likely to be involved with agenda setting (p < 0.05), political strategies (p < 0.001), and 
arena shopping (p < 0.001) than any other group of citizens (p. 352). At the same 
confidence level, the leaders were 17% more likely to determine they collaborate with 
other CSOs rather than the government than PB winners whose projects were adopted. 
The same leaders were 5% more likely than their members and 8% more likely than PB 
project winners to collaborate with other groups to influence decision making, and to 
distribute public goods in various participatory spaces (p. 354).   
In the exploratory study of Michels and De Graaf (2010), the authors used the 
mixed methods to assess the role of citizens who participate in public decision-making 
processes and to define the degree to which these citizens influence policies. The data for 
the qualitative case study design came from in-depth interviewing of eight informants 
including government officials, businesspersons, and professional association 





survey of 272 citizens who had participated in various participatory institutions including 
PB. 
The phenomenological study by Owusu-Achiaw (2013) examined the effect of 
participation on housing for the poor from the perspectives of the beneficiaries of social 
housing. The interviews of purposively sampled 120 residents of the housing scheme 
provided the data for the study. The study found that, without community involvement in 
decisions about their environment, policy makers failed to provide what people needed. 
Owusu-Achiaw identified the need for communities to disseminate information among its 
citizens such that decision making on the part of the residents relies on the awareness of 
such information. 
Using secondary data from the literature on participatory democracy, Fung (2006) 
developed a framework that provided a better understanding of various participatory 
institutions from three perspectives: who participates, how the participants communicate 
to make decisions, and the linkage between public policy and the deliberations by the 
participants. The research addressed the typology of participation and by how much 
participation was necessary for effective participatory governance. Fung (2006) posited 
in this article that participation ultimately should achieve the three fundamental 
democratic principles of “legitimacy, justice, and effectiveness of public action” (p. 73). 
Fung further posited that participatory designs are effective for the particular 
environment the designers have in mind. Therefore, there is no best practice; rather the 
process continually evolves within the context of the particular locus or arena, 





The case study design was the choice of Bowen (2008) in a study of eight 
Jamaican communities. The study focused on what participants understood and 
associated with pro-poor initiatives. It was a follow-up study to a grounded theory study. 
Nonparticipant observations and review of public documents provided the triangulating 
data for the study.  
Drawing on the theory of representation, Houtzager and Lavalle (2010) in their 
qualitative study utilized the case study design to explore civil society’s claims to 
representation and the contextual meaning of representation to participatory governance. 
Data gathering was through secondary data from surveys of NGOs that work with poor 
communities in the megacities São Paulo, Delhi, and Mexico City. The secondary data 
also included interviews with 229 NGOs engaged with residents of poor urban 
communities. The participant selection was by the snowballing method where 
participants referred the researchers to others whom they believe could provide 
meaningful data for the research.  
Houtzager and Lavalle honed in on the São Paulo survey because of the extensive 
Brazilian leading experience with participatory institutions. The researchers examined the 
claims of the NGOs to representing the people in political spaces, and the evidence to 
support the claims. The research found that CSOs in São Paulo were politically active, 
influencing the various stages that led to the formation of public policies. While the 
survey indicated that participants did not believe civil society was an alternative to 
democratic institutions, the research concluded that civil society had become the 





Khuluq (2008) used the case study design to understand the implementation 
process of the various poverty alleviation agenda of three districts of Indonesia. The data 
provided the qualitative tool to analyze the effects those programs had on the living 
standards of the poor. It was a comparative case study of two villages, which collected 
data from the semi-structured interview of purposively selected participants consisting of 
petty traders, artisans, teachers, government officials, and representatives of civil society. 
Other triangulating data sources were from state documents and participant observations. 
The study found that when policies succeeded in improving the lives of the poor, the poor 
participated with enthusiasm in government programs and did away with the passivism. 
Out of necessity, the poor united in the fight against poverty to improve their economic 
status, rather than the old selfish approach to individual or parochial survival. 
This study benefited from the qualitative approach, using the interviewing design 
that best answers the research questions in Chapter 1. It provides the model for better 
understanding of the practice of PB in the particular case of Ijede LCDA from the 
subjective experience of individuals who had experienced the process. Through 
interviewing of purposively selected participants, and the review of PB process 
documents from prior years, the study will contribute to strengthening the process of PB 
at Ijede LCDA. 
Summary 
Participatory budgeting is a relatively recent process in Nigeria. The outcome of 
PB in Brazil encouraged the United Nations and the World Bank. Porto Alegre is the 
quintessential example of successful PB, which these institutions highlighted worldwide. 





democracy begins and ends with the ability to vote in general elections. Beyond voting, 
there is the lack of interest in engaging the political class directly in dialogues on matters 
that affect daily lives (Adesopo, 2011; Bashir & Muhammed, 2012; Bowen, 2008; 
Donaghy, 2010; Ganuza & Frances, 2012; Leduka, 2009). Circa 2007, Nigeria adopted 
PB along with several other Sub-Saharan African nations (Adesopo, 2011). The provision 
of technical and financial assistance by national and international agencies, the 
availability of adequate budgetary allocations, and the active involvement of CSOs are 
some of the enabling dynamics that have contributed to the success of PB (Avritzer, 
2009; Baierle, 2009; Bherer, 2010; Goldfrank, 2007). 
The two frameworks that drive this study include Avritzer’s (2009) theory of 
participatory institutions establishing a tripartite relationship between civil society, the 
political society, and institutional design. The effectiveness of the relationship between 
the three institutions, in turn, determines the outcomes of PB as the other framework for 
this study. The willingness of the political class to cede some power under PB, the 
promotion of pro-poor policies, and redistribution agenda have been the stimulants 
encouraging participation by ordinary citizens (Postigo, 2010). 
As with other participatory democratic institutions, citizens who participate in PB 
learn civic activities and responsibilities through practice and thus improve the quality of 
the electorates (Hamlett & Cobb, 2006). Citizens learn to think of collective goals and 
benefits rather than personal gains and selfish agitations. Some of the aims of the PB 
process include the elimination of clientelism, combating corruption through a 
transparent budget process, and the reversal of socio-political exclusion of low economic 





improve the type and quality of services that meet the needs of the citizens, the 
contributions of ordinary citizens should be the source of information for government 
officials.  
Alves and Allegretti (2012) used the concepts of fragility and volatility to identify 
sustainability problems such as the absence of legal framework to protect the process 
from abandonment by Right-wing politicians. The researchers identified the quest for the 
establishment of a perfect PB process, regime changes, and political alliances as other 
issues that could threaten PB. There is unanimity among authors that there is no best 
practice in PB, and each locality would need to consider its sociocultural, political, and 
economic dynamics to determine what mix produces the best outcomes. 
The review of literature explored the concept of integrating PB with strategic 
planning given the high likelihood of project abandonment due to lack of funds, time to 
complete projects, and regime changes particularly in the case of Ijede LCDA and 
Nigeria. Participatory budgeting is an adaptation of strategic planning by a team of 
experts attached to the office of the mayor of Porto Alegre, Brazil (Menegat, 2002). The 
challenge for PB organizers is the measurement of the performance of the process, which 
strategic planning and its medium to long-term approach are designed to achieve 
(Gordon, 2005).  
Some essential components of successful participatory outcomes include the role 
of CSOs in the training and empowering of citizens, the willingness of the state to 
mandate the process and provide adequate financial resources, and the private sector 
corporate social responsibility initiatives. This study examined the influence of this mix 





In Chapter 3, I describe the research methodology, the locus of the study, and the 
purposive nature of informant selection to provide the data for this study. The chapter 
provides details of the process as practiced at the particular setting. Chapter 4 details the 
data analysis strategy, process, and interpretation. In Chapter 5, I present the discussion 





Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
 It is not known whether and how civil society empowers citizens to participate in 
the participatory budgeting (PB) process. Specially, it is not known whether and how 
civil society can empower citizens of Ijede LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria to participate in 
the PB process. The purpose of this qualitative case study was to gain a better 
understanding of the role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of 
Ijede LCDA in order for them to participate in the budgetary decision-making processes. 
The research questions of this study interrogated various elements that identify the 
dynamics CSOs need to consider in coordinating their activities to empower the citizenry. 
 Data collection for the study was conducted through interviews with purposively 
selected participants consisting of residents of the community, government officials, 
politicians, and representatives of CSOs that are active in the local government. The 
study reviewed budget documents for the fiscal years 2012 through 2014. The local 
government did not maintain official records of past PB processes. 
In this chapter, I present the research paradigm that directed the data gathering 
process for this study. The research questions determined the qualitative methodological 
approach. In the first section of this chapter, I lay out the details of the research 
methodology, the description of the locus of the study, the participants, and the method of 
participant selection. In the third section, I discuss the data collection, method of data 
analysis, and finally, I present the discourse on ethics in research and the protection of the 






As stated in Chapter 1, the research questions for this study drive the investigation 
and choice of a case study approach. The choice of the constructivist paradigm to which 
the case study design belongs was driven by the research questions, which were designed 
to collect rich data from the narratives of the research participants. The participants 
provided the information that revealed the particulars the research questions set out to 
investigate; namely, the activities of NGOs and their roles in mobilizing the community 
to participate in PB. 
RQ1:   What roles do nongovernmental organizations play in the design structure of the 
PB process at Ijede LCDA? 
RQ2: What resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at 
Ijede LCDA?  
RQ3:  What local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business 
community in the PB process?  
RQ4: What sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected 
projects? 
These research questions were designed to extract from the participants the 
essential factors needed for citizens to possess the ability to interact with the government 
over budgetary allocations and spending in a PB process. The interview questions 
examined the roles of NGOs, if any, in empowering citizens to acquire the necessary 
skills to engage the government effectively. 
Research question 1 addressed the problem statement by investigating the roles of 





and benefit from, the objectives of interacting with the government. The question also 
examined the methods NGOs adopt to interface with the citizens toward their 
empowerment. Research question 2 unraveled, through the intuitive perception of the 
participants, the activities CSOs needed to embark on to empower the citizens towards 
participating in the PB process at Ijede LCDA in Lagos state, Nigeria. 
Idemudia (2009) conjectured that some corporate organizations do reinvest in 
communities by providing funds, materials and equipment towards the execution of 
community projects because financial resources are hardly adequate for local and 
municipal administrations to fund PB. Thus, in their advocacy role, NGOs are expected 
to interface with corporations to participate in community projects.  
Research question 3 explored, through the experiences of the participants, the 
underlying factors that encouraged corporations to fill the resources gap experienced by 
governments. Essential to the success of PB is the intervention by NGOs establishing 
connections with corporations to create awareness about community needs. Research 
question 4 was also exploratory, surveying the sustainability strategies the government 
could consider to ensure citizen-selected projects are completed and maintained. This 
research question has the potential to lead to policy changes requiring the government to 
consider some sustainability strategies such as medium-term to long-term budgeting, and 
increased funding for PB. 
Together, these research questions provided the background for the collection of 
relevant data during the semi-structured one-on-one interviewing, the follow-up 





understanding of the role of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of 
Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in the budgetary decision making. 
Qualitative Method 
The qualitative approach is a social constructivist and naturalistic paradigm 
researchers use to understand their existence and their world (Marshall & Rossman, 
2011; Miller & Salkind, 2002). Researchers who engage in this approach gather most of 
their evidence through open-ended interviews with individuals who live phenomena 
under inquiry in the study (Kvale, 1996; Seidman, 2006). Creswell (2009) discussed the 
social constructivist paradigm along with the advocacy and participatory model. Sharing 
knowledge through social construction, researchers are able to organize relational 
patterns of thoughts and behaviors to give meaning to the experiences of  research 
subjects (Yin, 1994). Advocacy and participatory models present the opportunity for a 
researcher to investigate the socioeconomic issues of poverty, oppression, inequality, and 
empowerment (Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Patton, 2002). Researchers in this area, 
through advocacy, appeal to the conscience of society about the plight of marginalized 
citizens.  
Yin (2012) described as a compelling feature of the case study design the need to 
acquire in-depth understanding of phenomena in a real world context. Consequently, data 
collection for the case the study design occurs in the natural setting of the unit of 
analysis. Such an embedded mode of research produces new insights and learning.  Case 
study research outcomes have been applied to the evaluation of process initiatives and to 
document the analyses of the results of social experiments in public policy decision 





There are various research traditions under the qualitative paradigm. Common 
among these are: ethnography, grounded theory, phenomenology, and case studies 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2011; Patton, 2002).  
Yin (2009) identified interviewing as a very important method for collecting 
information for case studies. Interviewing is a significant part of the case study design 
and is widely used in process evaluation research into sociopolitical programs and 
initiatives and social projects by governments and NGOs (Kvale, 1996; Yin, 2012). 
Interviewing permits the inclusion of a broad range of context and other conditions 
without restricting the researcher to remote variables (Seidman, 2006; Yin, 2012). 
Interviewing assumes that the researcher has some strategic interest in the activities of the 
participants at a particular point in their lives. Blumer (1969) submitted that through 
interviewing, the participants grant context access to the researcher to understand their 
actions, behaviors, and meanings. In effect, the meaning people ascribe to their 
experiences determines the manner in which they pass through those experiences 
(Mishler, 1991; Seidman, 2006).  
Although there are various forms of interviews, such as in surveys where close-
ended questions are appropriate, the open-ended interview questions used in case studies 
enable the researcher to convert interview respondents into informants (Yin 2009).  The 
researcher, according to Yin (1994) can ask for the respondents’ opinions about aspects 
of the phenomenon under study or about specific events or to suggest personal insights 
(Yin 1994). Such personal insights often provide the researcher the opportunity for 






In conformity with Yin’s (2012) clarification of what constitutes the case in case 
the study design, this study’s unit of analysis is the PB process at Ijede LCDA of Lagos 
State, Nigeria, one of the local governments that should have completed five rounds of 
PB. As a bounded entity, “the boundary between the case and its contextual conditions – 
in both spatial and temporal dimensions – may be blurred” (Yin, 2012, p. 6).  For this 
study, the PB program in Ijede LCDA is the case but without definitive boundary 
between the PB process at the LCDA, and its space and time. A single case study site 
avoids diluting the details of the study and provides robust analysis of the context of the 
development of a novel phenomenon (Wolcott, 2008). The selection of Ijede LCDA was 
purposeful because of the ease of access to the site through a trusted gatekeeper, the 
Council Manager, whose position offered access to the participants.   
In 1999, the Lagos State government, in a controversial political maneuver, 
created 37 new local governments out of the existing 23. The move was controversial 
because the federal government opposed it due to the belief that the creation of additional 
local governments would increase the amount of federal allocations to the state. Ijede 
LCDA, along with the other local governments and LCDAs in the state, did not receive 
the statutory allocation of funds from the government at the center for nearly nine years. 
In spite of the nonpayment of its statutory allocations, Lagos State government was able 
to fund local administrations, albeit with far fewer resources than should have been 
available (Ugoh & Ukpere, 2009). Consequently, development was on hold for 9 years. 
Ijede is an old, semi-rural town with a history dating back further than 650 years 





Lagoon. Fishing was the mainstay of the people of Ijede. However, as the economy of 
Lagos State grew, the proximity of Ijede has attracted low income and middle-class 
dwellers who commute to work in the city of Lagos daily. 
The presence of federal and state institutions has been sustaining the economic 
activities in Ijede. The LCDA has a number of government institutions including: 
schools, hospitals, community health centers, ferry terminals, a federal government-
owned gas company, an oil palm plantation, and some housing estates. The majority of 
the inhabitants of Ijede are poor, and citizens look to the LCDA to enact policies that 
would address poverty and improve their economic status. Ijede LCDA, like most local 
governments in Nigeria, is in need of a network of roads, housing, electricity, and other 
essential social services and amenities. However, according to Khalil and Adelabu 
(2012), the most urgent need is for the people to engage local officials to identify 
priorities, obtain the commitment of the government to address those priorities, and hold 
the government accountable for its actions. Participatory budgeting has presented such 
opportunity.  
Population and Sample 
The method of selecting participants for this study was purposive sampling that 
ensured the collection of relevant and useful data from those with sufficient PB 
experience in the LCDA. This kind of criterion sampling is useful where informants have 
had direct exposure to the phenomenon under study (Yin, 1994). The sample population 
provided the required information to understand the roles of actors in PB. This study 
embraced Yin’s (2012) approach to the population, sample selection, and sample size. 





servants, the elected representatives, and the members of NGOs active in the community, 
all of whom had previously participated in PB.  
The study sample of 30 participants was drawn from this population. There were 
15 one-on-one interviews and two focus group discussions including five participants 
each. The focus group discussants were selected based on the usefulness of the 
information they provided at the individual interview stage. Each category of participants 
was represented in the focus groups. The focus group discussions encouraged the 
participants to generate spontaneous and emotional conversations. A large focus group 
could become unwieldy and beyond the interviewer’s control (Kvale, 1996; Seidman, 
2006).  
The study population consisted of adult citizens of Ijede LCDA: the civil servants, 
the elected representatives, and the members of NGOs who were active in the 
community. Participants were purposively selected for their previous PB experiences. 
The other criteria for participant selection included literacy, ability to communicate in 
English, and availability for the in-person interview and discussion sessions. See 
Appendix A for study population criteria. The sample size (n = 15) was sufficient to 
minimize the risk of participant attrition, and according to Marshall and Rossman, 
(2011), the diversity of the population group required such large sample, in order to 
enhance transferability. 
Participant Selection Process 
The gatekeeper provided assistance to locate individuals who met the participant 
criteria for this study (Patton, 2002). The gatekeeper made initial contact with the 





telephone numbers and email addresses of each willing individual. I contacted the 
participants to provide detailed information about the study, confirmed their 
qualifications under the participant criteria, and obtained the agreement of each 
individual to participate voluntarily in the study. 
Informed consent procedure 
Research participants should be informed of the risks and benefits of taking part 
in research studies and be informed of the voluntary nature of their participation 
(Rudestam & Newton, 2007). The process of obtaining participants’ consent to be part of 
this study was by telephone, explaining the purpose of the study and the criteria under 
which participants qualified.  I requested via short message services (SMS) that the 
participants send their email addresses  so that they could receive the informed consent . 
The informed consent provided details of the research topic and purpose, specifying the 
criteria for including the participants in this study.  
The initial correspondence included some sample questions, the estimated 45 to 
90 minutes time allotment for each of the two interviews, in which the participants were 
involved, and the risks and the mitigation of the risks to which the participants might be 
exposed. It also stated the voluntary nature of participation, the equivalent of $10 reward 
for each interview, and the freedom to withdraw from the study at any time. Participants 
were encouraged to communicate questions, concerns or any other issues that needed 
clarification to the researcher or to an appropriate representative of the institutional 
review board of Walden University, who was identified in the consent document. The 
participants were given up to a week to consider the conditions stated in informed 





venue of the interviews, each participant was handed two copies of the informed consent; 
one to be signed, dated and returned to me and the other to be retained for the 
participant’s record. 
Confidentiality 
 To ensure the confidentiality of the participants in this study, I expunged from the 
data, all references to identifying information. I retained sufficient information in field 
notes to identify the participants for member checking. A professor of intercultural 
communication at Iowa Wesleyan College undertook the data transcription, a fee based 
service rendered in a consulting capacity. He is an experienced communications expert 
with expertise in data transcription. The service is necessary to ensure accurate and 
detailed transcription. In addition, under consideration was the short turnaround time that 
made member checking possible during fieldwork and not several weeks thereafter when 
participants might not have full and accurate recall of their accounts.  
The transcriber signed a confidentiality agreement for the data transcription 
service. During data collection, I uploaded the audio files of the recorded interview to the 
transcriber via an encrypted link to an iCloud account I set up for the fieldwork. The 
transcriber returned the transcripts to me via an encrypted link from the transcriber’s 
iCloud account. The transcriber deleted the interview audio files and transcripts of the 
interviews as soon as I completed member checking satisfactorily. I encrypted all audio 
files I generated during the fieldwork and I backed them up to iCloud. I deleted all the 
recorded interviews on my phone and on my computer after backing them up to iCloud. I 
will retain the data I collected for this study in my secure iCloud account for the 





Sharing Study Results with Stakeholders 
The study participants and the community, through the Ijede Community Online 
News, and the website of Ijede Development Foundation (IDF), will have the opportunity 
to read the summary of the results of this study as Stake (1995) recommended. The 
community holds monthly fora at which attendees deliberate on issues of concern to the 
community. The Ijede community, at one of these fora, will have the opportunity to 
discuss the results of this study. Policymakers and other stakeholder are inspired and 
likely to take action because of media interests and public opinions. Therefore, there 
should be a platform for stakeholder feedback to attract the attention of policymakers in 
the community and the broader Nigerian space. The successful adoption of results and 
recommendations of this study by the Ijede LCDA could pave the way for its presentation 
and adoption at larger fora at state and national levels.  
The Interview Protocol 
The interview protocol for this study was standardized open-ended questioning 
with structured wordings designed to capture, in general, the same information from 
participants in the same group as recommended by Gall, Gall, and Borg (2003) and Kvale 
(1996);. The dialogues thus focused on the main points of the interviews and flexible 
enough for probing questions to explicate additional information from the participants.  
The interviews took place at a conference room in a hotel located within Ijede 
Community. The hotel and its facilities were adequate for hosting the interviews. The 
one-on-one interviews lasted between 17 and 47 minutes. As with the one-on-one 
interviews, I facilitated and moderated the two focus group discussions, which lasted 





telephone application, which was located close to the participants. Additionally, the 
Microsoft Word TM version of Apple TM MacBook laptop, which has the capacity for 
audio recording and annotation at various timelines, acted as backup recording device.  
To ensure confidentiality of the focus group participants, I instructed the 
participants on the importance of discretion during the discussions, which proceed 
without referring to anyone by name but by pre-assigned alphanumeric identifiers. I 
devised a list of identifiers, each unique to each participant to maintain anonymity 
(Rudestam & Newton,  2007). I applied the identifiers in place of participants’ names on 
all the notes taken during the group discussions. The recordings on iTalk contained 
prompts to indicate speakers’ identifier, which I annotated on the recording timeline on 
the Microsoft Word media recorder. 
Rudestam and Newton recognized difficulties such as domination of discussions 
by some individuals or muted participation by some women, which were addressed by 
requesting contributions from less active participants, respectfully thanking the dominant 
contributors and allowing other participants to provide alternative perspectives. I made 
deliberate eye contact with others who might want to contribute to the discussions 
whenever the opportunity arose. This study had a participant pool of 16 from which only 
15 were required. The proposed target for the participant pool was 30. The interview 
protocols for the one-on-one interviews, the focus group interviews, and the document 
review protocols are in Appendices B through F. 
At the conclusion of each focus group discussion, the participants had sufficient 
opportunity to ask questions. Kvale (1996) suggested participants confirm the clarity and 





reactions to any aspects of the research. The participants were interactive and spoke 
freely throughout the discussions. Finally, with gratitude, I reminded the participants of 
the content of the informed consent form and the contact information contained therein, 
should there be the need to clarify any issues or desire to be informed of the study result. 
Validation of Interview Questions 
The interview questions were specifically constructed for this study, and they 
were subjected to validation of application as de Vaus (2001) recommended. To ensure 
content validity of range of meanings, and the reliability that the interview questions 
would give the same result when used recurrently in varying circumstances, two cross-
cultural communications experts reviewed the interview protocol through a consensual 
validation process. A professor of political science and culture at a leading Midwest 
university who is a prolific writer and researcher, and whose works have focused on 
Nigeria and Africa’s political spaces, and an associate professor at a Southern university, 
who used the interviewing method to interview participants in ethnographic research in 
parts of Africa, validated the interview questions. I chose these professors for their 
contributions to African socio-political commentaries and their expertise in the nuances 
of African sociocultural constructs.  
In reviewing the interview questions, the experts considered the language of the 
interview questions appropriate for the average Nigerian English speaker. While the 
questions were adjudged acceptable, further explanations were suggested for participants 
who, from responses to the first two icebreaker questions, might require additional 
prompting to obtain detailed accounts that contributed to the thick data obtained. In 





responses provided by the participants ensuring concurrence of meanings between the 
researcher and the participants. During data collection, I modulated the language of the 
interview questions to accommodate the level of understanding and verbal articulation of 
the participants. The interview protocols were validated without material alterations, and 
they were used on the field as they were designed.  
Researcher Role 
I had conducted a study of the practice and implementation of PB in six local 
governments in Lagos State, Nigeria, which revealed weak implementation of PB, 
skeptical electorates, and unmotivated state officials. The study further revealed a general 
lack of trust on the part of the citizens in the motive of the state. The poor residents who 
are the targets of PB declined the calls to participate for fear of tax dodger labeling. The 
study also found that rather than encouraging individuals to participate in PB, 
representatives of neighborhood associations were the invited participants. All the 
participants in the research identified inadequate funding as a challenge to development. 
These findings prompted the need for further study into the process of PB in Lagos State. 
None of the participants in the preceding narrative was involved in the present study. 
Therefore, this study and its participants were independent of the prior research. The 
qualitative researcher is a data collection instrument during a research process (Corbin & 
Strauss, 2008). The qualitative researcher designs his or her instruments and does not rely 
on some third party survey questions developed for other purposes. I had the moral 
imperative to collect data as objectively and realistically as possible (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2011). Thus, the task of this researcher, as Kvale (1996) submitted, was to ask 





Kvale’s suggestion, I explored the responses of the participants and extricated their 
meanings from those narratives. My responsibility was to ensure the interviews remained 
focused as structured.. 
This study involved human subjects who provided the data. Consequently, before 
entering the field, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of Walden University ensured 
that the benefits of this research outweighed the risks. As I proceeded to fieldwork, I 
conducted interviews with participants with whom he established some empathetic or 
emotional relationship in the course of collecting data. My duty as the researcher was to 
put the participants at ease such that without undue pressure or influence, the stories they 
were willing to tell unfolded. Because of the large data qualitative research potentially 
produces, the number of participants is usually not very large. Therefore, 15 participants 
were sufficient to reveal information that ranged from personal through controversial to 
subversive all of whom contributed towards answering the research questions and 
influencing the conclusion of this study (Stake, 1995). This researcher in his role ensured 
accuracy and objectivity through member checking and data triangulation strategies. 
Data Collection and Analytical Strategies 
Data were collected from interviewing, focus group discussions, and public 
documents available at the local government (Janesick, 2011; Yin 2009). Transcripts of 
interviews, with all good intentions, might not accurately reflect what transpired during 
the interviews and discussions. This kind of limitation imposes additional burden on 
researchers who wish to ensure the trustworthiness of the data and the subsequent 





The purpose of collecting data was to possess adequate information to answer the 
research questions. According to Yin (2009), data collection strategies available to 
qualitative researchers include individual interviews, documents, direct observations, 
artifacts, and participant observation, which should be derived from two or more sources. 
The preferred data collection strategy for this study was to elicit information through in-
depth, semi-structured, open-ended one-on-one interviews, focus group discussions and 
the review of government records. A fundamental assumption of interviewing is that the 
interviewer is interested in people, but that assumption requires the interviewer to 
suppress personal ego and allow the importance of the participants to prevail (Seidman, 
2006).  
Case studies are directed by the theoretical concepts (Yin, 2012). Therefore, 
Avritver’s (2009) theory of participatory institutions provided the theoretical proposition 
from which this study emerged. The theory contributed to the development of the 
essential methodological steps of this study. Yin (2012) posited that theories assist 
researchers in developing the research questions, defining the research data, directing the 
data analysis, refining the case study design. Theories also play a major role in the 
interpretation of the data. The application of Avritver’s theoretical orientation simplified 
the implementation of this study by providing a number of theory-generated pre codes as 
the foundational guide to data analysis. 
I recorded the interviews without objections from any of the participants. The 
recordings were transcribed verbatim, and copies of the transcripts were shared with the 
participants for member checking. Following the approval of the participants that the 





for the study, coding of the data began. Atlas.tiTM, a qualitative analysis software, was used 
for the coding process. The analytical process categorized the data under various topics or 
pre codes from the literature, the theoretical and conceptual frameworks for easy retrieval 
at any time. Thus, according to Stake (1995), the standardized unit of analysis was either 
a word, a phrase or a complete sentence.  
The initial open codes uncovered meanings and ideas, and they revealed the 
thoughts contained within the texts. Yin (2009) described qualitative data analysis as a 
process seeking matching textual patterns and conflicting or missing information.  The 
patterns form categories of themes around concepts found both the theoretical and 
conceptual frameworks, and in the literature.  Using the tools available in Atlas.ti, some 
concept maps or models emerged to display the interrelationships between codes and 
around concepts and themes graphically (see Appendix H for coding protocol). 
The triangulation of information from multiple sources is an intrinsic element of 
qualitative research (Patton, 2002). In addition to the one-on-one interviews and the focus 
group interviews, government budget documents completed the data triangulation for this 
study. During PB process, the usual practice is to maintain some records of the 
government’s preparation and how citizens are invited and delegates elected. In effect, 
there should be a log of participants, attendees at meetings, and delegates representing the 
citizens. The records should also contain minutes of meetings and the decisions reached. 
The local government did not maintain any records of past PB processes. 
 The government provided budget documents and records of budgetary allocations 
and disbursements for the fiscal years 2012 through 2014. There were no logs of project 





Also, of importance were social factors that played important roles in the decisions of the 
community in its preference for project selection. The type of projects selected by the 
community helped to unravel the strategies and tactics of the people.  
Discrepant Data Analysis 
During data analysis, I sought for evidence of information that might be contrary 
to emerging categories, or data that produced disparate perspectives from the rest of the 
categories. Such disparate cases produced alternative prognosis, which explored during 
the data analytical process. As Scheurich (2001) suggested, discrepant cases provide the 
opportunity for the researcher revise the categories to provide better interpretation of the 
data. Seeking conflicting or missing information is one of the activities in the process of 
data analysis (Yin, 2009). Therefore, the absence of any account or references to the legal 
framework to entrench or institutionalize PB was of particular concern. Without 
supporting legal backing, the process is fragile and vulnerable to the whimsical dictates 
of politicians and civil servants when financial constraints call for competing interests 
over resources.  
Trustworthiness 
Guba (1981) constructed credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability, as the criteria qualitative researchers need to establish the trustworthiness 
of their studies. The criteria as they affect this study are described below. 
 Credibility. Credibility or construct validity is the effort by the qualitative 
researcher to gauge the truth of research findings from the narratives of the participants. 
Yin (2009) points to construct validity as the method used to accurately measure the 





meaningful and true, and to locate the reader vicariously in the study locus, the claims of 
this study derives a substantial proportion of contextually thick data such that sufficient 
information is available to the reader. Triangulating data from public records of past PB 
processes and field notes contributed to the validity of the study. The strategy of 
identifying discrepant cases or data and revising the emerging pattern for alternative 
interpretative analysis increased the credibility of the study (Patton, 2002).  
The source of the researcher bias is the passion as a Nigerian citizen concerned 
about developing an electorate that is sensitive and sufficiently enlightened not to be 
gullible to the manipulations of the political actors. Such bias could have had an impact 
on the data interpretation. As Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested, the researcher 
solicited the participants’ input in member checking, interpretation of the data for 
accuracy, and conformity with the participants’ meanings of their narratives. 
Transferability. Merriam (1998) and Yin (2009) described transferability as the 
extent to which common characteristics between the study population and a broader 
population could make the findings apply to subsets of the population. In naturalistic 
studies, each case is unique and findings are not transferable (Guba, 1981; Yin, 2009). In 
spite of this restriction, Stake (1995) suggested that each case is in some way a reflection 
of the broader population and the researcher should not reject transferability. Instead, the 
onus is on interested follow-up researchers to make the case for transferability having 
determined that adequate information is available about the fieldwork. Sufficient 
information about the research paradigm, participant selection, the interview questions, 
and the data analysis strategy indicate that this study is sufficient in detail for 





The categories of participants represent all stakeholder groups including 
politicians, civil servants, officials of nongovernment organizations, and the residents of 
the local government. The broad variation in participant collections is an additional 
triangulation strategy, which together with the wide variation in participant selection 
increased the prospect for transferability (Guba, 1981; Patton, 2002). 
Dependability. Kvale (1996) described reliability (dependability) as the extent to 
which the results of an inquiry are consistent, accounting for changing dynamics of the 
phenomenon under study. The various steps of the design such as the data collection 
protocol, should be replicable to produce the same result (Yin, 2009) As Lincoln and 
Guba (1985) suggested, for other researchers to develop a methodical understanding, and 
to establish dependability, this study included sections dedicated to the research design, 
planning, and implementation, working details of data collection, and reflexivity. 
Following Patton’s (2002) suggestion, I engaged some level of self awareness and some 
sense of socio-political consciousness in the examination, analysis, and interpretation of 
the textual corpus. The interviewing process is particularly susceptible to reliability issues 
specifically when the interviewer, albeit inadvertently, asks leading questions, which 
might influence participants’ responses (Kvale, 1996). 
Confirmability. It is inevitable that personal biases and preferences influenced 
some aspects of this study. However, as Hancock and Algozzine (2011) recommended, I 
provided direction in the form of an audit trail to the reader of this study through detailed 
descriptive representation of the various stages of critical decisions and procedures. The 
findings of this study relate directly to the experiences of the participants as opposed to 





maintaining the electronic recording of interviews, full interview transcripts, and 
government records in the public domain. Atlas.ti aided in establishing themes, 
definitions, and relationships between categories. Qualitative data analysis software such 
as Atlas.ti also serve as the repository of all the records generated from research studies 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Ethical Procedures 
Ethical considerations are present in all phases of research right from the 
beginning through to the final report (Kvale, 1996). This study investigated issues 
connected with PB introducing some improvements that affected human lives. Therefore, 
this study abode by good ethical conduct in research, avoiding harm in the process of 
providing benefits for the sake of many. Since social research participants are prone to 
privacy risk, the qualitative researcher strikes a balance between participant anonymity 
and the ability to generalize research findings (Yin, 2009). It was imperative that I 
protected and preserved the privacy of the participants since participants not anonymous 
to the researcher. In any case, the content of the informed consent form was discussed 
with participants and their consent obtained before collecting data from them. 
The informed consent form provided the research purpose, a brief description of 
the design, and likely risks and benefits to participants. To overcome the potential for 
undue influence or coercion, the document contained information about participants' right 
to withdraw from the study at any time since participation was voluntary. Each 
participant expressly granted his or her consent by attesting on a consent form, a copy of 






In addition, the accuracy of the data gathered was member-checked for informant 
authentication and approval (Hancock & Algozzine, 2011). The participants had the 
opportunity to confirm the accuracy of the interpretation of their information. Rudestam 
& Newton, 2007) suggested at the conclusion of member checking, all identifying 
information of the participants on the transcripts be replaced with pseudonyms to 
maintain anonymity. 
Summary 
Participatory budgeting is a relatively recent process in Nigeria. The outcome of 
PB in Brazil encouraged the United Nations and the World Bank. Porto Alegre is the 
quintessential example of successful PB, which these institutions highlighted worldwide. 
The perception among most Nigerians and Africans in general is that participatory 
democracy begins and ends with the ability to vote in general elections, beyond which 
there is lack of interest in engaging the political class directly in dialogues on matters that 
affect daily lives (Adesopo, 2011; Bashir & Muhammed, 2012; Bowen, 2008; Donaghy, 
2010; Ganuza & Frances, 2012; Leduka, 2009).  
The two frameworks that drive this study include Avritzer’s (2009) theory of 
participatory institutions establishing a tripartite relationship between civil society, the 
political society, and institutional design. The effectiveness of the relationship between 
the three institutions in turn determines the outcomes of PB, the conceptual framework 
for this study. The willingness of the political class to cede some power under PB, the 
promotion of pro-poor policies, and redistribution agenda have been the stimulants 





As with other participatory democratic institutions, citizens who participate in PB 
learn civic activities and responsibilities through practice and thus improve the quality of 
the electorates (Hamlett & Cobb, 2006). Citizens learn to think in terms of collective 
goals and benefits rather than personal gains and selfish agitations. Some of the aims of 
the PB process include the elimination of clientelism, combating corruption through 
transparent budget process, and the reversal of socio-political exclusion of low economic 
status citizens (Baierle, 2009). Fung (2006) conjectured that if the government is to 
improve the type and quality of services that meet the needs of the citizens, the 
contributions of ordinary citizens should be the source of information for government 
officials. 
Alves and Allegretti (2012) used the concepts of fragility and volatility to identify 
sustainability problems including the absence of legal framework to protect the process 
from abandonment by Right wing politicians, and the quest for the establishment of a 
perfect PB process rather than organic systems amenable to changes, modifications, 
regime changes, and political alliances. There is unanimity among authors that there is no 
best practice in PB, and each locality would need to consider its sociocultural, political, 
and economic dynamics to determine what mix produces the best outcomes. 
The review of literature explored the concept of integrating PB with strategic 
planning in view of the high likelihood of project abandonment due to lack of funds, time 
to complete projects, and regime changes particularly in the case of Ijede LCDA and 
Nigeria. Participatory budgeting is an adaptation of strategic planning by a team of 
experts attached to the office of the mayor of Porto Alegre, Brazil (Menegat, 2002). The 





strategic planning and its medium to long-term approach is designed to achieve (Gordon, 
2005). 
Some essential components of successful participatory outcomes include the role 
of CSOs in the training and empowering of citizens, the willingness of the state to 
mandate the process and provide adequate financial resources, and the private sector 
corporate social responsibility initiatives. This study examined the influence of this mix 
of ingredients in strengthening PB at Ijede LCDA. 
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology, the locus of the study, and the 
purposive nature of informant selection to provide the data for this study. The chapter 
provides details of the process as practiced in the particular locus of study. Chapter 4 
details the data analysis strategy, process, and interpretation. In Chapter 5, I provide the 






Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the data collection and data analysis processes, and 
strategy. Finally, I lay out the results of the study. The research questions of this study 
determined the qualitative methodological approach to gain further understanding of the 
role of CSOs in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede Local Council 
Development Area (LCDA) to participate in participatory budgeting (PB). The case study 
design fits the paradigm, requiring interviews of the participants (n = 15) that provided 
the dense data for the study. The following research questions drive the case study design 
of this study. 
RQ1: What roles do nongovernmental organizations play in the design structure of the 
PB process at Ijede LCDA? 
RQ2: What resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at 
Ijede LCDA?  
RQ3: What local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business 
community in the PB process? 
RQ4: What sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected 
projects? 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the role of civil society 
in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in the 
budgetary decision-making processes. The disadvantaged people that stand to benefit the 
most from PB have yet to give their full attention to the PB process in their community. 





is necessary for them to use education to empower participation in the process. However, 
is not known whether and how civil society empowers citizens to participate in the PB 
process. Specifically, it is not known whether and how civil society can empower citizens 
of Ijede in Lagos state, Nigeria to participate in the PB process. The research questions 
were designed to collect dense information from the research participants based on their 
subjective perspective of the PB process. 
Through the data collected, I analyzed the local paradigms that strengthened 
participatory democracy by strengthening PB. 
Contextual Premise of the Study 
The nature of the research questions of this study dictated the choice of the case 
study design. The data sources synonymous with the design are interviewing, focus group 
discussions and government budget documents. Data were collected at the locus of study. 
I proceeded to Ijede to collect data from 15 one-on-one interviews, two focus group 
discussions, and the analysis of the budget documents of the government of Ijede LCDA. 
Demographic distribution of the participants is shown in Table 1. The venue of the 
interviews was in the conference room of a hotel in Ijede. 
Participant Anonymity and Interview Protocol 
Conforming to the approval of Walden University’s Institutional Review Board 
on approval number 09-23-15-0329984, I preserved anonymity by devising acronyms for 
each participant depending on the group to which he or she belonged. Citizens were 
represented by C1 to C9; politicians and civil servants were G1 to G5, and the individual 





The interview protocol consisted of standardized, open-ended questions with 
structured wordings designed to extricate similar information from participants in the 
same group (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2003; Kvale, 1996). The interviews focused on the 
theme of the study with some flexibility to elucidate additional information from the 
participants. 
 The individual interviews lasted between 16 and 47 minutes while the two focus 
group interviews lasted 50 and 53 minutes respectively. By the conclusion of the eleventh 
one-on-one interview, the point of redundancy had been attained. Patton (2002) described 
redundancy as saturation, the point where participants are no longer offering new 
information. Nevertheless, I proceeded to complete the other four interviews as specified 
in the proposal of this study. 
To validate the data I collected, I presented the transcript of the interviews to the 
respective participants to confirm the accuracy of the transcripts. This member-checking 
process presented the opportunity for four of the participants to clarify some information 
they provided during the interview sessions. 
Data Analysis 
 The analysis of the data collected started with 29 precodes: 13 from the 
theoretical and conceptual frameworks of this study and 16 from the literature review in 
Chapter 2 of this study (see Table 4). More codes that emerged during data analysis were 
grouped into themes. Employing pattern matching as the overall data analytical strategy, 
and following Yin’s (2009) recommendation, I subjected the nodes to further reiterative 





provide logical thematic aggregation of the salient issues, which explained the model 
necessary to strengthen the internal validity of the study. 
 
Table 1 
Participants’ Demographic Distribution 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Groups    n   %*  
___________________________________________________________________ 
          Gender 
Female      3   20 
Male     12   80 
___________________________________________________________________ 
    Social Groups 
Citizens    9**   60 
Politicians and civil servants  5   33 
Representatives of NGOs  1     1 
___________________________________________________________________ 
* Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole numbers. 
 
** Of the nine citizens, five were representatives of the Community Development Associations, the 








Participant Interview Data 
____________________________________________________________ 
 Participant   Interview       Number of  
Anonymous Code       Duration in Minutes Pages Transcribed*  
 ____________________________________________________________ 
         Citizens 
C1      17:25   2.3    
C2      22:39   4.2 
C3      23:51   4.4 
C4      20:22   2.4 
C5      18:06   3.3 
C6      16:52   2.5 
C7      18:43   3.1 
C8      16:58   3.0 
C9      20:15   2.5 
____________________________________________________________ 
            Government 
G1      21:27   3.7 
G2      24:33   4.1 
G3      20:01   2.2 
G4      20:48   2.5 
G5      16:17   2.0 
____________________________________________________________ 
                                             Nongovernmental Organization 
N1      47.31   5.5  
____________________________________________________________ 







Focus Group Discussion Data 
________________________________________________________________________ 
           Discussion a         Number of  
Group     Duration in Minutes Pages Transcribed b  
________________________________________________________________________    
Group 1     53:16   7.0 
Group 2     50:34   6.7    
________________________________________________________________________ 
a The discussion were conducted on November 5, 2015. 




Precodes Generated from Theoretical Framework and Literature 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Codes from theory    Codes from literature  
________________________________________________________________________  
Opportunities for deliberation   Vocal social movement   
Claims for rights     Political will to cede power 
Redistribution of power    Legal framework  
Redistribution of public goods   Binding PB decisions 
Empowerment      Citizen mobilization 
Citizen control     Equality of participants 
Capacity to understand and decide on issues  NGOs as equal partners with state 
Institutional design to promote participation  Negotiating skills 
Direct interaction between state and NGOs  Efficiency in resource management 
NGO autonomy from the state   Transparency 
State connects grassroots with NGOs  Informed and involved NGOs 
Approachability of politicians   Absence of influential elites 
Connection between state and community  Willing head of government 
      Sustainability 
      Change of government 










Nodes and the Research Questions (RQ) they Address 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
RQ    Nodes                                                                         
____________________________________________________________________________ 
RQ1    Confusion about PB   
PB design 
    Attracting NGOs   
Cooperation between state and community 
Project oversight and evaluation 
Encouraging citizen participation 
Mobilizing the community 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
RQ2    Activities of local NGOs  
    Education/training (understanding how democracy works) 
    Inhibitors 
    Limited resources 
    Transparency and Accountability 
Willing government  
    Actions for the future 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
RQ3    Community development 
    Corporate social responsibility 
    Limited resources   
____________________________________________________________________________ 
RQ4    Strategic planning 









Table 6  
Nodes Dominance from One-on-One Interviews 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
                 Number of  Research 
Nodes                    Codes   Questions 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Attracting NGOs     45           1 
Development/Community needs   35         3 
PB design      36         1 
Education and training    30            2 
Mobilizing the community    25             1 
Activities of NGOs     24            2 
Corporate Social responsibility   23            3 
Limited resources     20               2 & 3 
Encouraging citizen participation   15           1 
Socio-cultural problems    15          2 
Strategic planning     10           4 
Inhibitors        9           2 
Sustainability        9           4 
Future actions        6           2 
Oversight and evaluation      6          1 
Transparency and accountability     6           2 
Cooperation between government and community   4           1 
Confusion about PB       3           1 









Node Dominance from Focus Group Discussions 
____________________________________________________________________ 
         Number of   Research 
Nodes             Codes  Questions 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Attracting NGOs     45        1 
PB design      21        1 
Development      17        3 
Mobilizing the community    15        1 
Activities of local NGOs    15        2 
Corporate social responsibility   12        3 
Education and training    10        2 
Future actions        6        2 
Confusion about PB       6        1 
Limited financial resources      3    2 & 3 
Encouraging citizen participation     3       1 











The initial analysis of the data generated 299 codes, including the precodes. The 
codes were subjected to further analysis, which produced a thematic taxonomy of 23 
nodes. The nodes were further grouped according to the research questions they 
addressed (see Table 5). Before coding, I read the interview transcripts three times for 
familiarity and error correction as Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggested. 
Table 6 and Table 7 show the spread of the codes among the nodes. The most 
dominant nodes were attracting NGOs, Development and community needs, PB design, 
education, and training. 
The codes from which the nodes emerged primarily came from the 15 interview 
transcripts and two transcripts from the focus group discussions. The nodes that emerged 
from the data are relevant to the research questions as presented in the following section 
on findings.  
Findings 
Research Question 1 
What roles do nongovernmental organizations play in the design structure of the 
PB process at Ijede LCDA? Seven dominant themes represented the roles of NGOs in the 
design of PB. The question sought to extricate the input of nongovernmental 
organizations as to how, at Ijede Local Council Development Area (LCDA), PB was 
designed. The data revealed the noninvolvement of NGOs in the design and organization 
of PB in Ijede LCDA. 
Confusion about PB. There was some misunderstanding about whether the PB 
process was a series of stakeholders’ meetings with the government over budget (Figure 





concept. There were conflicting recollections about when it was introduced to the 
community. To some participants, PB was an annual stakeholder meeting with the 
government. At the focus group discussions, G1 clarified:  
The executives of Community Development Associations (CDAs) form the 
Community Development Council (CDC), which coordinates the activities of all 
CDAs and represents Ijede LCDA at the state conference of CDCs. The state 
government registers the CDAs and the CDCs as nonprofit organizations. In 
addition, present in Ijede is the Ijede Development Foundation (IDF) formed by 
some educated indigenes of the community to promote the heritage of the 
community and to offer scholarships to indigene students. 
G3 clarified further during one of the focus group interviews: 
I don’t know if we are getting the definition of NGO right. We may be looking at 
an NGO as a foreign organization or an organization from outside here. Ijede 
Development Foundation is an NGO. Landlords Associations, CDAs and CDC 
are NGOs. May be we should redefine our perspective of NGOs so that we can 
take our minds away from dollar based NGOs. 
Given that NGOs exist in Ijede, but their presence not recognized as those of 
NGOs, it is evident that PB in Ijede was without NGO involvement. Seven themes 
appeared prominently from the analysis of the data. 
The concept of PB is still relatively new in Ijede LCDA. The time line of the 
introduction varied between 2009 and 2013, depending on which participant was 
supplying the information. The participants also had various meanings attached to the 
















the government to “let us know what they are doing with the people’s money.” From 
C3’s perspective: 
…it was about two months ago that we discussed in a group and it was 
mentioned. But from the description, I realize that is what we have been doing but 
nobody call it that name. However we have it in mind that when this year’s 
budget process begins, we will like to call it PB and fully participate the way we 
should be participating. 
At the one-on-one interview, N1 explained in similar vein, 
Until you mentioned it, I did not know. I know they have stakeholders meetings 
over budgets. They don’t call it participatory budgeting. The stakeholders' 
meeting is through the CDC arrangement. In those meetings the representatives of 
the local government, the head of department for Agriculture is in attendance.  
Indeed, a few other participants echoed N1’s opinion believing the processes in 
which they participated were stakeholders’ meetings with the government over budgetary 
matters. There was no consensus among the participants about the meaning and purpose 
of PB and about the timeline. At one of the focus group discussions, G2 disputed PB was 
a new process:  
I want to make a correction. I want to correct the impression that participatory 
budgeting is new. May be the name we call it is different. If they could recall, in 
2005, we had NEEDS, SEEDS and LALEEDS. LALEEDS was the process for 
Local governments to call the community to be involved in the development of 





The local government did not just give the community what the government 
imagined the community wanted but what the people identified as their needs. 
Contextually, PB as practiced in Ijede met some criteria of the process. The government, 
according to G5 at the one-on-one interview, followed a process in which: 
We called all the stakeholders and we provided the guidance on how to go about 
presenting their opinions or how to go about bringing their opinions to the floor at 
the stakeholders meeting. My usual advice to them was, before coming to the 
stakeholders meeting, they should have had their minor in-house meeting on their 
major needs so that when they come to the stakeholders meeting, they present the 
views of the larger majority of those within their groups. Basically, to some of 
them, it was more or less a political process that this is their council and they 
needed to be there to shout and make noise. But to others, they believed, yes if 
they talked to the government they could get one or two things done, but if they 
did not discuss they might get nothing. So some felt it was a serious matter. Some 
were there as observers, to see how things went and may be the following year, 
they could have something to say. 
PB design. The node identified a number of actions, decisions, and processes 
constituting the designing of PB process. There was some misunderstanding about 
whether the PB process was a series of stakeholders’ meetings with the government over 
budget (Figure 3). 
For PB to achieve its intended objective of inclusive governance, connecting the 
state with the business community and providing effective local governance, PB requires 





the absence of influential elites who provide the usual Right Wing opposition to a 
socialist initiative such as PB. G4 at the one-on-one interview informed about the absence 
of influential elites, “This place [Ijede] is a community of artisans, fishermen and 
farmers.” In the absence of any Right-wing opposition, the community formed some 
associations known as Community Development Associations (CDAs). The executives of 
the CDAs constituted the Community Development Committee (CDC) with which the 
government regularly interacted. In spite of the regular meetings between the CDC and 
the government, C4 at the one-on-one interview believed the government had not 
communicated the objectives of PB properly with the CDC: 
Unofficially, we the CDC members have discussed with the council manager that 
we will like to be carried along in the proper way, but I don’t think we were 
properly involved in the past. As a community, we really don’t know the process 
as you (the researcher) have described it. 
One of the important steps in a PB process is the invitation to all stakeholders as 
groups and as individuals to attend the meetings. Without a doubt, stakeholders who form 
themselves into groups tend to have much stronger influence over decisions (Boulding & 
Wampler, 2010). Notwithstanding, individuals are capable of significant contributions. 
However, G5 at the one-on-one interview expressed concern over who were invited to PB 
meetings: 
During our 2013 budget retreat, the budget officer at the time was asked a 
question by one of the staff of the budget department that we should have invited 





community development associations (CDA) and community leaders that 
attended the meeting. That was what brought out the discussion on PB. 
Individual local officials appear to understand how PB should run. The 
participants representing the government, excluding the politicians, enunciated at the one-
on-one interviews general descriptions of a typical PB process. As a government official, 
G2 conjectured:  
To the best of my knowledge, when we talk of participatory budget, it is supposed 
to include the majority of the stakeholders. By the time the local government 
involves all the stakeholders in its budgetary process …we will know their 
problems and we will know how much to budget. 
Participatory budgeting is a yearly process, but at the one-on-one interview, G4 exposed 
a design gap that allowed the postponement of the process due to insufficient funds: 
There was the problem with the finance of the local government in 2010, I think. 
We did not complete all the projects that were selected in that year, so we had to 
wait to complete those projects before we did another round of the process. 
Thus, an apparent institutional design weakness stemmed from poor and unstructured PB 
process. The absence of experienced professional NGOs that should have performed the 
necessary advocacy role on behalf of the citizens might have been responsible for the 
poor PB design.  Experienced NGOs would have alerted government organizers of the 
process to any potential flaws in the design. 
 Attracting NGOs. The perception of the absence of NGOs in the community was 
especially pervasive among government officials responsible for organizing the process. 














nonexistent. This node identified what the participants suggested be done to attract NGOs 
external to the community. Professional NGOs with some expertise required for PB 
advocacy were not present in the community. The participants suggested several 
strategies to attract NGOs to the community (see Figure 5). 
In the absence of NGO involvement in the design process, the fact emerged that 
the community needed to embark on efforts to attract professional NGOs with experience 
in various social issues that the community desires to address. Ijede has all the conditions 
that attract professional NGOs. According to C6 at the focus group discussion, Ijede is “a 
rural community of peasant farmers, fishermen, artisans and petty traders”. N1 at the one-
on-one interview identified potential environmental problems such as pollution “from the 
nearby hydroelectric plant at Egbin. NI further informed: 
NGOs can come here because we are by the lagoon. NGOs might be interested in 
the fishing culture, protecting the eco system, pollution, and water purification. 
There are NGOs who are interested in those areas including agriculture and 
greenhouse effect and all that because of the power plant we have here. So you 
have NGOs to relate to Ijede, they have every reason to be here. They can come 
and look at problem of erosion, water and the socio-cultural aspects of the 
indigenes here. 
In spite of these reasons, G1 at the focus group discussions acknowledged that “NGOs 
refuse to come.” C4 from the discussion group postulated some explanations as to why 
NGOs would not establish their presence in Ijede: 
Let’s look at the structures of the NGOs themselves because there is the tendency 





them is different from what we understand NGO to be because NGOs are 
supposed to provide one service or another and not supposed to make a profit. But 
the way I see NGOs and why I believe they are not in this axis is that there is little 
to be gained. Typically, NGO is supposed to look for gaps in the services a 
community desires and they fill in that gap left by the government… There are so 
many things we lack here. 
Virtually all the participants agreed that the community would have to rely on 
IDF and CDC to reach out to external NGOs and create the necessary interactive fora to 
promote Ijede. In advising the community, C9 suggested at the focus group discussions:  
We try to assess NGOs that we feel can address our felt needs. So, we will 
interface with them to partner with us on some projects. Annually, we will have 
programs of activities that will bring them to the community. Most of those NGOs 
are situated in urban areas but we will still reach out to them because the 
community development associations have three levels; primary, the secondary 
and the tertiary. So, the apex level is at the state level, we can interface at that 
level because we have representation there. We can interface with different NGOs 
through the Ministry of Local Governments and other parastatals. We will 
continue to look for opportunities to interface with those NGOs that can meet our 
needs. 
In G1’s view at the group discussions, “charity begins at home.” The community 
should direct its efforts towards utilizing the meager resources wisely and effectively. G1 





…Everyone should go back to their locality and have an introspective view of 
what they believe their requirements or their needs are.  Secondly, they should 
document everything on paper, may be in form of minutes of meetings from the 
smaller units of associations to the CDC, to identify where they believe their 
challenges are, collate them together and may be the local NGOs could become 
stronger and more effective or use those documents to put out request to an 
external NGO. When they have major decisions, they should share those with the 
local government but their decisions to a large extent can be implemented without 
government input as long as those decisions do not go against the law. 
Ijede is a peninsula, on the Lagos Lagoon. Compared to other communities across 
the Lagoon, the community is largely underdeveloped. Less than 10-minute boat ride 
across the Lagoon are some of the most affluent communities in Nigeria. Ijede on the 
other hand is still rural and underdeveloped. Its picturesque hilly view of the lagoon and 
its affluent neighbors on the other shores of the Lagoon keep first-time visitors in awe of 
its beauty.  
Ijede has developed mainly from the numerous self-help projects embarked upon 
by the residents. With the exception of the main access road to the community, the 
community health center, and the two primary schools, Ijede has relied on self-help 
efforts from the residents, especially those with more means than the average residents 





















If we the politicians within this community can embark on a project within 
ourselves, may be the project can attract the governments and the NGOs. That is 
what we can do. You know we politicians we campaign a lot and promise we 
want to do this, we want to do that. We don’t have to get into office before we can 
mobilize the community to do some of those things we promise. We can really 
help ourselves. If we come together and establish one or two projects that can 
attract the attention of the state government, the projects may in turn attract the 
NGOs at the same time. 
At the focus group discussions, C8 suggested another way to attract external NGOs:  
Ijede is supposed to be a good tourist attraction because there is the Ororo Spring 
that flows into the lagoon. It is very important to Lagos State because when there 
is to be the installation of new Oba of Lagos, the kingmakers have to collect water 
for the new Oba from the spring. But the spring is there and abandoned when it 
can be developed as a tourist attraction with history behind it. 
Ijede is at the Northeastern extreme of Lagos State. There is only one access road 
leading to the peninsula. All the participants agreed that another access road is required 
for the community to be accessible to other communities, and more importantly to Lagos 
metropolis. C2 at the focus group discussions, and similar to three other participants, 
made the case for such a project: 
The road leading to Ijede is bad. There is only one entrance to the community. 





Igbe-Igbogbo Road, is impassable. If the government can do something about it, it 
will open up the community. 
For government intervention such as the construction of major infrastructure, there need 
to exist some cooperation between the state and the community. For PB to succeed, the 
state must be willing to cooperate with the community and its NGO advocates.  
Cooperation between state and community. This node is an essential element 
of PB design structure. The political society should be willing to encourage participation 
by ceding control of part of the budget to the citizens (Rodgers, 2010). In Ijede, sufficient 
cooperation existed between the local government and the community to create strong PB 
design (see Figure 6). 
An important element of PB that is capable of derailing the process is the lack of 
cooperation between the state and the community. The state should be willing to cede 
control of part of its budget to the citizens (Dewachter & Molenaers, 2011; Postigo, 
2011). On the surface, this has been the case in Ijede. In a PB process, the citizens select 
a project or some projects, which they expect the government to undertake although, 
according to G1 during the one-on-one interview: 
Like any public policy, I would not say the citizens selected most of the projects. 
They come, prioritize what they felt. At the end of the day, in most cases, it is 
really what government officials, the politicians want to do that they really set 
about doing. So in the long run, the impact on the citizen is, may be one, two or 
three projects, out of the multitude of projects, which are approved in the budget, 





Budget performance on capital projects is just over 2% of the total budget. Most 
of the funds accruing to the local government are used for overheads costs. We 
have 98% recurrent expenditure and 2% capital budget. So funding is a major 




Figure 6. Codes Linked with Cooperation Between Government and Community.  
 
G2 corroborated the inadequate financial resources of the local government at the one-on-
one interview: 
The only challenge we have is implementation, which has to do with finance. This 
place is very rural, and they could not generate much internally generated revenue 





By the time they deduct staff salaries, teachers’ salary, overhead costs from the 
federation account, there is nothing to write home about. So it is the small amount 
remaining they have been using to embark on all the projects that were identified 
during the conference and town hall meeting for the purpose of the PB process. 
The only relevant documents the local government could provide were the 
approved budgets for fiscal years 2012, 2013 and 2014. Records were not maintained for 
the conduct and outcomes of past PB processes at the local government. According to the 
approved budgets of the local government, the percentage of actual capital expenditure of 
total revenue declined from 2.30% in 2012 to 0.3% in 2013 (see Table 8). The 2% capital 
budget, which declined year on year, corroborated G1’s account. However, it is not 
known how much of the capital budget was allocated to PB. This explained G5’s account 
that the people believed the process was “a scam, and they had to be pacified to 
participate in the succeeding year”. The approved budgets also confirmed G5’s 
recollection: “I could recall in 2012 and 2013 or so, we were forced to fail them because 
of paucity of funds, there was so much outcry” 
Project oversight and evaluation. As part of PB structure, there should be a 
system of project evaluation and oversight championed by civil society organization to 
ensure timely project execution to specification and within budgeted cost (Adesopo, 
2011; Bryson, 2011; Schick, 2003; Sintomer et al., 2008). There were no project 
oversight and evaluation by the citizens, a required element of a PB design. Figure 7 
shows the codes linked with project oversight and evaluation. 
Project monitoring is an important aspect of PB that encourages the citizens to 







Revenue and Expenditure Profiles of Ijede LCDA 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
       2012   2013a   2014b 
_______________________________________________________________________  
   % Total     % Total   % Total  
  Naira Revenue Naira    Revenue Naira Revenue 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Revenues 
Federal Statutory      
Allocation     580     96.5  670    97.2    831    97.0 
Internally Generated 
Revenue       21       3.5      19      2.8      25      3.0 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Total      601   100.0  689  100.0    856  100.0 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Expenditures 
Personnel Cost     185     31.0  175    25.3    217   25.4 
Teachers’ Salaries     255     42.3      77    11.2      79     9.2 
Other Overheads     135     22.4  103    15.0    209   24.4 
Capital Expenditure      14       2.3          2      0.3    351   41.0 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Total      589     98.0  357    51.8    856 100.0 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Cash Balance            12       2.0  332    48.2          -       - 
Note. Amounts are in millions of Naira. 
a




 This were the approved budget estimates. The actual revenue and expenditure profiles were not available 








Figure 7. Codes Linked with Project Oversight and Evaluation. 
 
implementation. Where the projects are too complex for a local contractor to handle, 
some aspects of the projects are subcontracted to local contractors (Baierle, 2005).   
Participatory budgeting anticipates the civil society would represent the citizen in 
ensuring accountability and transparency over funds available to the state (Goldfrank & 
Schneider, 2006; Leduka, 2009). Civil society would ensure citizen selected projects are 
executed on time and within budget. G3 revealed an important shortcoming of the 
citizens during the one-on-one interview: 
The process of formulating the document was not that difficult. But the 
implementation became a problem because when funds start to flow in, we more 
or less focused on overheads than the projects. We can do that because, at the end 
of the day, the people that initiated this projects hardly come back to ask about the 





in any way. After the stakeholders meeting, I think the next time we get to meet 
them again is another stakeholders meeting. May be once a year. In extreme 
cases, if there is any event initiated by the local government, we invite them and 
then they have a chance to vent their displeasure on how projects are being 
implemented. 
 There was the indication that when projects were completed, the citizens noticed. 
For example, flooding was a major problem in the community. It was one of the early 
projects the community elected under the PB process. During the one-on-one interview, 
C5 confirmed, “By solving the flooding problem alone, the people felt secured again, 
they were very happy.” 
Encouraging citizen participation. An important design structure represented by 
this node goes to the core of PB. An essential feature of PB is encouraging the electorate 
to participate at the local level in decision making on issues of direct concern to their 
daily economic and social lives (Avritzer, 2010; Dobson, 2005; Michels & de Graaf, 
2010). Participatory budgeting process works well when there are actors in the 
community, including the government through its actions that encourage citizen 
participation. The codes that converge into this node are in Figure 8. 
Participatory budgeting thrives when the citizens are sufficiently motivated to 
participate in decision making on issues that affect their daily lives (Bashir & 
Muhammed, 2012; Bowen, 2008; Donaghy, 2010; Ganuza & Frances, 2012). At the one-
on-one interview, G4 suggested the government should strive towards gaining the trust of 





…call everybody to town hall meetings, let them say what they want, put it down 
in writing and, bring it back to the council. The council should confirm what it 
wants to do, and then execute it to the letter. That is how the people can trust us. 
   
 
 
Figure 8. Codes Linked with Encouraging Citizen Participation.  
 
A few other participants reiterated the need for the government to gain the trust of the 
citizens as a motivating factor for citizen participation. In a suggestion to encourage 
citizen participation, G5 at the one-on-one interview recommended, 
The only thing I think we want for greater participation, which will serve as an 
incentive…is that what we budgeted for last year we actually deliver. If we do 
that, all the Olorituns [heads of CDAs] will be happy. I could in 2012 and 2013 or 
so, we were forced to fail them because of paucity of funds, there was so much 





they saw it as a scam and a waste of time. In fact the only incentive you can give 
them is to do what you have promised, you must earn their trust, be transparent, 
let them know in good time if for any reason such as funds or whatever, why you 
will not deliver on your promise. If you do that, you have got them. 
It is important also that project selection is left to the citizens. G4 at the one-on-
one interview acknowledged that government imposed its agenda on project selection 
over citizen-selected projects: 
At the end of the day, there was a technical session among the counselors, the 
chairman and the management of the local government. That was more or less 
like a budget retreat in which a synopsis of the stakeholders meeting was 
presented and based on the synopsis; everything was prioritized based on the 
needs of different stakeholder groups. The council then agreed on the projects to 
undertake. 
The government intervened in the selection of projects because of limited resources. Such 
intervention, as G5 enunciated above, led the citizens to believe the process was “a 
scam,” eroding the citizens’ confidence in the process. 
 Mobilizing the community. The effort to mobilize the community to action and 
participation is a role for CSOs within the basic structure of PB. Civil society 
organizations are deemed equal partners with the state in mobilizing the citizens to 
participate in decision-making processes, to learn negotiating skills, and by so doing 
participatory institutions are strengthened (Acharya, Lavalle, & Houtzager, 2004). An 
important role of NGOs in a PB process is to organize and mobilize the citizens. Figure 9 







Figure 9. Codes Linked with Mobilizing the Community. 
 
One of the functions of civil society in a democratic process such as PB is to 
mobilize the citizens (Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). In Ijede, the CDAs, the CDC, the 
IDF performed the roles of NGOs in the absence of professional NGOs in the 
community. Indeed, the community thrived on self-help projects initiated, financed, and 
executed exclusively by the citizens of the community without assistance from the 
government or any external source. At the focus group discussions, C2 explained the 
activities of the CDAs: 
What are CDAs established for? They are set up for self-help projects based on 
communal efforts expected to be supported by the local government. In most ideal 





development associations; we have been coordinating self-help projects at the 
individual community levels. 
 Limited financial resources of the local government necessitate intense 
competition among contending projects and groups. The more diverse the community’s 
demand on government, the less impact the government will have on the community 
(Donaghy, 2010). Thus, G4 suggested, “At the end of the day, the community is the 
beneficiary of the projects so they need to speak with one voice.” However, through self-
help, the CDAs and the CDC have learned to motivate the community into action. 
According to C8, 
In my own community, I expended more than N6 million to be sure that 
electricity gets to my community without the assistance of the corporate 
organizations located in the community or the government. That was done purely 
through self help. 
 The CDC assumed the role of organizing the coordination of self-help efforts in 
the community. The motivation for the CDC’s actions was because of the state 
government’s policy of reimbursing self-help efforts of communities. At the one-on-one 
interview, N1 observed the counter productivity of the self-help efforts: 
The problem is that the system [of self help] has worked too well, and the 
government does not want to take any responsibility at all. So you have 
communities doing things by themselves and the government merely observing 
and then the government comes to collect taxes on the usage of some of those 





not do much to help the communities since the communities have already 
completed these projects themselves. 
 The youths who form a very large demographic of Ijede, are often left out of 
community activities. During the focus group discussions, C7 opined that the youths of 
the community should be involved in PB process: 
The youths form a significant segment of the community. We should get them 
involved in PB activities. The government and the community should decide on 
what age limits they want to have among the youths to be part of the community 
when they discuss PB. I think the way our children mature, we could even make it 
15 years. The government and the community could give them special 
assignments during the organizing stage so that they can see how the whole 
process works. The youths can be involved in sports as part of bringing fame to 
the community, but we need to get them to participate in debates so that they can 
learn how to conduct themselves and how to convince other people about their 
opinions without resorting to fights. They too can learn how to negotiate what 
they want with the elders. 
 Traditional institutions in Ijede are quite influential on the people of the 
community. At the one-on-one interview, G3 expressed the opinion that the traditional 
rulers be part of the process, “be sincere, and open up to tell us what exactly is their 
problem.” In contributing, G2 agreed: 
The chiefs should have held a meeting with Kabiyesi [the traditional head of the 





community. We need to enlighten them before they attend the meeting. So, we too 
need to be involved in mobilizing for participation. 
Research Question 2 
What resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at 
Ijede LCDA? The question interrogated the resource framework and network that are 
necessary for effective PB advocacy in the particular case of Ijede. Seven nodes 
addressing this question emerged from the data analysis. Participatory budgeting requires 
civil society organizations (CSO) to play a role for meaningful and effective process 
outcomes. Through their advocacy, NGOs work with communities to empower them 
through some interventional programs. Civil society organizations are autonomous of 
government (Diamond, 1994; Fowler, 2012; Grajzl & Murrell, 2009). Consequently, they 
use that autonomy to mobilize at the communal level to produce coordinated participation 
in public discourse (Montambeault, 2009). The community associations consisting of the 
CDAs, the CDC, and the IDF have played the roles of NGOs. With the successes they 
have collectively achieved, there is little doubt that with adequate resources and 
networking, they could prove to be sufficient and effective in their advocacy roles for 
Ijede Community. 
Activities of local NGOs. This node identified the activities of local NGOs at 
connecting with resources, and networking with other institutions for effective 
community advocacy. Nongovernmental organizations are at the forefront of advocacy 
for PB. Their visibility in the community is shown by the codes that make up the network 





For civil society to thrive, there must be a willing government to allow the space 
for CSO activities (Dewachter & Molenaers, 2011). The CDC in Ijede fit the outlook 
posited by Acharya et al. (2004) of “institutionally embedded actors” that are too close to 
the government (p. 41). Its affinity with the government is a tacit demand by the state that 
summons monthly meetings hosted by the State Commissioner for Local Governments. 
Bherer (2010) posited that participatory mechanisms create opportunities for the 
government and the civil society to dialog and collaborate, but without excluding the 
rights of civil society to protest (Essia & Yearoo, 2009).  
 
 








It is possible for ordinary citizens to learn governance by participation. The 
educational benefits create a population with a high sense of civic responsibility (Bherer, 
2010). A sign of the link between policymakers and the poor in the society is visible 
when citizens can hold politicians accountable for public spending on issues that affect 
the poor and the vulnerable in the society. In the one-on-one interview, G3 confirmed the 
affinity with the government and posited on the structure of the CDC: 
They are the people of the environment but recognized and registered by the 
government. When there is something coming to the community, they will be the 
first point of contact. They hold their regular meetings with the local government 
and the state government. They are a well-recognized body. 
At the one-on-one interview, C9 appreciated that the CDAs and the CDC “have been 
assisting, but they do not have the expertise that professional NGOs have. They have 
been assisting in transmitting the information they received from the residents to the local 
government authority.” At the focus group discussions, C1 confirmed that in the past, 
members of the CDC were not properly involved in the process, but the CDC was getting 
ready to be more involved: 
Unofficially, we the CDC members have discussed with the council manager that 
we will like to be carried along in the proper way, As a community, we really 
don’t know the process as you [the researcher] have described it. 
 The community associations hold regular meetings to deliberate on issues of 
interest to the community. In addition, they hold monthly meetings with local 





stimulate and coordinate the all-important self-help efforts by the communities of Ijede. 
The participants recognized the need to reach out to persons and organizations external to 
the community but according to C4 at the one-on-one interview, “The only movements 
we have in the community are the CDAs and the CDC. We need help from more 
enlightened people to help us.” There is the particular expediency to interact with 
external NGOs with professional expertise in socio-political matters. Through external 
networking with these professional NGOs, the community associations could tap into the 
expertise that empowers them towards improved participatory strategies. 
Education/training. The local NGOs are not perceptive at delivering resources to 
the community. This node identified education and training as a resource the participants 
recognized as desirable for effective advocacy. Empowerment of the citizens is delivered 
through education and training. Figure 11 shows the codes that form the network of 
training and education. 
Perhaps the most important resource network with which the CDC needs to 
engage is in education and training. The citizens should understand how democracy 
works, how to engage the government from a position of strength as equal partners. 
Therefore, to participate effectively in a democratic process, poor citizens require 
education in the form of social and civic training, the responsibility for which falls on the 
CDC in particular. This kind of advocacy creates engaging citizenry that demands 
transparency, accountability, and efficiency (Postigo, 2011). At the one-on-one interview, 
C3 narrated a situation that signified the need for training in advocacy: 
In the course of our intervention, some people wrote letters and petitions that the 





They even wrote the petition to us at the CDC that we should assist them to drop 
the petitions at the local government. We said no, we are not to provide these 
facilities for you. We told them to write directly to the local government but copy 
us. By copying us, when we got to the stakeholders meeting, we table the issues 
there. We have some of the illiterates come to us with their grievances, and we 
advise them to go to the local government when we have stakeholders meetings 
with the government to present their views at the meeting. 
A professional NGO would handle these situations differently by directly advocating on 
behalf of the illiterates and the underserved in the community. In NI’s view during the 










The NGOs need to come, not with a foreign mentality. It has to be home grown 
that we can relate to, not the way they do it in London or the US, it has to be 
something we develop here that we can relate to here. Otherwise, they will simply 
turn up for meetings, eat drink and go back home, but we should still encourage 
NGOs to come and teach these things. 
On the side of the government, especially those responsible for overseeing the PB process 
and organizing it, there is the consensus about inadequate understanding of the process as 
a whole, and every group in the community, including the local officials, should benefit 
from some training. 
Inhibitors. Adesopo (2011) identified some inhibitors, which hinder community 
access to resources and networking with institutions. This node identified some of the 
inhibitors preventing effective advocacy in Ijede. Some of these factors were identified 
and form the codes in the network in Figure 12. 
Adesopo (2011) described as inhibitors, some challenges that might stand in the 
way of effective or successful PB process in Nigeria. These include lack of understanding 
of how democracy works, misunderstanding about the obligations of stakeholders. poor 
oversight and evaluation of projects, transparency and accountability issues, poor 
communication, and inadequate resources. Every participant identified one factor or the 
other that posed a challenge for PB. On their own, the citizens of Ijede have learned to 
network with the government. During the focus group discussions, C9 suggested: 
If we have to get in touch with the federal government, we do not have access to 
the president in Aso Rock. We have the state assembly; we channel our 





Governor, and may be from the governor to the presidency. I don’t know how 
long that will take but in the meantime, some people are dying because what is 




Figure 12. Codes Linked with Inhibitors. 
 
 
The poor residents of Ijede make up the bulk of the memberships of the CDAs and the 
CDC. They had provided some training designed to the best of the abilities of those 
residents who developed the training materials. At the one-on-one interview, C5 
informed: 
We have had three trainings this year. The CDC organized training for artisans, 





telling them about their rights. The CDAs and CDC are doing some of those 
things NGOs are supposed to be doing. 
In the absence of NGOs the CDC could coordinate the activities of the CDAs so 
that the trainings could be more focused on community needs and how to get the best 
from the government. While these trainings provided some benefits to those who 
attended, the community has not developed political sophistication in its citizens. 
Government is still perceived, according to C7 at the one-on-one interview, “…as lord 
and master. We can’t confront them because we rely on them for many things.” This is a 
manifestation of the fact that the citizens lack the understanding of their obligations 
toward the government and the obligations of the government to the people. In 
recognition of the effect of not fully understanding the ways obligations flow back and 
forth between the community and the government, G6 during the one-on-one interview 
proposed some lessons in political awareness: 
Lessons in awareness will go a long way. We need to let them know the 
importance of participatory budgeting and what benefits they stand to gain if they 
devote more time to learning about how government is organized. They should be 
asking us questions and demanding answers. 
According to G4 at the one-on-one interview, the community needs to be enlightened: 
The people should be aware that there’s something called participatory budgeting. 
Even though they are practicing it, they really do not know that is what they are 
doing. They should be aware of the expected outcomes, the advantage it can 
bring. They need to know about the history of the process in Brazil where it 





They should be able to form different groups and know that they can belong to 
different groups that address different interests that they align with.  
G1 suggested that the people needed to play more roles in the PB process: 
The second step is in the implementation of projects. They should be given 
supervisory and contractual roles. Let them suggest contractors for projects and 
the people that are closest to the project should supervise and report to the 
appropriate groups as often as possible. That may improve the level of 
participatory budgeting. 
As there are no professional NGOs in Ijede to assist with empowering training 
towards better participations C3, echoed the suggestion of a few other participants that 
“through seminars and presentations of that sort in open forum, the NGOs can help, but 
the NGOs are not here.”  
Cultural Problem. During the one-on-one interview, N1 introduced the cultural 
dimension to the factors inhibiting proper PB process. N1 expressed concern about policy 
formulation or engaging the government,  
Our traditions are contrary to most Western culture. First, we have the tradition of 
when the elder talks, you keep quiet. You have the situation where the person who 
used to be your king or your chief is now a civil servant, or the government has 
now taken over the position of traditional heads, once you become the local 
government chairman, whatever you say goes, you become the king. So you have 
people who now project traditional images and traditional ways of doing things to 





Before citizens develop the capacity to engage the government effectively, they 
should understand their rights and responsibilities as citizens. The citizens of Ijede, in 
C5’s opinion expressed during the one-on-one interview, are inhibited by their cultural 
values: 
The difference is; do they [the citizens] care? Do they care about their wellbeing, 
about their health, about pollution? People in America do not say because they are 
janitors they don’t care because they do care. They know they have rights, and 
they will not be put down by a wealthy man. The problem in Ijede is they are very 
religious and they believe that God put them wherever they are, and they don’t 
complain. They work tirelessly and make every effort they believe can get them 
there.  
Limited resources. This node stands apart from other inhibitors as a significant 
resource the community lacked at all levels including government, civil society, and 
individuals, thus contributing to stunted community development. Resources, especially 
financial resources, are necessary for PB to be of any consequence. Figure 13 is the 
taxonomy of codes that form the limited resources network.  
A prominent theme among the participants was inadequate resources. The more 
optimistic of the participants would say resources were limited. Lack of resources or 
limited resources is a major inhibitor to the success of PB. All governments experience 
limited resources in one way or the other. In the case of Ijede, it is particularly dire. 









Figure 13. Codes Linked with Limited Resources. 
 
created out of Ikorodu Local Government in 1999 therefore, “the funds coming from the 
federal government has to be divided into six.” G2 posited a reason the revenue of the 
LCDA is less than it should be; “…they did not do proper census before they gave the 
figure to the census board. That is the major problem they have with federal allocation.” 
There are no other avenues for the LCDA to raise its revenue base, according to C9 
during the one-on-one interview,  
…except through Federal allocation and internally generated revenues, but in this 
environment, because of the nature of things, we don’t have much economic 
activities. It is only small small shops, no market. Revenue is so low we depend 






At the one-on-one interview, C2 was empathetic towards the local government 
administration because “This place [Ijede] is very rural and they could not generate much 
internally generated revenue (IGR) here. They have to rely on the money coming from 
the federation account." In recognition of the efforts of the community at self-help 
projects, C7 suggested:  
The key thing is to meet with the leader of the community, to organize something 
like a seminar with the good people of this community. We have so much to do. 
We have no funds to tackle them except NGOs will come to our rescue, then we 
will tell them our problems. There is no availability of funds to address the 
problems we have. 
 The government is evidently resource strapped as G1 revealed earlier: "budget 
performance is usually on the low side with only 2% of total revenue expended on capital 
budget while 98% was expended on overheads or recurrent expenditures." Paradoxically, 
the NGOs that have shown any interest in Ijede, according to G2, “want money from the 
local government, but we don’t have anything”. G2 further conjectured in the one-on-one 
interview: 
It is the lack of financial resources that is driving them [NGOs] away. They don’t 
have international backing; they source for themselves so they expect that we [the 
local government] would source for them too. So, finance has been our problem. 
C3 expressed similar empathetic agreement towards the local government administration: 
“The Executive Secretary of the local government has actually initiated the digging of 





Transparency and Accountability. The role of the government in its interface 
with CSOs is important for effective advocacy. This node identified what the participants 
recognized as essential to advocacy and in interacting with the government. Since PB 
involves fiscal issues, the government must be transparent in providing the citizens with 
its finance and policy guidelines (Wampler, 2012b). Two of the goals of PB are 
transparency and accountability. Where these are missing, networking between the 
government and NGOs is difficult. The codes are shown in Figure 14. 
Donaghy (2010) posited that when the priorities of the citizens are integrated into 
state budget priorities, there is the strong perception of transparency by the citizens. In 
practicing PB, the government in Ijede demonstrated its willingness to be transparent as 
presented by G5 at the one-on-one interview: 
We invite people from every sector money is budgeted for. So, in their presence, 
the chairman will present the budget and they can see what we are doing with 
their money. By the time we passed the budget, it will not be new to them because 
they are already aware of what we are doing. As far as I am concerned, we were 
transparent in our job. 
In demonstrating the importance of transparency and accountability, G2 acknowledged 
during the one-on-one interview, “The only incentive you can give them [the citizens] is to 







Figure 14. Codes Linked with Transparency and Accountability. 
 
In NI’s view, the people need to learn to demand accountability:  
Once you teach them on how to engage the government and how to have 
constructive criticism, how to demand accountability from the government, then 
we are well on our way. The first step to getting people involved in governance is 
to first of all expose them to the fact that they are not just the governed but they 
are the government. Once they realize that as the electorate, their votes put the 
politicians there, it is their right to have accountability from that government. 
Willing government. Willingness on the part of the government to respect the 





activities of civil society in educating and informing the electorates on procedural and 
legal matters need the support and encouragement of the government. The organizers of 
the PB process should be willing to consider the convenience of citizens when organizing 
for the process (Wampler, 2012b). A willing government willing to negotiate with NGOs 
is a prerequisite of a successful PB process. The codes that form the willing government 
network are shown in Figure 15. 
Participatory budgeting only succeeds where the government is willing to 
accommodate the participation of the citizens, and the advocacy of civil society (Fung, 
2006; Goldfrank, 2007). G1 submitted, “As civil servants, if the population we have to 
deal with is more enlightened about what we are doing, it makes our work easier and 
more rewarding.” G3 further suggested,  
If we keep doing what is expected of us, providing the people with the services 
they need, eventually, some people will notice. They will let the people know that 
they can get more if they know how to engage the government and collaborate 
with us.” C6 corroborated this willingness by observing, “Whenever the local 
government sees us organizing to undertake projects, they become jittery and they 
respond by contributing to our efforts. So, we take the initiative, and they follow. 
Next time, they start before we start. 
Actions for the future. The participants recognize the inadequacy in resources 
and networking that might have contributed to the ineffectiveness of NGO advocacy. 
This node represents the suggested actions the community could embark upon to 







Figure 15. Codes Linked with Willing Government. 
 
improve the level of resources required to improve advocacy. The codes that form the 
network for future actions are in Figure 16. 
The participants at the focus group discussions recognized the need to inject fresh 
ideas into Ijede Community to assist with empowering the CDAs, the CDC, and the IDF 
to help with progressive development of the community. G2 opined, 
Development has to be through NGO involvement and on the side of the local 
government, we do our best, and we continue to strive to do better because Ijede 
should not have three primary schools and the children have to trek for miles to 
go to school and to return home.” C9 believed “the CDC should identify areas 








Figure 16. Codes Linked with Future Actions. 
 
 
Before the arrival of external NGOs, C6 proposed “…to make sure that this community is 
developing, we must continue to with self help, and raising funds through donations from 
individual and corporate bodies present within the community.” C7 recommended the 
involvement of the youths through extracurricular activities, if possible, “…we can hold 
some events in the school and let the children host us.” 
 During the focus group discussions, several of the participants spoke about the 
beauty of Ijede and gentrification of the community to attract external interests. A few 
participants echoed G2’s suggestion:  
For example, this is the lagoon. Let us develop a very beautiful place for people to 
come from all over the country to relax and have fun. Then the whole country will 
be interested to know where Ijede is. Someone told me he boarded a ferry from 
Lagos Island to Ijede. That was when I was posted here. I was surprised. So this is 





such a project. That is one. Again, I think they have a local magazine or 
newspaper. They need to distribute it beyond the community to let people know 
there is a beautiful place called Ijede. 
At one of the focus group discussions, C6 typified the general optimism by the 
participant:  
I think ultimately NGOs will come from outside. As others have said, the 
improved caliber of the people in the community as more people move into the 
community will eventually attract outside NGOs. And these new people are likely 
to have the necessary connections at their disposal to help the community. With 
the discussion we are having today, I think in the next few years to come, Ijede 
will be in the center of action.   
Research Question 3 
What local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business 
community in the PB process? The purpose of the question was to explore the local 
dynamics at Ijede LCDA to encourage the involvement of the business community in the 
PB process. Three thematic nodes emerged from the data to address this research 
question. According to Lindgreen and Swaen (2010), corporations enhance their public 
perception of accountability and social responsibility by undertaking social programs for 
the benefit of people living within communities in which they operate. Through corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) programs, corporations fill the gaps in services provided by 
governments and the needs of communities (Idemudia, 2011).   
Community development. The dire necessity for development at Ijede is a 





PB process in Ijede. The involvement of corporations in PB fills the resources gaps 
experienced by governments and their communities. The intervention leads to faster 




Figure 17. Codes Linked with Community Development. 
 
At no time did Ijede LCDA invite businesses and corporations operating in the 
community to participate in the PB process. At the one-on-one interview, G3 revealed 
and described the benefits of involving corporations in PB: 
We don’t invite them [businesses and corporations] but I can see that if we invite 





community they have located their business. We have drawn up a program to 
have meetings with them monthly or quarterly to rub minds on the way forward. 
The participants were aware of the benefits of CSR. Indeed, the community 
appears to pursue the tactic albeit with native and uncoordinated approach. At the one-on-
one interview, C3 informed that: 
During the meeting for 2015 budget, it was mentioned that the council should be 
in a position to assist to approach corporate organizations to provide electricity, 
which the council actually did by relating with Egbin Electricity Company to 
ensure power is distributed to this area just as a sort of encouragement. 
Electricity supply to the community is unreliable, but it is host to the power plant 
supplying electricity to several communities in Southern Nigeria. Ijede is yet to reap the 
benefit of the proximity to the supply source. The strategic location of Ijede is beginning 
to attract newcomers. C5 is a relative newcomer to Ijede and disclosed during the one-on-
one interview, “The reason I have remained in Ijede is because of the potential. That has 
encouraged me to engage. Like I said, we have the fishing and agricultural communities 
and industrial base community, with road and water access.” There is the proposal by the 
state government to connect Ijede with metropolitan Lagos. If the government executes 
the project, Ijede should experience the inflow of new settlers and economic development 
from which the business community could benefit. N1 continued: 
The World Bank would not give the money to construct a six-lane highway to 
Ikorodu if there is no economic strength or potential in this area and they will not 
be thinking of a fourth mainland bridge that will bring traffic from Lagos to Ijede 





animal husbandry, rice farm in Imota, a neighboring town so; all these make Ijede 
a potential growth town. The fishing industry has not been touched so Lagos State 
seems to be encircling Ijede. 
 For the time being, while the community awaits the government to put super 
infrastructure in place, in C1's reflection during the one-on-one interview: 
“…communities [are] doing things by themselves and the government is merely 
observing and then the government comes to collect taxes on the usage of some of those 
projects.” The self-help projects embarked upon by the community are sufficient to 
encourage corporations to assist their host community with resources to complete more 
projects. 
Corporate social responsibility. The vehicle for business community 
involvement is through corporate social responsibility. The involvement of corporate 
organization in PB process is through CSR. The codes in this network are shown in 
Figure 18.  
There is the evidence that the business community in Ijede had been responsive to 
the community’s requests for assistance. At the one-on-one interview, C4 narrated the 
community success at getting companies to act:  
The Chairman of CDC went to the contractors that worked on the main road to 
Ikorodu, told them about the efforts of the local people to develop the community. 
That company became socially responsible and gave us the equipment for 48 
hours. The company encouraged the CDC to identify areas where they can open 
up the community to other areas. The CDC was encouraged. The progress we 








Figure 18. Codes Linked with Corporate Social Responsibility. 
 
G6 corroborated C4’s contribution, “The companies provided road construction 
equipment like graders, and the oil companies assisted with road construction equipment. 
They have given financial assistance to the CDAs. That has been very effective.” Other 
participants corroborated the community’s attempt at engaging with corporations to be 
more socially responsible. Some participants echoed C1’s account of the community’s 
efforts at reaching out to businesses in the community: 
About June this year, there was a meeting between my community association 
and some corporate organizations to discuss their corporate social responsibility. 





Lagos, and they promised to look into our requests from January 2016. We took 
them round the areas, and they promised to start working from January 2016. 
The major corporate activities in Ijede may be creating potentially serious 
environmental problems. According to N1 during the focus group discussions, the 
corporations are giving what might amount to tokenism, considering the environmental 
effects of their activities: 
Nobody has attempted to assess the environmental impacts of the hydroelectricity 
plant and the sand dredging on the lagoon. The community does not have the 
required advocates to confront the corporations involved in these activities. The 
dredging activity alone should have attracted NGOs interested in the environment, 
to be concerned whether the dredging activities could cause erosion, whether it 
causes a drop in fishing activities. As I said, the road infrastructure takes a lot of 
pressure from the sand-moving trucks, which use the roads that are not designed 
for such heavy goods vehicles. 
At the focus group discussions, C9 proposed the community organize events to 
invite external businesses to extend their marketing programs to Ijede: 
In terms of encouraging businesses, maybe we have a mini trade fair for the 
companies in and out of Ijede to showcase their goods and services. If trade fair 
can bring additional business exposure to the companies in Ijede, that may 
encourage them to be socially responsible towards the community. 
 Limited resources. The unusually high level of scarcity of resources, especially 
financial resources, is an important element that should promote and encourage the 





for corporations to embrace CSR is the scarcity of resources and how best corporations 
intervene. The code network that addressed limited resources is shown in Figure 13. 
Research Question 4 
What sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected 
projects? The purpose of this question was to explore the sustainability strategies for 
citizen-selected projects. Two nodes emerged to address this question. 
Participatory budgeting in Nigeria, as in other jurisdictions where it is practiced 
suffers from scarcity of financial resources to fully support citizen-elected projects. 
Where funds run out to complete projects within the same fiscal year in which they were 
initiated, the risk of abandoned projects increases. In order to ensure project completion 
and sustainability, PB could benefit from medium-term planning rather than single fiscal 
year planning. Bryson (2011) posited that medium-term strategy for government 
spending in a strategic planning model provides some assurance of project completion 
and sustainability. Issues relating to this research questions were not discussed during the 
focus group discussions because it was directed only at participants representing the 
government. 
Strategic planning. Medium to long-term planning, as is the practice in strategic 
planning, is a sustainability strategy identified by the participants to prevent partisan 
intervention by politicians especially after regime change. Projects selected by citizens in 
a PB process are prone to abandonment especially when regime change occurs. Strategic 









Figure 19. Codes Linked with Strategic Planning. 
 
Participants representing civil servants and politicians responded to questions 
relating to project sustainability. G3 appreciated the significance of strategic planning, 
contextually associating it with the citizens’ perception of confidence in the government:  
The community has more confidence in the government when they know that 
such longer-term projects have the commitment of any government that comes in. 
For instance, we are in October, if the government wants to embark on a road 
project, the people will have the confidence that the project will be completed, if 
not this year, next year because it is already in the plans for the estimated time it 
will take to construct the road. It is already in the budgets. Without the long-term 
planning, the people will be skeptical and say, don’t mind them, before February 
they will abandon it, but if there is the strategic plan, the community will have 





G7 attributed sustainability issues to the nature of democracy itself:  
Politicians have their own agenda and their predecessors’ programs do not excite 
them. They want to abandon what they meet on ground and start funding their 
own programs. Often times, when they say continuity and there is a change in 
government, the new government may not be interested in some projects, so they 
tend to abandon them. 
The tenure and timing of strategic plan are just as important as its implementation. G2 
suggested,  
If I were to be part of the policy formulators, I would say since the local 
government chairmen have three-year tenure, the strategic plan should be six 
years so that, at least, after three years there will be continuity. There will be no 
abandoned projects. If the new government knows there is six-year plan that has 
run for three years, I think they will follow it. 
G1 examined the topic from the problem local governments have in planning their 
finances, which fluctuates due to factors beyond the control of the local governments, but 
disagrees with a six-year term: 
Strategic planning would go a long way in assisting the local government to plan 
its financing. Elected local officials have three-year tenure, and it will make sense 
if we were to have stakeholders’ priorities that will span a three-year plan for the 
life of each legislature. We will be able to plan for quality projects that can be 
completed within the three years into the budget. That will make sense. 
Sustainability. This node represents project sustainability involving regular 





resources are limited, and new projects are not commonplace. The codes in this network 
are shown in Figure 20. 
Project sustainability involves completing a project and maintaining it for as long 
as it is needed and available for the citizens. G2 believed local government employees 
still have a lot to learn to serve the people efficiently: 
We need more training, constant training, and this continuity; the government 
coming in should read the blueprint of the past government and really follow it. That will 













C1 and C8 addressed the issue of project sustainability from the perspectives of the 
citizens. They believed the government had done very little in terms of project 
implementation. The citizens through self help, a common theme throughout the data 
collection process, had achieved the little development the community currently enjoys. 
C8 complained that the government failed to reimburse the community for all the self-
help projects it had undertaken, contrary to the arrangement make by the state with CDCs 
all over the state:  
Some of those self-help projects need attention. The government can, at the very 
least, provide some funds year in year out to make sure that they help the 
community to maintain these projects.  
C1 was concerned the community would like to do more self-help projects:  
…but the ones we have already done now need maintenance. Look at the drainage 
we constructed: yes, they have lasted well, but they need maintenance. The 
government does not include in their annual budgets the cost of maintaining these 
projects that we used our own efforts to build. They owe us money they promised 
they will pay for the self-help projects they approve, but till today, nothing.  
The major drawback with self-help projects, according to C4, is: 
Who will maintain them? We have used our meager resources and the toil of our 
people to build these projects. The least the government can do is to ensure that 
there is provision for maintaining these projects, but as you know, in Nigeria, we 





Summary of Key Lessons Learned  
An overarching revelation by the data analysis was that Ijede LCDA did not 
follow a structured or well-designed participatory budgeting process. Although the 
process was not identified as participatory budgeting, the process, as revealed by the 
individual interviews, was over simplified to mean stakeholders’ meeting. The 
unstructured nature of the process was responsible for the absence of documents relating 
to prior PB process. Minutes of the minutes were not maintained, and attendance was not 
recorded. Decisions taken at the stakeholders’ meetings were said to be included in the 
budget. Therefore, the finding of research question 1 is, NGOs did not play any roles in 
the design of participatory budgeting in Ijede. 
The budget documents available did not indicate any specific projects or items of 
capital expenditure that were citizen-selected projects. The absence of structure to the 
process goes to the heart of Avritzer’s (2009) theory of participatory institutions and civil 
society. For participatory democracy to be effective, there should be some strong 
interplay between institutional design, the political society, and an active civil society. 
The absence anyone of the three weakens participatory democracy. In the particular case 
of Ijede, the absence of strong institutional design was exacerbated by the non-inclusion 
of NGOs in the call notices inviting stakeholders to the process. Serendipitously, active 
NGOs existed in Ijede, but the CDAs, the CDC, and the IDF all constituted by the local 
citizens, were not recognized as such. The fact of their true statuses emerged during the 
first of the focus group discussions and confirmed during the second group discussion.  
Regarding research question 2, the interview questions revealed the need for help 





better participation in democracy. At the same time, all the participants recognized the 
challenge of getting external assistance. The members of the CDC, five of whom were 
participants in this study, had the time to deliberate before the group discussions. Indeed, 
a meeting of the CDC was scheduled a day before the focus group discussions took place. 
The participants appeared determined to get the process to work for the benefit of the 
community.  
At the focus group discussions, the dominant topic was how to attract professional 
NGOs to the community to train, educate, and empower the citizens. The participants 
recognized they lacked the skills the process required. There were several suggestions on 
the strategies to adopt for professional NGOs in Lagos to pay attention to Ijede. Having 
overcome the confusion around the name and nature of PB, the participants focused their 
attention on how to develop Ijede to attract interests from the world at large. The CDC 
did much to motivate the people to action. It mobilized the community to undertake 
several projects through the efforts of the people contributing personal resources and 
communal labor. This strategy was what the CDC considered along with organizing 
business and cultural expositions to attract attention to the community, which although 
still underdeveloped, holds first-time visitors in awe of its aquatic splendor. 
At the focus group discussions, there appeared to be the awakening of some 
consciousness and the need to project the community to attract investors, NGOs and 
governments. For the community’s strategy to work, the citizens need education and 
training, not only for participation in PB but also to acquire networking skills. Such skills 
are required at the state level where there might be some opportunities for CDCs from 





In addressing research question 3, the participants appeared unsatisfied with the 
corporate social responsibility efforts of the major businesses in the community. Without 
some coordinated strategy to maximize the willingness of some of the corporations to 
assist the community, the participants at the one-on-one interviews appeared somewhat 
satisfied with the token largesse the community received. At the group discussions, the 
need to get more out of the businesses was discussed. The community lacked the skill to 
advocate for more contributions. The participants believed the involvement of 
professional NGOs with expertise in working with rural communities could encourage 
businesses to do more.  
Research question 4 was for the participants representing civil servants and 
elected government officials during the one-on-one interview sessions. The participants 
were unanimous in supporting measures to protect citizen-selected projects from 
abandonment or non-implementation from a new government in the event of regime 
change. The consensus was for the government to adopt medium-term strategic planning 
to ensure the execution, completion, and sustainability of citizen-selected projects by 
earmarking funds for the completion of projects without interference from a new 
government. Considering the concerns of citizen participants over the maintenance and 
sustainability of projects the community undertook through self-help efforts, this strategy 
could help the government protect and preserve the projects undertaken by the citizens. 
Research Data Trustworthiness 
 To attain what Patton (2002) described as particularity, “doing justice to the 
integrity of unique cases,” the platform for trustworthiness of the data collected for this 





process of analyzing the data are grounded in my subjective researcher judgment (p. 
546). To understand the constructions of meanings of the participants, I brought my deep 
understanding of the context, content, and culture of the participants, all of which were 
critical to interpreting the meanings and the experiences the participants projected. 
Adequacy of the Data Corpus 
I relied on multiple evidential sources for the data corpus to be adequate and for 
the result of this study to be valid. I collected adequate amount of evidence from the 
information provided by the 15 participants. There was adequate variety in the typology 
of evidence, which consisted of the one-on-one interviews, focus group discussions, and 
documents provided by the local government. Another adequacy of evidence included 
intuitive interpretation of the data, and the presentation of the interpretation of the 
findings to meet trustworthiness criteria. 
Therefore, I located the validity of the result of this study within qualitative 
paradigmatic reinforcements of multiple data sources including one-on-one interviewing 
of the 15 participants, two focus group discussions, and the review of budget documents 
provided by the local government. By establishing some nexus between these data 
sources during data analysis, I established another positivist paradigmatic praxis of data 
triangulation (Patton 2002). The contextual meanings of the participants were dominant 
throughout the data analysis, the participants having been provided the interview 
transcripts for member checking to support the validation of their understanding and the 






 Research question 1 and research question 2 were designed to address the 
sustainability of participatory budgeting as a democratic institution. “Legal framework” 
was a code from the literature review, the revelation of which was expected in the data. 
An essential element of for the sustainability of participatory budgeting is the legal 
instrumentality that entrenches the process and protects it from disruption or termination 
by an unsympathetic government. Participatory budgeting had survived assaults from 
Right-wing governments in parts of Brazil because the process had the necessary legal 
framework that institutionalized it (Rodgers, 2010; Wampler & Hartz-Karp, 2012). The 
data did not reveal such enabling legal framework. Participatory budgeting is fragile and 
tenuous without the proper legislation to protect it. Perhaps the absence of the legal 
framework simplified the decision for the local government to suspend the process for 
two years between 2012 and 2013 because it was expedient to sidetrack the process.  
Summary 
 In this chapter, articulated the results of the study. I also presented the data 
collection process, at the locus in quo, the transcription of the interviews from audio 
recordings, and the analysis of the interview transcripts. I commenced data analysis by 
identifying precodes from the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, and from the 
literature review. I proceeded to interpret the data according to the research questions to 
which they corresponded. 
 I used research question 1 to interrogate the roles of NGOs in the design structure 
of the participatory process at Ijede LCDA. The data revealed the lack of deliberate 





Ijede. However, there were the CDAs, the CDC and the IDF, all of which were formed by 
the citizens to perform as NGOs. Serendipitously, the government invited the CDAs and 
the CDC as representatives of the citizens to participate in the process, but without their 
involvement in the process design.  
Research question 2 uncovered the resource framework and network that are 
necessary for effective PB advocacy at Ijede LCDA. The data revealed the intimate 
nature of the relationship between the CDC, which has stood as advocates for the 
community in the absence of professional NGOs. The participants acknowledged the 
need for training and education in civic responsibilities. There was the recognition of the 
need to learn how to engage the government for effective participation. The participants 
also identified some inhibitors to participation such as poverty, lack of or inadequate 
resources for the local government and the community, and illiteracy. The presence of 
these inhibitors hindered the ability of the people to demand accountability and 
transparency from the government, which by all accounts, was willing to conduct PB as 
effectively as it could. 
 I applied research question 3 to explore the possible local dynamics at Ijede 
LCDA that could encourage the involvement of the business community in the PB 
process. The data indicated lackluster efforts by the major corporate organizations 
operating in the community. The participants appreciated that the commercial activities 
of the corporations, which include hydroelectricity and sand dredging from the lagoon, 
pose potential environmental problems for the community. Most of the participants 





believed the corporations should be more responsible to their host community because of 
the potential hazards to which the community is exposed. 
 Research question 4 was exploratory in nature and it was intended for the 
government participants only. The question investigated the sustainability strategies Ijede 
LCDA could consider for citizen-selected projects. The consensus was the need for 
medium-term budget planning of three years. The participants believed the introduction 
of strategic planning at the local government level could eliminate the potential for the 
abandonment of projects by new governments unsympathetic to ongoing or uncompleted 
projects initiated by preceding administrations. 
 In Chapter 5, I probe deeper into the findings of this study and conclude with 






Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to explore the role of civil society 
in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in the 
budgetary decision-making processes 
 To achieve this purpose, I conducted 15 one-on-one interviews and two focus 
group discussions. The purpose of the study was achieved by using the following 
interrogating research questions: 
RQ1: What roles do nongovernmental organizations play in the design structure of the 
PB process at Ijede LCDA? 
RQ2: What resource framework and network are necessary for effective PB advocacy at 
Ijede LCDA?  
RQ3: What local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the involvement of the business 
community in the PB process?     
RQ4: What sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA consider for citizen-selected 
projects? 
In this chapter, I recapitulate the data collection strategy and data analysis, 
provide insight into themes emerging from the data, and finally, I provide the study 
results. 
Study Overview 
The foundations of this study were the theoretical framework of participatory 
institutions and civil society and the conceptual framework of participatory budgeting. 





relationships between civil society, political society, and institutional design (Avritzer, 
2009). These three approaches to democratic governance do not always create active 
public engagement and equitable distribution of public services unless local peculiarities 
form the basis of their application. Participatory budgeting is a democratic process that 
provides the opportunity for citizens to interact with the government by actively engaging 
in decision making on fiscal planning priorities (Fischer, 2012; Pateman, 2012).  
Ijede is a semi-rural town and its proximity to Lagos conurbation has attracted 
low-income and middle-class dwellers who wish to escape the high property and rental 
costs of the metropolis. Residents of Ijede commute by ferry to the commercial hub of 
Lagos, a journey of less than 15 minutes (Ilesanmi, 2010). The presence of Egbin 
Hydroelectricity Plant, dredging activities on the Lagos Lagoon, a federal government-
owned gas company, an oil palm plantation, and some housing estates owned by some of 
the corporations have sustained the economic activities of Ijede. The majority of the 
inhabitants of Ijede are poor. The citizens rely on the LCDA to implement policies that 
would alleviate poverty and improve the local economy.  
It is not entirely clear when PB was introduced in Ijede LCDA. With this study, I 
set out to investigate whether and how civil society could empower citizens of Ijede to 
participate in the participatory budgeting process.  
The findings of this study come from the views of the residents of Ijede. The 
participants characterized their perceptions of participatory budgeting as a process they 
need to learn. They acknowledge the expediency to reach out to professional NGOs to 
provide training and education to empower them to engage effectively with the 





participants were committed to developing the community through their self-help efforts 
and through informed involvement in participatory budgeting. By transforming these 
ideas into action, participatory democracy could be strengthened through effective 
participatory budgeting. In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the results and findings 
of this research and the implications for social change. Finally, I discuss 
recommendations for further research.  
 Discussion: Research Question 1  
  Research question 1 was: what roles do NGOs play in the design structure of the 
PB process at Ijede LCDA? An effective institutional design should consider and include 
civic mobilization, stable financial pathways, and consistent organizational arrangements 
(Hilmer, 2010; Wampler, 2012b). The first finding is the poor PB design at Ijede LCDA. 
The understanding of the participants representing the government was that there were no 
NGOs in Ijede. For this reason, the government did not involve the Community 
Development Associations (CDAs) the Community Development Committee (CDC), and 
the Ijede Development Foundation (IDF) in designing the PB process in Ijede. The lack 
of recognition of these entities as NGOs by the local government and the entities 
themselves was responsible in part for their non-inclusion in the design of PB at the local 
government level.  
Acharya (2004) posited that community-based organizations (CBOs) are probably 
the most effective for participatory budgeting because they have a better understanding of 
local issues than advocacy NGOs, which often fail to empower the people with necessary 
skills for participation. Nongovernmental organizations participate when they have a 





NGOs to engage the government. However, without the requisite skills, CBOs are 
ineffective in self-representation and they might inadvertently legitimize state actions 
against their wellbeing (Grajzl & Murrell, 2009). The failure to recognize the CBOs as 
NGOs was a fundamental flaw in the PB design at Ijede. The state, according to Bherer 
(2010), could correct this flaw by strengthening the community organizations through 
state-organized education and training arrangements. 
The second finding is that the government did not have a communication strategy 
to explain the history, the purpose, and the process of PB to the citizens. Civic 
mobilization established through effective communication is one of the pillars of 
institutional design (Hilmer, 2010; Wampler, 2012b). The absence of strategic 
communication led to a misunderstanding among the citizens about the meaning and 
purpose of the PB process.  
To the citizens’ understandings, their PB experiences were annual stakeholders 
meetings with the local government for the presentation of annual budgets, which took 
account of their chosen projects. Given the belief that there was no NGO presence in the 
community, the local government, should have promoted the process by organizing 
informational sessions to educate the citizens about citizen roles and responsibilities in 
the process. This oversight weakened the PB design in the community and diminished the 
veracity of the intended outcome of active citizen engagement and the participation in 
public policy decisions that affected their daily lives. 
The third finding is the weakness in the design of PB was due to inadequate or 
nonexistant training provided to government officials organizing the PB process. The 





better informed about the process than the politicians were. Regular training and updates 
on ideas that work in other local governments in Lagos State would empower the 
organizers to organize better PB processes. Although the government is not expected to 
play the role of NGOs, ensuring that the citizens play their roles in the process would 
enable the local government to perform its role as mandated by the state government. 
The fourth finding addresses the need for educational empowerment and the 
enlightenment of the citizens. Most of the citizens in Ijede are active members of the 
CDAs. The CDC regularly holds meetings with other CDCs around the state. Through its 
state level interactions, the CDC could reach out to other CDCs for training, which could 
be sponsored by the Lagos State Ministry of Local Governments, the organizers of the 
state CDC meetings.  
The enlightenment of the citizens prepares the local NGOs to perform impactful 
advocacy roles. Ijede Development Foundation would benefit from this arrangement, as 
many of the members of the CDC are also members of the IDF. The community leaders, 
through the CDC, regularly organize the citizens to execute developmental projects that 
are funded and performed by the citizens. Although the state government should have 
compensated the community for its efforts, the state failed to commit to this expectation. 
The citizens require empowerment programs that could teach them how to negotiate the 
bureaucratic terrain that fails to meet the expectations of the community and slows its 
ability to develop.  
The IDF should play a leadership role in reaching out to professional NGOs to 
provide advocacy services to Ijede, albeit on ad hoc basis. The citizens of Ijede suggested 





and gentrification projects. The IDF is in the best position to lead the efforts to transform 
Ijede from obscurity to some prominence. In spite of their PB experiences, it was unclear 
how much of participatory democracy civil servants have learned and put into practice 
for the benefit of the community. 
The fifth finding concerns project funding, oversight, and evaluation. According 
to Adesopo (2011), poor funding for PB and the absence of project oversight and 
evaluation carried out by the citizens are two of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of PB. 
This finding is a direct effect of the lack of awareness of the roles of citizens in a well-
designed PB process. Having taken the time to evaluate projects desired by the 
community, the citizens, under the leadership of the CDC and the IDF, should engage the 
government to ensure the implementation of their selected project choices. The 
government expended less than 2% of its total revenue on capital projects. It was not 
clear from government records how much of the 2% was directed at PB projects, but the 
citizens did not demand explanations and analysis of capital expenditures. In other words, 
the CDAs, the CDC, the IDF, and individual citizens did not demand accountability of 
the government.  
The role of the citizens is to hold the government to the contract between the 
citizens and the government that is the agreed upon budget that the government presented 
to them at a town hall stakeholders’ meeting. The role of the citizens does not end at 
identifying projects. They should take an active interest in supervising and ensuring the 





Discussion: Research Question 2 
Research question 2 asked: what resource framework and network are necessary 
for effective PB advocacy at Ijede LCDA? In the particular case of Ijede, and considering 
the findings revealed by research question 1, the NGOs in Ijede require greater than the 
usual amount of resources and networking to perform advocacy roles in the community. 
The first finding is the willingness on the part of the government to permit the PB process 
and to encourage its continuity. The local government engaged with the people 
periodically and appeared sympathetic to the citizens’ plight including poor road 
network, unreliable electricity supply, and low economic activities. Without the 
willingness of the government to cede roles to citizens and create the space for civic 
engagement, participatory democracy would lose its essence of putting power in the 
hands of the people (Dewachter & Molenaers, 2011). However, the CDCs in Lagos State 
are creations of the state government. They are embedded in the Lagos State Ministry of 
Local Governments, and they might have lost the voice to protest and to protect their 
communities.  
The IDF is independent of the state, and it should be involved in the community’s 
interfacing with the government to reduce the vulnerability that exists in the CDC’s 
interaction with the state. In the meantime, more should be done to ensure that the 
citizens develop political sophistication and to learn the nuances of democracy. 
The second finding is the willingness of the government to cooperate with the 
community. This obscures the reality of inadequate resources, thus preventing the 
citizens from confronting the government. Adesopo (2011) was particularly concerned 





the bloated recurrent expenditures of the local government, the community had little to 
gain from the capital expenditure allocation earmarked for physical development in the 
community. Since professional NGOs run on resources partly provided by the 
government, the local government in Ijede could allocate some funds for the NGOs to 
expend towards citizen empowerment specifically designed for participation in the PB 
process and for advocacy roles similar to professional NGOs. The local NGOs could 
direct such funds towards inviting professional trainers on topics directly relevant to the 
PB process and towards advocacy in general.  
The IDF is already involved in providing scholarships to children of indigenes in 
Ijede. Some of the funds could be directed toward educating the community as a whole 
on how to develop the community space to attract more state and federal presence, and to 
project the willingness of the community to develop. Ijede is one of the few communities 
in Lagos state with available land for residential, industrial, and agricultural 
developments. Without a ready work force and the road network for easy access, 
investors could be unenthusiastic about locating their operations in the community. 
Thirdly, NGOs provide better services to the people when the government is 
transparent and accountable. The activism of the NGOs should engender independent and 
politically aware citizenry, whose awareness inspires transparency, accountability, and 
efficiency (Postigo, 2011). Since the awareness of the NGOs was not strong, a willing 
government in Ijede should complement its willingness with its openness in matters of 
direct interest to the citizens. In the circumstance where the local government ran out of 
funds to implement its budget proposals, it should be as open to disclose its inability to 





announcing the budget. When citizens lose trust in the government, getting them to sit at 
the table to discuss matters relating to PB would require unnecessary persuasion, and it 
might lead to the collapse of the process. 
A missing node from the data was the legal framework to strengthen the 
networking ability of NGOs with the government. In the absence of a legal framework to 
institutionalize the process, efforts of NGOs could be frustrated and undermined by 
unfriendly governments. The Lagos State government has not established a legal 
framework institutionalizing PB. The fragility of the process manifested when in 2012 
and 2013 the local government suspended the process for lack of funds in spite of 
budgetary provisions for capital expenditures for those years. 
Discussion: Research Question 3 
Research question 3 was: what local dynamics at Ijede LCDA encourage the 
involvement of the business community in the PB process? Corporate organizations are 
capable of committing considerable resources towards the socio-economic development 
of their host communities (Fowler, 2012; Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). When sufficiently 
persuaded, corporate organizations do reinvest in communities. Firstly, the businesses 
community in Ijede has had minimal impact on the locality. There was no evidence major 
businesses voluntarily assisted the community. The businesses appeared willing to accede 
to token requests by a community in dire need of a lot of assistance.  
In conducting the PB process in Ijede, the organizers had left out local businesses 
when inviting participants to the process. By their presence at PB meetings, corporations 
are exposed to the needs, the challenges, and efforts of the citizens at making the 





projects, they gain some understanding of the challenges of the environment, and they 
appreciate the necessity for whatever demands the community directs at their CSR 
programs. The businesses should be as concerned about the wellbeing of their host 
community as they are about their workforce and corporate performance. The business 
community should be willing to expend some resources to fill apparent gaps between the 
needs of the community and the resources of the local government.  
Secondly, the requests for corporations to provide assistance under their CSR 
programs have been uncoordinated with different communities receiving what might 
amount to tokenism from corporations. The corporations are capable of providing better 
resources when the requests are coordinated community wide (Idemudia, 2011). There 
was the assumption by the citizens that the local government could approach the 
corporations on their behalf. In Lagos State, corporations are known to have collaborated 
with the government to develop modern infrastructure and city gentrification.  
The local NGOs in Ijede should coordinate their requests to the corporations for 
investment in community projects rather than providing funds to the state, which 
according to Idemudia (2009), are often misdirected and misappropriated. In addition, 
CBOs can advance CSR initiatives of corporate organizations by helping to identify what 
message to communicate and what other factors are unique to the effectiveness of 
communication in the community (Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). Therefore, the community 
could channel its demands on corporations through the government, which is best placed 
to negotiate tax write-offs and other incentives for the businesses that participate in 





for high-value projects that could be negotiated under Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
agreements with businesses inside and outside the community. 
The third finding concerns the potential environmental impacts of the Egbin 
Hydroelectricity Plant and the dredging companies located in and around Ijede. There has 
not been any attempt to assess the environmental footprints of these activities and the 
effects they have on the community’s health and wellbeing. While the environmental 
consequence of the hydroelectricity plant and the dredging activities might be unknown 
without some research, the participants were concerned about the potential adverse effect 
on fishing, the mainstay of several of the residents. They were also concerned that the 
local fishermen might not have the ability to perceive the immediate causes of 
unexpected activities on the lagoon should they occur. The IDF and the CDC should 
express their concerns to the Lagos State Environmental Protection Agency to investigate 
their concern and issue a protocol to monitor the lagoon regularly for pollutants and to 
ensure the protection of the ecology of the lagoon. 
Discussion: Research Question 4 
Research question 4 asked: what sustainability strategies should Ijede LCDA 
consider for citizen-selected projects? Participatory budgeting was an idea born out of the 
fundamental concept of participatory democracy (Abers, 2001; Menegat, 2002). Adesopo 
(2011) agreed that the prospect for project sustainability is better when fiscal planning or 
budgeting co-occur with strategic planning. There is the danger of project abandonment 
under participatory budgeting when the project is of high value and spans more than a PB 
cycle of one year. The likelihood of change in political party controlling the government 





with no prior understanding or commitment to the process could abandon or discontinue 
ongoing projects. According to Schick (2003), fiscal policies are meaningless when 
budgets span a single year because budget monitoring is weak and sustainability is 
subjugated. The new strategy should encourage sustained and consistent information flow 
to all stakeholders, especially when budgeting is a product of strategic planning that 
would have involved these stakeholders in the first place (Gollwitzer, 2011). 
A major sustainability problem creating fragility for the process was the absence 
of a legal framework. A legal framework would protect PB from funds starvation, bypass, 
and abandonment by unsympathetic regimes, and suspension and application of the 
process by government officials (Alves & Allegretti, 2012). A PB legal framework 
institutionalizes the process and opens up the opportunity for process improvements 
spearheaded by the government (Avritzer, 2010; Wampler, 2012). 
The participants representing the group of politicians and civil servants believed a 
medium-term plan of three years would ensure that projects not completed in one fiscal 
year would be carried over for completion in the succeeding fiscal years. When a change 
in government occurs, sufficient provision will remain in the budget for project 
completion before the new government formulates its budget. The medium-term strategy 
gives some level of confidence in the government that it would complete the projects it 
began.  
The second finding referenced the issue of sustainability and maintenance of 
projects especially those performed by the community through self-help efforts. The state 
government, by its policy, should reimburse the community for the costs of completing 





citizens had to redirect resources that should have been utilized to develop other projects 
to maintain projects already in use. The local NGOs should negotiate with the local 
government to earmark some funds in its budget for the maintenance of all projects, 
including self-help projects that the government should have owned, had it reimbursed 
the community for the costs of the projects. 
In the Brazilian experience of PB, governments hostile to the process had three 
issues against PB. The issues included the unsustainability of the single-year-span of PB 
that did not support sustainable development, the curtailment of citywide strategy by the 
parochial interests of the corporations, and the failure of PB to connect the demand for 
state funds with PPP investments (Leubolt et al., 2008; Sintomer et al., 2008). To support 
the state to supplement the scarce resources of government, there was the call for the 
mobilization of private sector investors. While Leubolt et al. saw the focus on large 
projects by PPP initiatives as a drawback, PPP initiatives could assist Ijede to develop 
more rapidly rather than the stagnant outcomes from small projects that have failed to 
improve the immediate locale of the poor. The private sector has always favored long-
term fiscal planning, and if they are to contribute to the government’s development 
strategy, there should be a concurrence of budget tenures between the two partners 
(Schneider & Baquero, 2006). 
Implications for Social Change 
 This study challenged the participants, all of whom were actively engaged in the 
affairs of the community, to introspect on their individual and communal contributions. 
They spoke with enthusiasm and passion about the community. They were optimistic 





their future. The findings under the four research questions addressed how the 
community and the local government could collaborate to make participatory budgeting 
achieve its goals of efficiency in the administration of scarce resources and transparency 
in governance as suggested by Goldfrank (2007), Heller (2012) and Peruzzotti (2012). 
 This study exposed the fragility and volatility of PB in the absence of a legal 
framework institutionalizing the process. The government of Lagos State could consider 
a set of formal rules to protect the sustainability of PB in the state. The framework could 
mandate a minimum percentage of the revenue of local governments be reserved for 
citizen elected projects. The legal mandate has the potential to elevate PB to the 
consciousness of the residents of Lagos State in general. 
The findings of this study also indicate the need for the Ijede LCDA to redesign 
its participatory budgeting process. The redesigning should take account of the active 
presence of the community bases organizations as the advocates of the community. 
The local government currently does not engage in strategic planning (SP). By 
introducing SP, a redesigned PB process would be conducted during the stakeholders’ 
conference of SP. The local government should have the capacity to undertake higher 
impact projects which implementation might span two or more fiscal years without the 
risk of abandonment due to lack of funds or regime change. 
 There is the dearth of training for the civil servants, the citizens, and the NGOs in 
Ijede in areas relevant to PB, negotiations, and community development strategies. Funds 
could be targeted at education and training to be provided by professionals. This 





and civil servants, and it could contribute to the acceleration of development in Ijede 
LCDA.  
The IDF might become a dominant entity in the forefront of change if it takes the 
steps to initiate investor engagement programs. The IDF could negotiate with the Lagos 
State government for businesses and corporations in Ijede and beyond, to contract for 
PPP of high-value projects under build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreements.  
Recommendations   
Although the results of this study might be transferable to other communities in 
Nigeria and elsewhere, the findings indicate the need to research other rural communities 
for local peculiarities of what might be required to strengthen participatory budgeting for 
social and economic development in those communities.  
Participatory budgeting being an extraction of strategic planning ab initio, further 
research could be conducted to understand the effects of funds availability, higher impact 
projects, and project sustainability if PB were attached to the medium-term strategic 
planning of localities. Additionally, this study revealed the fragility of PB in the absence 
of a legal framework to institutionalize the process. Research could be undertaken to 
understand the effect of legal frameworks on the effectiveness and sustainability of PB 
process in selected municipalities in Nigeria and elsewhere. 
Conclusions 
Participatory budgeting is a quintessential example of participatory democracy. It 
is a political institution that has not attracted sufficient interests among the socially 
disadvantaged citizens who stand to benefit the most from being involved in political 





the government in decision making on fiscal planning priorities. With this study, I set out 
to gain further understanding of the role of civil society in educating and empowering the 
citizens of Ijede LCDA to participate effectively in the budgetary decision-making 
process. The foundations of this study anchored on Avritzer’s (2009) theory of 
participatory institutions, and the concept of participatory budgeting. 
In Chapter 2, I used the literature to examine the crucial roles of CSOs. Through 
advocacy, CSOs consolidate efforts of communities, groups, and individuals to highlight 
concerns for the attention of the state and the larger public. Civil society organizations 
have opened up the public sphere to the poor and the voiceless to be part of governance 
and public decision making through participatory democracy (Orji, 2009). As shown in 
the review of literature in Chapter 2, and as with other participatory democratic 
institutions, citizens who participate in PB learn civic activities and responsibilities 
through practice, and by so doing, improve the quality of the electorates (Hamlett & 
Cobb, 2006). Citizens learn to think in terms of collective goals and benefits rather than 
personal gains and selfish agitations. 
This study helped to uncover the understanding of the civil servants, and the 
elected politicians at the Ijede LCDA that there were no NGOs operating in Ijede to 
assume advocacy roles and to prepare the citizens for participation in the PB process. 
However, the study revealed the existence of a number of active NGOs, which were not 
identified as NGOs primarily because their memberships consisted of local residents. 
These NGOs have been responsible for organizing the communities as best they could.  
The results further revealed inadequate institutional design in the legal 





of which have contributed to weakening the PB process in Ijede LCDA. Particularly, 
without a set of formal rules to institutionalize the process, PB is fragile and vulnerable. 
Therefore, this study would have achieved positive social change if Lagos State 
government could establish a broad system of formal rules to protect the process from 
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Appendix A: Study Population Criteria 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Criteria Considerations  Examples 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
Inclusive Elected politicians  Council Chairperson/Counselors  
criteria  Employees of the LCDA Council Manager/Treasurer 
Community residents  Community organizers 
NGOs in the community Active NGOs 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Target  Prior PB experience  Neighborhood assembly 
population     Ward budget forum 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Accessible Civil servants   Employees of the LCDA 
Population Elected politicians  Ward counselors 
  Citizens suggested by  Known prior participants 
  gatekeeper 
  Adults only   Male or female aged over 21 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Criteria for  No prior PB experience Inability to speak/read/write  
exclusion Illiterates   English 
Likelihood of prop-out Unavailability for at least two days 
  Ethical concern  Expectation of reward 
      Quid pro quo 










Appendix B: Individual Interview Protocol for Resident Citizens 





Purpose of interview: As you are aware, the Lagos State government introduced 
participatory budgeting to local governments in the state in 2005. 
After about 10 years of experience with the process, I am 
conducting this research to gain further understanding of the role 
of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede 
LCDA to participate effectively in decision-making processes such 
as in participatory budgeting.  
The information you provide has the potential to influence how 
government arrives at public policy decisions when active 
electorates are involved. As more citizens get involved, your 
information could improve how citizens negotiate opposing 
positions peaceably. 
This interview should last no more than an hour and it will center 
on your personal experience of participatory budgeting and other 








Appendix B: continued 
IQ/RQ/FQ  Interview Questions for Resident Citizens 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
IQ Participatory budgeting is said to be a democratic process that 
provides the opportunity for the electorates to interact with the 
state and through participation, citizens actively engaged in 
decision-making on fiscal planning priorities and in budgetary 
policy formulation. How did you hear about PB? 
IQ  In how many PB sessions have you participated or organized? 
IQ  What roles did you perform during PB process? 
IQ Describe other community groups or activities in which you have 
participated. 
IQ  What do you understand to be the objectives of PB? 
RQ1 Briefly describe your experiences with PB: the organizing, budget 
allocation, project selection and implementation.  
FQ How would you access your contributions to the process? Do you 
believe you made a difference to your community? 
RQ3 How prepared were you to participate in the process? What was 
the nature of the preparation, if any? 
FQ  What, if any, were the rules of participation in PB?   
FQ  What benefits have accrued to the community as a result of PB? 
__________________________________________________________________ 






Appendix C: Individual Interview Protocol for Civil Servants 
 





Purpose of interview: As you are aware, the Lagos State government introduced 
participatory budgeting to local governments in the state in 2005. 
After about 10 years of experience with the process, I am 
conducting this research to gain further understanding of the role 
of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede 
LCDA to participate effectively in decision-making processes such 
as in participatory budgeting.  
The information you provide has the potential to influence how 
government arrives at public policy decisions when active 
electorates are involved. As more citizens get involved, your 
information could improve how citizens negotiate opposing 
positions peaceably. 
This interview should last no more than an hour and it will center 
on your personal experience of participatory budgeting and other 






Appendix C: continued 
 IQ/RQ/FQ  Interview Questions for Civil Servants/Elected Politicians 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
IQ Participatory budgeting is said to be a democratic process that 
provides the opportunity for the electorates to interact with the 
state and through participation, citizens actively engaged in 
decision-making on fiscal planning priorities and in budgetary 
policy formulation. How did you hear about PB? 
FQ In how many PB sessions have you participated or organized? 
RQ3 What roles did you perform during PB process? 
RQ1 Describe in as much detail as you can recall, the process of 
organizing a PB session? Tell me what you perceive the citizens 
expect from PB? 
FQ How successful would you say PB has been in project 
implementation? Why have you been successful or not so 
successful in implementing citizen nominated projects?  
RQ1 What challenges, if any, have you identified that may be facing 
PB? Describe a most difficult moment you recall during the 
process? 
RQ1 What changes have been introduced to the process since you have 
been organizing?  
RQ1 How successful have you been at completing PB-selected projects? 
What factors, if any, might have prevented project completion, if 
projects were not complete?  
FQ In what ways did you influence the process and the decisions on 





Appendix C: continued 
 
    IQ/RQ/FQ  Interview Questions for Civil Servants 
________________________________________________________________________ 
RQ4 Strategic planning has been described as a deliberate, disciplined 
approach to essential decision-making and taking particular actions 
that direct the purpose and the survival strategy of an organization. 
Strategic planning provides the roadmap to organization leaders to 
determine courses of action and to provide the basis for those 
actions for long term planning. Given that strategic planning 
covers three to five years, how do you imagine longer-term 
planning under strategic planning could aid project completion? 
FQ How have you personally benefitted, in terms of information, skills 
and attitudes? 
RQ1  In what ways do you believe the PB process could be improved? 
FQ Are there any other points of observations, information or 
suggestions you would like to share? 
__________________________________________________________________ 





Appendix D: Individual Interview Protocol for NGOs 





Purpose of As you are aware, the Lagos State government introduced 
Interview participatory budgeting to local governments in the state in 2005. 
After about 10 years of experience with the process, I am 
conducting this research to gain further understanding of the role 
of civil society in educating and empowering the citizens of Ijede 
LCDA to participate effectively in decision-making processes such 
as in participatory budgeting.  
The information you provide has the potential to influence how 
government arrives at public policy decisions when active 
electorates are involved. As more citizens get involved, your 
information could improve how citizens negotiate opposing 
positions peaceably. 
This interview should last no more than an hour and it will center 
on your personal experience of participatory budgeting and other 






Appendix D: continued 
IQ/RQ/FQ Interview Questions for Representatives of NGOs 
__________________________________________________________________ 
IQ Participatory budgeting is said to be a democratic process that 
provides the opportunity for the electorates to interact with the 
state and through participation, citizens actively engaged in 
decision-making on fiscal planning priorities and in budgetary 
policy formulation. How did you hear about PB?  
IQ In how many PB sessions have you participated or organized? 
IQ What roles did you perform during PB process? 
RQ3 Describe your NGOs involvement in past PB sessions? 
FQ What expectations, outcomes, or effects do you anticipate for your 
involvement?  
RQ3 What training programs have you had with PB participants?  
RQ3 To what extent would you say the trainings were adequate?  
RQ2 What specific resources, (human, financial and material) do you 
consider necessary to be involved effectively in PB? 
RQ2 What additional resources do you believe are required either from 
the government or from other sources? 
RQ3 How could your advocacy encourage the business community in 
and around the LCDA to provide additional resources (financial, 
materials and expertise) to improve the quality and spread of 
projects approved at PB sessions?  
FQ How have you personally benefitted, in terms of information, skills 
and attitudes?  




Appendix D: continued 
IQ/RQ/FQ Interview Questions for Representatives of NGOs 
__________________________________________________________________ 
 
RQ3 Describe how you have interacted with government officials and the 
business community before, during, and after PB sessions? 
 
FQ Are there any other points of observations, information or suggestions you 
would like to share? 
__________________________________________________________________ 




Appendix E: Focus Group Interview Protocol 
 




















Official Title/Interest group 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Purpose of interview: This is a follow up session to the individual interviews you 
each had with me. This interview is to provide the 
opportunity to confer with others who have had 
participatory budgeting experiences and to reflect on what 
your particular experiences mean since your participation.  
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
RQ1 Considering how PB is currently designed in Ijede, what aspects of 





Appendix E: continued 
RQ1 How would you extend the benefits of your PB experiences to 
other areas in the community? 
 RQ/FQ  Interview Questions for Focus Groups 
 
RQ2 NGOs are to assist the citizens to navigate the process and 
negotiate resources with the government. What specific skills are 
required but not yet acquired by different stakeholder groups 
involved in PB? In what ways can NGOs empower citizens to 
improve participation? 
RQ1 During the one-on-one interviews, some of you identified certain 
challenges that might prevent the community from benefiting the 
most out of PB. These include... In what ways could the 
community overcome these barriers? 
RQ3 What administrative and legal supports do civil society 
organizations need in order to support PB in Ijede LCDA?  
RQ3 Describe the type of support the business community in and around 
Ijede LCDA could provide in support of PB  
RQ4 The idea of incorporating PB within the frame of strategic planning 
was suggested and discussed during the one-on-one interviews 
with politicians, civil servants and NGOs. Let us discuss the 
viability of the idea and how it could ensure longer-term planning 
to ensure sustainability of citizen-selected projects. 
FQ Are there any other observations you have that might help 
improved the PB process?  




Appendix F: Document Review Protocol 
Step 1:  
Make a list of documents and likely information required from the documents. Consider 
sourcing documents from other sources, for example, state government, for inclusion. 
Step 2:  
Develop a list of relevant attributes in existing record such as date, time, source, authors, 
and authorizations. 
Step 3: 
For each item of required information that could potentially be found in an existing 
document, determine alternative sources for same information and the location of those 
other sources. Consider accessing the alternative sources. 
Step 4: 
Develop a document review checklist that can be systematically used by any other 
reviewer to ensure consistency of information to be collected, analyzed, and coded. 
Include document title, file reference, storage location, and custodian. 
Step 5: 
Complete the protocol checklist to verify that all useful information has been extracted 
and documented. 
Step 6: 
Document the findings of the reviews noting contradictory information, inconsistent 





Appendix G: continued 
Note where documents indicate the existence of other documents that might be relevant 
or corroborative.  
Step 7: 





Appendix G: Coding Protocol 
Step 1 
Transcribe recorded interview, field notes, and public documents; 
Step 2: 
Format data for coding in Microsoft Word; 
Step 3: 
Copy formatted data to Atlas.ti; 
Step 4: 
Level 1 coding: Initial coding and open coding begin with key words or phrases from 
literature, theoretic framework and conceptual framework 
Level 2 coding: Review codes in Level 1 and develop categories 
Level 3 coding: Study codes categorization from Level 2 and refine codes categorization 
to develop themes. 
Level 4 coding: Develop theoretical concepts emerging from categories and themes and 
organize possible answers to research questions. 
 
